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ABSTRACT

Do existing measures of state fragility measure fragility accurately? Based on commonly
used fragility measures, South Africa (SA) is classified as a relatively stable state, yet
rising violent crime, high unemployment, endemic poverty, eroding public trust, identity
group based preferential treatment policies, and the rapid rise of the private security
sector are all indications that SA may be suffering from latent state fragility. Based on a
comprehensive view of security, this study examines the extent to which measures of
political legitimacy and good governance, effectiveness in the security system –
especially with respect to the police system – and mounting economic challenges may be
undermining the stability of SA in ways undetected by commonly used measures of state
fragility. Using a mixed-methods approach based on quantitative secondary data analysis
and semi-structured interviews with government officials, security practitioners, and
leading experts in the field, this study finds that the combination of colonization,
apartheid, liberation struggle, transition from autocracy to democracy, high levels of
direct and structural violence, stagnating social, political, and economic developments
make South Africa a latently fragile state. Conceptually, the results of this research call
into question the validity of commonly used measures of state fragility and suggest the
need for a more comprehensive approach to assessing state fragility. Practically, this
study offers a number of concrete policy recommendations for how South Africa may
address mounting levels of latent state fragility.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There is a hierarchy of political goods. None is as critical as the supply of
security, especially human security. Individuals alone – almost exclusively
in special or particular circumstances – can attempt to secure themselves,
or groups of individuals can band together to organize and purchase goods
or services that maximize their sense of security. But usually, individuals
and groups cannot easily nor effectively substitute private security for the
full spectrum of public security. One only has to look at the collapse of the
SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation], SAA [South African
Airways] and municipalities, and the strike violence that is allowed to
continue unabated, to see that any of the above definitions apply to SA
(Carpenter, 2012, p.1).
If we don‘t change the way we are governed, this country will end up in a
bad way. Five more years of corruption and undermining of our
institutions of our democracy will make our country a failing state
(Ramphele, 2013, p.1).

After many years of civil strife, South Africans negotiated a peaceful settlement
amongst themselves, which led to the first-ever democratic elections in 1994. Nelson
Mandela became the first president of a democratic South Africa (SA), and the young
democracy began to address the vestiges of apartheid in an effort to build a new nation,
notwithstanding the many challenges in the wake of the apartheid-era (Mandela, 1994;
Sampson, 2000).
In the afterglow of the hugely successful political settlement of 1994, and the
hosting of the Soccer World Cup in 2010, SA was heralded as a great democracy
1

underscored by the widely used State Fragility Index (SFI), which indicates that the
South African state has moved from moderate to low fragility. When SA won the hosting
of the Soccer World Cup, a concerted effort was made to contain crime. A combined
effort by the security forces and the criminal justice system, in collaboration with the
private security industry, had a positive impact on reducing crime levels in the country
leading up to and during the hosting of the event. All of these accolades point to SA
becoming a stable and peaceful democracy.
Despite all these well documented improvements, corruption is endemic, the
unemployment and poverty rates are undeniably high, violent crime is unacceptably high,
huge social disparities remain,1 while affirmative action and black economic
empowerment remain official government policies. High crime rates, especially violent
crime rates, are referred to as ―direct violence.‖ ―Structural violence‖ is a term coined by
Johann Galtung (1969) that refers to a type of violence where some social structure, or
social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs.
Examples in the case of SA are high unemployment and poverty, endemic corruption,
sub-par government leadership, and ethnicity based preferential treatment as applied
through affirmative action and black economic empowerment (BEE) policies. The
structural violence that existed in SA under apartheid manifested itself through the racial
legislation, which was vigorously applied through the criminal justice system. SA
remained a rather violent democracy during the 1990‘s up to today. Since the 2010
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SA‘s Gini coefficient of 0.7 makes it one of the most unequal societies in the world. The closer the
coefficient is to 1, the higher the inequality. This inequality is present throughout society and within each
population group (SAIRR, 2012).
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Soccer World Cup, notwithstanding a huge increase in police numbers and the police
budget, violent crime is on the increase again, and the levels of other crime categories
remain high.
At the same time, the private security industry has grown to become the largest in
the world, and the South African Government (SAG) has outsourced some of its core
security functions to the private security industry.2 This observation leads to a number of
questions: why have the crime levels remained so high, with violent crime increasing,
corruption, unemployment and poverty rates as high as they are, and a widening social
disparity between those who have the means with which to live a reasonably good life
(haves) and those who cannot meet basic needs (have nots)? Although apartheid has been
overcome politically, indications are that it may still persist socially. For instance, why
has the ruling African National Congress (ANC) not been able to deliver on its promises
to improve the well-being of all South Africans? Is the SAG able and capable of
effectively addressing these challenges? Are current violent crime rates and governmental
and societal challenges a sign of latent fragility, suggesting that SA is moving toward
unrest or even a ―failed state‖ status?3 To what extent do private security companies
(PSCs) contribute to or undermine the overall effectiveness and legitimacy of the SAG?4

2

The growth is measured as a percentage of GDP.
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The term latent state fragility is used by Michailof (2013) in a different context.

4

PSCs are defined as legally registered local or international private companies that offer security services
on a contractual basis in a variety of capacities such as armed security services, security-related advice and
training, intelligence-gathering services, and securing fixed assets.

3

If the rise in PSCs even inadvertently contributes to latent state fragility, whatever
achievements have been accomplished over the past 20 years may be at risk. These
difficulties may result in significant security system challenges. Examples include unmet
promises of job creation, quality and pace of basic local government service delivery, and
in metro areas, the provision of proper housing (SAIRR, 2012).5
This research examines the extent to which SA exemplifies latent state fragility. I
define the term latent state fragility, within the context of governmental capacity, when
traditional indicators of state fragility show a country to have moderate to low fragility,
while it experiences high violent crime; social disparities; endemic corruption; high
unemployment and poverty rates; and poor service delivery, especially with regards to
the provision of security to its population. I call these the ―non-traditional indicators‖ of
state fragility.
The challenges facing the SAG juxtaposed against the lowering fragility levels
highlight SA‘s paradox. On the one hand the SFI shows that SA has very moderate to low
fragility, while on the other hand the country faces the many serious challenges to
personal, community, political, and economic security. All of these broader security
measures are also measures of fragility or stability, but they go beyond the SFIs‘
measures. The SFI measures take into account security, political, economic, and social
effectiveness and legitimacy scores. However, the SFI does not take into account
extended human security measures, like unemployment and poverty rates, corruption,

5

The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR)‘s Unit for Risk Analysis is regarded as one of
SA‘s premier research organizations designed to inform business, government, and diplomatic leaders
about risks likely to emerge on SA‘s social, economic, and political horizon.
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government leadership, crime rates, and identity-based preferential treatment policies.
These are important measures of structural violence that affect the potential for conflict in
a state. This study shows that the SFI measures are not comprehensive enough.
Societal-Systems Research, Inc., a private research enterprise, produces the
information resources that form the foundation of the Center for Systemic Peace, which
produces the SFI (Center for Systemic Peace, 2014). The Center was founded in 1997
and engages in global systems analysis with a research focus on the problem of political
violence by systematically analyzing the dynamic relationship between criminal activity,
racial and political inclusivity, and the regime‘s overall stability across time. In so doing,
the SFI relies exclusively on state-aggregated data and ignores personal, community, and
economic security and individual perceptions of security.
To address some of these shortfalls, this study identifies the most serious
challenges to personal, community, political, and economic security under the existing
conditions in SA, in an effort to assess whether existing measures of state fragility may
ignore important factors measuring fragility. This question is at the heart of this research
and will guide my analysis.
The increase in the numbers of PSCs should be seen against the backdrop of the
many challenges that face the South African security system, particularly the South
African Police Service (SAPS), and the growing lack of trust of the general public in its
ability to maintain safety against crime and corruption. The increase in numbers of PSCs
may also be attributable to the SAG outsourcing some of its security system functions out
of necessity, where the state does not have the level of expertise necessary to provide
effective security services.
5

In SA, PSCs secure, among others, fixed assets such as commercial and
government buildings, provide residential security, function as armed response units,
provide crime laboratory and forensic services, and gather intelligence. Moreover, given
that some of the aforementioned functions traditionally assumed by the state are now
provided by the private sector, one might ask about accountability and legitimacy of the
state, and if outsourcing leads to a form of fragility not measured by any of the standard
state fragility measures. This study examines this type of latent fragility in more detail. It
is SA‘s strategic role as a key economic and military force in Africa, and therefore a vital
contributor for stability that makes this study a noteworthy contributor to government
policy (re)formulation in an effort to address the many challenges it faces.

Provision of Security
Preliminary findings in the case of several fragile states show that the deficiency
gap in the security system is often filled by PSCs, as the state is no longer capable of
performing necessary security functions for its population (Carmola, 2010). Between
2001 and 2011, the number of PSCs has increased by more than 60% (PSIRA, 2012), and
the SAG is now even outsourcing forensics and crime intelligence functions (Barlow,
personal communication, April 25, 2013; Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013).
Good governance can only be established when a state at least has a legitimate,
accountable, and politically controlled security system with good oversight mechanisms
(Jackson, 2012). Good governance includes not just political institutions, but norms and
patterns of interaction among the people - governed and governors - and effective socioeconomic systems (Dorff, 2007). Conversely, a good governance deficit (GGD) exists
6

when a state lacks, among others, the capacity and capability to offer its population basic
security services. The provision of safety and security is one of many core responsibilities
of the state, and the security system is comprised of several actors and institutions
involved in the provision of security. Max Weber (1965) highlights the connection
between justice, power, community, and security that is the essence of the role of the
state. The security system is central to the stability of a state, the rule of law, and good
governance, but a deficiency in the security system can hold perilous consequences for
the state, such as reduced stability, the breakdown in the rule of law, and bad governance.
Today, SA suffers daily from so-called service delivery strikes and reports of
direct and structural violence, and questionable leadership in the police appear in the
media regularly. Violent crime has increased over the past year, while there are numerous
reports of court dockets that go missing (Burger, personal communication, May 28, 2013;
Kohler-Barnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013), and decreasing public trust in
the SAPS leadership. In the meanwhile, SA has developed the largest private security
industry in the world, partly in reaction to the high levels of crime, especially violent
crime, alleged police ineptitude, and partly for business opportunism. On the one hand,
PSCs can be seen as an asset because they perform a complementary role by helping to
develop and maintain the state‘s security system and are transparent in their operations.
On the other hand, PSCs are considered to be a liability by the recipient state. If a
state is supposed to have a monopoly on the use of force, yet it has allowed the growth of
the private security industry to start taking on security functions that the state ought to be
providing, the state has then lost its monopoly on the use of force and may become less
stable. On the contrary, if a state is already in a stage of fragility, the private security
7

industry may become a stabilizing factor. The private security industry in SA has
assumed functions that the state ought to be providing to its population. Today, SA has
almost 9,000 registered and active PSCs offering services ranging from security to
industrial and commercial clients, cash-in-transit, training, body guarding, and armed
reaction services to security control room, security consultancy, and special events. This
growth continues to increase in SA and may have reached the stage where it could pose a
threat to the stability of the country. In fact, the size and spread of the private security
industry may be a predictor of latent state fragility.

Global Security Assemblages
Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) foresee that the privatization of security is
inevitable and that this trend cannot be stopped with the world becoming a global village.
However, this finding presupposes that the privatization of security takes place from a
government‘s position of strength and not from a position of weakness to control the
security situation inside the country. A stable, legitimate state conducting good
governance is regarded as a sound, strong state. There are occasions when such a state
may choose to outsource certain security functions to the private security industry for
reasons of economic efficiency. However, a state with a GGD may contract the services
of PSCs (insource as opposed to outsource) to fill the void in the security services it has
to offer.
Security privatization could be seen within the context of globalization where
traditional relationships between public and private power and authority are being
transformed (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009). In their research, Abrahamsen and
8

Williams show a ―range of different global and local, public and private security
agents…interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms
of security governance‖ (p. 3). Part of my analysis sheds light on whether the SAG
outsources to the private security industry out of strength (efficiency) for economic
reasons, or because of weakness (ineffectiveness) in governance, since they are incapable
of providing adequate security to protect the population.
PSCs are often seen to be part of ―complex security networks‖ consisting of
private and public, and global and local actors that transcend national boundaries
(Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p. 6). It is interesting to note that the World Trade
Organization often ―includes private security in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, thus providing a strong incentive for member states to allow free and fair
competition in security services‖ (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p.5). Abrahamsen and
Williams acknowledge that in a weak state the proliferation of private security may be an
indication of state weakness, but could be a reflection of their empowerment of the state
through the ―shifts in governance‖ (2009, p. 6). In the case of SA, the high violent crime
rate, high level of corruption, governance deficit in its security system, and consistently
high unemployment rates are additional factors whose impact are considered in this
study.
In summary, SA is regarded as a stable state by the SFI, yet there are measures of
latent state fragility that it does not take into consideration. At the same time, SA has the
largest private security industry in the world, and indications are that it is growing. These
developments prompt the question whether the prevalence of PSCs is an indicator of
growing fragility or of enhancing stability? This research offers new insights into a
9

theory of latent state fragility. Moreover, this study intends to show that the human
security components of personal, community, economic, and political security have to be
considered as integral components of determining the level of fragility. This study offers
policy recommendations to the SAG in an effort to assist policymakers in determining the
best way forward to address the apparent waning governmental capacity of the SAG, and
SA‘s potential slide into fragility. The aforementioned challenges facing the SAG
juxtaposed against the lowering fragility levels highlight the dilemma facing SA and has
become SA‘s paradox.

Organization of the Study
This study is organized into eight chapters that present the backdrop to one of the
core roles of the state as the major provider of security to its population, and the everincreasing role of the private security industry in a state that is becoming increasingly
fragile. In chapter 2, I develop a theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis
done in chapters 5-7 to help determine the extent to which the security system correlates
with good governance and state fragility. In particular, I draw on literature discussing
human security, the state, the security system, and outsourcing security system functions
to formulate the concept of latent state fragility in SA.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the current security challenges in SA and
offers a historical account of how the apartheid system evolved and how the new SA
emerged after the 1994 elections. Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology used for
this study with a description of the main research question and hypotheses,

10

operationalization of concepts, sampling and data collection methods, and some of the
main limitations in my study.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present the results of my data analyses based on 45
interviews with high level former and current security and government experts,6 review
of official government, parliamentary, and other public documents, and statistics obtained
from the World Bank, think-tanks, and the SAG. In chapter 5, I provide an analysis of
human security in SA that focuses on personal, community, economic, and political
security, and the overall effectiveness of the security system. The data indicate that SA
has serious social, security, and structural challenges, which do not help to inspire
confidence in the country‘s future.
In chapter 6, I examine SA‘s security context with specific focus on the security
system deficits and the effects of outsourcing of security functions on the overall
provision of security. The opinions expressed by my interviewees range from opposition
to outsourcing to PSCs, to outsourcing even the core functions, such as intelligence under
the present conditions of endemic corruption, lack of efficiency and capacity, sub-par
leadership, and lack of public trust in the security system.
In chapter 7, I examine good governance in SA by analyzing political
effectiveness and good governance and how that is correlated with the effectiveness of

6

In my efforts to approach high profile government and other leaders, unfortunately a number of agreed
appointments were cancelled, and others did not materialize. Interviewees consisted of two former heads of
national intelligence, four former cabinet ministers, a former police commissioner, former ANC liberation
operatives, a high court judge, current government representatives, academics, researchers, private security
sector actors, and Parliamentarians across the political divide.
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the security system. It is apparent that the middle-to-upper-class (the haves) no longer
relies on the state for the provision of security and has turned to PSCs to provide that
service. Consequently, the state has become the primary provider of security for the poor
(the have nots).
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and their relevance to the concept of latent
state fragility. In addition, the chapter develops a number of concrete policy
recommendations for the SAG intended to assist policymakers in addressing erosions in
public trust and government legitimacy, and providing comprehensive security for South
Africans of all ethnicities/races, economic standing, and political orientation.

12

CHAPTER 2
GOVERNANCE AND STATE FRAGILITY – A SECURITY SYSTEM
CORRELATION

How do governance and state fragility correlate with the state‘s security system?
More precisely, does state fragility presuppose a deficient security system or does an
effective security system help establish a stable state? In an attempt to address these
questions, I consider that after the Cold War, most conflicts in the world have occurred
within states and not between states, and that the focus of security has shifted to the
individual and the community. First, in an attempt to answer whether measures of state
fragility really measure fragility, I use the human security framework by focusing on the
differences between a state-centered and a human-centered approach to security, by
comparing two schools of thought concerning the concept of human security, i.e. narrow
and broad and focusing on the broad school.
Second, I look at the role that good governance, legitimate governance, and GGD
play in the stability and the ability of the state to provide for the security of its citizens. In
this study, I argue that a stable state should be able to provide for the security needs of its
population, especially in the areas of personal, community, economic, and political
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security, through its agencies, such as the police, home affairs, defense, judiciary,
intelligence, and penal system.
Third, the term security in this study is used holistically and goes beyond
individual services and therefore the study refers to the security system. Specifically, I am
interested in understanding the relationship between the security system and state
stability and focus on the security system functional space, where the security system
actors interact with one another.
Last, to understand the role that the outsourcing of security functions play in the
stability of the state, I focus on the advantages and shortfalls of the outsourcing of
security functions. There may be sound economic reasons for the state to outsource
security functions, in which case it could contribute to stability, which is an advantage.
However, the state should consider which security functions are core and decide which of
those, if any, should be outsourced. Loss of expertise and institutional memory could be
the result of outsourcing core security functions such as police, intelligence, and customs
(border control). Furthermore, outsourcing to PSCs assumes effective management,
transparency, and accountability of the PSCs. When this is not present, the state loses
control over the activities of PSCs. When a state outsources from a position of weakness
because it has lost the capacity and capability of offering its population effective security,
this study refers to such outsourcing as insourcing. Insourcing assumes that the state
cannot offer these services without the assistance of the private security industry. Such
insourcing could contribute to stability and may be indicative of latent state fragility.
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HUMAN SECURITY

As the Cold War came to an end, conflicts were no longer primarily between
countries but within countries (European Union, 2003). The security discourse shifted
from the narrow interpretation of security as security of territory from external
aggression, protection of national interests in foreign policy, or global security from the
threat of a nuclear holocaust, to human security (UNDP, 1994). During the Cold War,
legitimate concerns of ordinary citizens who sought security in their daily lives were
largely ignored (UNDP, 1994). Ordinary citizens sought protection against threats from
crime, political repression, unemployment, disease, hunger, social conflict, and
environmental hazards (UNDP, 1994).
Human security can be said to have two main aspects (a) safety from chronic
threats such as hunger, disease, and repression; (b) protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions in the patterns of daily life caused by violent and aggressive behavior,
including structural violence, and non-state (societal) behavior. Examples of direct
violence are death through crime, drug abuse, dehumanization, and discrimination.
Examples of structural violence are deprivation, rampant preventable/treatable disease,
poor response to natural disasters, underdevelopment, poverty, inequality, and population
displacement as these harm people indirectly (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). These threats can be
universal irrespective of the social standing and wealth or poverty of the individual
(Booth, 2007; Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998; UNDP, 1994). In the end, human
security is not a concern with weapons, but a concern with human life and dignity
(UNDP, 1994). Human security is about enabling people to exercise choices freely and
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safely, and guaranteeing that the opportunities brought today by development will not be
lost tomorrow (UNDP, 1994). It is about freedom from fear, freedom from want, and life
of dignity. The Human Development Report (HDR) asserts that ―human security is more
easily identified through its absence than its presence‖ (UNDP, 1994, p. 23). Table 2.1
illustrates the differences between a state-centered and a human-centered approach to
security.7

Table 2.1
State-Centered and Human-Centered Approach to Security

State-Centered Security
(a neorealist vision)

Security Referent
(object)

Security Value

7

In a Hobbesian world, the
state is the primary provider
of security: if the state is
secure, then those who live
within it are secure.

Human-Centered
Security
Individuals are coequal with the state.
State security is the
means, not the end.

Personal safety, wellbeing and individual
Sovereignty, power, territorial freedom.
integrity, national
1) Physical safety and
independence
provision for basic
needs
2) Personal freedom
(liberty of association)
3) Human rights;
economic and social
rights

See also Booth (2007); and Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde (1998).
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Security Threats

By what means

Direct organized violence
from other states, violence
and coercion by other states

Retaliatory force or threat of
its use, balance of power,
military means, strengthening
of economic might, little
attention paid to respect for
law or institutions.
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Direct and indirect
violence, from
identifiable
sources (such as states
or non-state actors) or
from structural
sources (relations of
power ranging from
family to the global
economy)
• Direct violence:
death, drug abuse,
dehumanization,
discrimination,
international disputes,
weapons of mass
destruction
• Indirect violence:
deprivation, disease,
poor response to
natural disasters,
underdevelopment,
population
displacement,
environmental
degradation, poverty,
inequality
Promoting human
development: basic
needs plus equality,
sustainability, and
greater
democratization and
participation at all
levels. Promoting
political development:
global norms and
institutions plus
collective use of force
as well as sanctions if
and when necessary,
cooperation between
states, reliance on
international

institutions, networks
and coalitions, and
international
organizations.

Source: Tadjbakhsh (2005)

Table 2.1 shows that human security is ―juxtaposed with state-centered models of
security by proposing people-centered answers to the questions of whose security (that of
people in addition to states), security from what (from non-traditional sources, direct and
indirect sources of violence, including structural violence) and security by what means
(through development and human rights intervention, in addition to policing and
military)‖ (Booth, 2007; Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998; Tadjbakhsh, 2005, p. 1;
UNDP, 2008).
The HDR of 1994 focuses on the security of people rather than security of the
state and sets the stage for the human security discourse (UNDP, 1994). Human security
offers a ―link between the concept of security and human beings‖ (Goetschel, 2004, p.
26). The referent object of security shifts from the state to the individual (Buzan et al.,
1998). The motivation behind placing an emphasis on human security was to ―capture the
so-called peace dividend‖ and to re-direct ―resources devoted to the military through the
Cold War to more productive ends‖ (Krause, 2002, p. 2). Debiel and Franke (2008) assert
that the protection of the individual as opposed to the state is the focal point of this
discourse.
According to the HDR, human security is a universal problem and relevant to rich
and poor with threats such as crime, drugs, disease, unemployment, pollution, and human
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rights violations common to everyone. The components, such as famine, pollution,
terrorism, drug-trafficking, ethnic disputes, and social disintegration are interdependent;
hence it is ―easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention‖ (UNDP,
1994, p.22). Human security is people-centered – how they live and breathe, how freely
they exercise their choices, how much access they have to market and social
opportunities (UNDP, 1994). There are three schools of thought concerning the concept
of human security, i.e. narrow, broad, and European, which is a combination of the first
two (Krause, 2002; Werthes, Heaven, & Vollnhals, 2011). In this study, I use only the
broad school as it uses a holistic approach concerning human development in general.
Hereby, I briefly discuss the narrow school before discussing the broad school in more
detail.

Narrow School
This school of thought was developed in Canada in 1999 and associates with the
Human Security Network, a grouping of states, among which SA is a participant
observer, whose goal is to establish common policies on human security (Krause, 2002).
Proponents of this school argue for the ―inclusion of violence into traditional security
thinking and point to the normative success of violence-based human security initiatives‖
(Owen, 2004, p. 375). Proponents argue that realism failed to recognize that the state
could be the aggressor as well as not explaining that more than 90% of all warfare is
intra-state and not interstate (Owen, 2004). This school argues that the concept of human
security is defined by the ―threat of political violence to people by the state, or any other
organized political entity‖ (Werthes et al., 2011, p. 10). This definition of human security
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is linked to the concept of freedom from fear, where the use of, or threat of force and
direct violence is removed from the everyday lives of people (Krause, 2002). The rich
seek security from the threat of crime and drug wars in their streets, the fear of losing
their jobs, HIV/AIDS, rising levels of pollution, and soil degradation, while the poor seek
security from the threat of hunger, disease, and poverty, in addition to the fears that the
rich experience (UNDP, 1994). During the founding years of the United Nations (UN),
the American Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, reported to his government that ―no
provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make
the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their
jobs‖ (UNDP, 1994, p. 24).

Broad School
This school of thought was led by a Japanese initiative, which drew from the
HDR that human security should mean more than a concern about a threat of direct
violence; it should also be about freedom from want, including components of structural
violence. In other words, it should be about ―ensuring basic human needs in economic,
health, food, social, and environmental terms‖ (Krause, 2002, p. 3). Burton‘s (1990)
human needs theory operates on the assumption that denial of fundamental human needs
is the underlying root of war, and that resolution of any conflict requires meeting those
needs for all parties. Burton (1990) suggested that the needs are ontological consequences
of human nature, which are both universal and will be pursued by all people regardless of
the potential consequences. There is a link between frustration and basic needs for
identity, security, recognition, autonomy, dignity, and bonding (Burton, 1990). Basic
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needs such as security, communal recognition, and distributive justice are regarded as
innate and therefore non-negotiable (Azar, 1990, pp. 2, 74). Azar (1990) emphasized the
fact that these needs are expressed around religious, cultural, or ethnic communal identity
(pp. 7, 40, 42, 74).
In Maslow‘s well-known hierarchy of needs, ―basic physiological and safety
(security) needs take precedence over higher order needs, such as recognition, respect,
affirmation, and self-actualization‖ (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2006, p. 81). Burton
(1984) has suggested that the ―intensity of many international disputes reflects deep
underlying needs for security, protection of ethnic and national identity, and other such
fundamental needs‖ (Lewicki et al., 2006, p. 81). Clearly, all the aforementioned authors
include a broad conception of security as a priority human need.
Baldwin (1997) argues that absolute security is unattainable simply because of the
unpredictable way people behave when they make choices to expose themselves to risks
in pursuit of adventure, food, and water. He asserts that states have to prioritize and ―do
not allocate all their resources in pursuit of security, since they have to set aside resources
for providing food, clothing and shelter to their population‖ (Baldwin, 1997, p. 19).
Therefore, security competes with other goals for scarce resources. Waltz (1979)
observes, ―in anarchy, security is the highest end‖ and ―only if survival is assured can
states seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power‖ (p.126). Considering the
aforementioned points of view on security leads to the question: what is security?
Wolfers (1962) argues, ―security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats
to acquired values; in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be
attacked‖ (p.150). This definition begs the questions whose values and which values are
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being threatened by what or by whom and by which means (Möller, 2009). As the state
clearly plays a pivotal role in the provision-of-security debate, this study explores the
security functions of the state in the context of the human security debate as performed
by the security system, and the impact that good governance has on the functionality of
the security system.
The broad approach is a more holistic approach concerned with human
development in general more than strictly with security. In terms of this school, human
security means putting people first and adopting an approach to security that focuses on
the relationship between states and their citizens and no longer viewing the security of the
state in terms of economic, political, and social well-being of the citizens. Issues to be
addressed in addition to situations of conflict are fair trade, access to healthcare, and
access to education. As a supporter of the narrow school, Krause (2002) posits that the
broad vision of human security is nothing more than a shopping list and includes just
about anything that could be considered a threat to the well-being of people. If this is so,
the concept loses its utility to policy-makers and analysts, since it ―obscures what is
distinctive about the idea of security and how it is inextricably tied up with conflict and
existential threats, and the use of violence‖ (Krause, 2002, p. 3). The broad school may
fall into the trap, which Deudney (1990) describes as ―if everything that causes a decline
in human well-being is labeled a ‗security‘ threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness
and becomes a loose synonym of ‗bad‘‖ (pp. 463, 464). Such labeling is termed
securitization.
The main argument of securitization theory is that ―by labeling something a
security issue it becomes one‖ and that something then is being done about the matter
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(Waever & Buzan, 2004, p.13). Securitization is a process whereby the state conflates the
wide field of the economy, food, health, environment, and society with questions of
security, which overlap with borderlines that become blurred (Rampp, 2012). By stating
that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a
right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object‘s survival. The issue is then
moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it
can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of
policy-making by the power holders. Security is ―not conceptualized as a real world
subject-matter,‖ but rather its premise is that issues are made subject to security (Rampp,
2012, p. 78). For security, this means that it no longer has any given (pre-existing)
meaning, but that it can be anything a securitizing actor says it is (Franke, 2002). The
danger resulting from over-securitization is the ―propensity to treat traditional policy
issues as existential threats to security, and demonstrate the need to more clearly define
the distinction between non-existential and existential threats that justify extraordinary
measures‖ (Franke, 2002, p. 2). For the securitizing act to be successful, it must be
accepted by the audience. Securitization studies aim to understand "who securitizes, on
what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least,
under what conditions" (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 32). If a subject is
successfully securitized, it is possible to legitimize extraordinary means to solve an
impending or perceived threat (Franke, 2002). This could include declaring a state of
emergency or martial law, mobilizing the military, or attacking another country. Poverty
and disease have become pressing human security concerns that have caused untold
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suffering in the developing world (European Union, 2003). It is possible to legitimize
extraordinary means to solve these threats to human security.

Human Security Components
Human security is not a defensive concept but an integrative one,8 which
acknowledges the universalism of life claims as mentioned above, and is based on the
solidarity among people and can happen when there is consensus that development must
involve all people (UNDP, 1994). Based on the HDR first released in 1994, there are
seven components that make up human security of which this study uses four (personal,
community, economic, and political) in order to measure components of structural
violence.9 This list summarizes a range of security threats from physical violence to
human dignity that are relevant to this research study. This study does not include
environmental, food, and health-care security as these have not manifested as pressing
security threats relative to the four that are used in this study. However, personal and
community security is threatened where a state has high violent crime rates. Political
security is threatened when a state experiences high levels of corruption and abuse of
power. Economic security is threatened when a state has high levels of unemployment
and poverty rates.

8

Human security should be available to everyone, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or social
class.
9

The remaining three components of human security identified by the 1994 HDR are health, food, and
environmental security. For a description see UNDP (1994).
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Personal and Community Security
Personal and community security components are combined because the linkage
between the two is high given the fact that ―violation of physical integrity also impacts on
community trust and levels of behavior in communities‖ (Werthes et al., 2011, p.18). A
large number of violent acts have a ―negative impact on social cohesion,‖ irrespective of
whether it is committed by state or non-state actors (Werthes et al., 2011, p.18). Personal
security concentrates on the basic threats caused by physical violence irrespective of
whether it is from states, groups, or individual persons (Werthes et al., 2011). These
threats from physical violence may come from the state (physical torture), other states
(war), other groups of people (ethnic conflicts), individuals (crime, including rape or
domestic violence against women), and threats to self through drugs and suicide (UNDP,
1994, p. 30). Community security focuses on protecting people from their loss of
traditional practices and membership of certain groups, for example, ―family, community,
organization, racial or ethnic group from which people derive cultural identity‖ (UNDP,
1994, p. 31 [f]).

Political Security
One of the most important aspects of human security is political security, focusing
on the protection of basic human rights (UNDP, 1994). Human rights‘ violations may
―especially originate during times of political unrest, but also from political repression by
the state‖ (UNDP, 1994, p. 22[f]). Freedom of the press is one of the most essential rights
and ―highly indicative for this dimension of human security‖ (Werthes et al., 2011, p.24).
Werthes et al. (2011) disclose the conceptual connection between development and
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security, in that human security is a precondition for human development and not vice
versa. Martin and Owen (2010) argue that ―people must first be secure from critical and
pervasive threats to their vital core, whatever the cause, before the mechanisms of
development can take root‖ (p. 222). If human development is about people and
expanding their choices ―to lead lives they value, human security recognizes the
conditions that menace survival, the continuation of daily life and the dignity of human
beings‖ (UNDP, 2008). One of the main sources of threat to people‘s security
―undoubtedly comes from the state‖ in the form of corrupt police and judges, and violent
and unruly gangs of ex-combatants from predatory rulers (Krause, 2002, p. 6).
Sovereign states have responsibilities and fiduciary duties, which encompass the
whole spectrum of the human rights, human security, and human development discourse
(Werthes et al., 2011). Evans (2008) is the author of the doctrine called ―responsibility to
protect‖ (R2P) and the lead architect of the original report to the UN in 2001. According
to this doctrine, it is the state‘s responsibility to protect its citizens from genocide, crimes
against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes (Evans, 2008). Evans (2008) stresses
that military action should be the last resort when deciding on the measures to take to act
against a state that has failed its citizens in the aforementioned areas. Promoting human
security is about states keeping their side of the social contract because they are created
to provide security, among other things, so that individuals may pursue their lives in
peace (Krause, 2002). Today, human security has manifested itself as an integral part of
the security discourse (Werthes et al., 2011). A failed state traditionally is considered a
threat to regional security. A weak or failing state is essentially one that cannot deliver on
its end of the social contract within its own borders (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). The strength or
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weakness of a state is therefore to be determined not only on the basis of its capacity to
resolve problems that threaten its security in terms of, for example, armed insurgency or
ethnic strife, but also on the basis of its capacity to pre-empt threats to the health, welfare,
and life expectancy of its citizens (Tadjbakhsh, 2005).

Economic Security
The main threats to economic security are persistent poverty and unemployment.
Since most insecure jobs are in the informal sector, which is prevalent in the majority of
developing countries, there is no social insurance or net for people working in the
informal sector (Canagarajah & Sethuraman, 2001). Unemployment and underemployment are indicative threats to economic security and both can be somewhat
addressed by an existing social safety program as provided by either the state or the
private sector, or a combination of the two (Werthes et al., 2011). However, care should
be taken not to make too many citizens dependent on social grant programs that may
become unsustainable. A critical aspect of economic security is citizens having equal
access to the economy regardless of their ―social background, religion, ethnicity, and
gender‖ (Werthes, et al., 2011, p. 19). In a study conducted at Oxford University,
researchers concluded that unequal access to socio-economic opportunities, resources, or
power sharing could lead to deep-rooted conflict, ―especially when the inequalities
existed in an environment in which group identity provided an emotionally charged
context often based on historical factors‖ (Tadjbakhsh, 2005, p. 32) Moreover, it is not
the existence of inequalities that triggers violence, but a collective feeling of unfairness
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based on the perception of an unfair distribution of benefits among the various groups
(Tadjbakhsh, 2005).
Although the concept of human security has been widely used in theory as well as
policy discussions over the past two decades, it has also been criticized for conceptual
weaknesses and lack of a clear definition. The broad conception of human security
including all seven components encompasses just about everything that threatens the
individual and ―is so vague that it verges on meaninglessness‖ (Paris, 2001; see also
Franke, 2002). To avoid this criticism and to use a wider conception of human security
that allows for the measurement of components of structural violence, this study focuses
on specifics of the aforementioned components such as identity group-based preferential
treatment, social disparities, poor service delivery, especially provision of security to the
population, corruption, unemployment, and high unemployment and poverty rates.
In summary, the narrow school argues that ―pragmatism, conceptual clarity, and
analytic rigor‖ are reasons to focus human security on violent threats (Owen, 2004, p.
375). Proponents of the broad school argue that human security is more than safety from
violent threats and includes a wide range of structural issues such as poverty, disease,
environmental disasters, and other social, psychological, political, and economic aspects
of vulnerability (Owen, 2004). In this study, I use human security as an integrative
concept, which acknowledges the universalism of life claims of freedom from want and
freedom from fear. I use the personal and community, political, and economic security
components as the most relevant for my study as they approximate measures of structural
violence, and social and political stability.
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THE STATE
According to Max Weber (1965), a state is ―a human community that successfully
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory‖ (p.
154, emphasis mine), underscoring the connection between justice, power, community,
and security that is the essence of the role of the state.10 There are three main elements in
this definition, namely monopoly, legitimacy, and force. Monopoly represents the concept
of a level of concentration of political power, within a community living on a specific
territory (Mitropolitski, 2011). Weber, like Hobbes, posits that a state exercises
concentrated power and justice over its territory to protect its human community who in
turn has given legitimacy to the state by the acceptance of that power within that human
community (Mitropolitski, 2011). Bull (1979), Waltz (1988), and Taylor (2008) argue
that states are the only actors that possess the monopoly on the use of force. Legitimacy
focuses on state authority, which may manifest itself as ―legitimating ideas that shape the
use of physical force,‖ and whose ideas have been institutionalized (Mitropolitski, 2011,
p. 9; see also Jachtenfuchs, 2005). The main mode of governance within this community
is physical force, as represented by the state agencies that have the power of the state to
conduct arrests, incarcerate, and ward off attacks from foreign countries (Mitropolitski,
2011).

10

―The specific punctuation is part of the original text. In German: ‗als eine Gemeinschaft, welche
innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes das Monopol legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit für sich (mit
Erfolg) in Anspruch nimmt‘‖ (Mitropolitski, 2011, p.5).

29

This study argues that a stable state should provide its population all the security
system functions at the macro-level that ensure state sovereignty, territorial integrity,
societal and environmental security, the maintenance of the political and economic order,
the rule of law, and political control of the armed forces. The specific focus of this study
is on the ability of the state to provide its population with personal, community,
economic, and political security, through its agencies, such as the police, home affairs,
judiciary, intelligence, and penal system. A stable state may even outsource part of its
security system functions and remain a stable state; provided there has been no
deterioration in the provision of security system functions to the population, as a result of
such outsourcing.11

Good Governance
According to Collier (2007), 70% of the world‘s failed, weak, or fragile states are
located in Africa, home to the world‘s poorest billion people.12 Jackson (2012) argues
that most of these states, ―may also have a dysfunctional security sector that is either
politically compromised, or chronically underfunded, or subject to conflict and unable to
control sovereign territory or criminal activity‖ (p. 251). A fragile state is unable to
deliver a legitimate, accountable, and politically controlled security system with good
oversight mechanisms. Waltz (1979) identifies security as a core government function
and a public good very much in the Hobbesian manner, where the all-powerful sovereign

11

Please see explanation of outsourcing later in the chapter on page 45.

12

Eight of the top ten states ranked lowest on the Human Development Index are located in Africa and
have either recently experienced conflict or are currently at war (Jackson, 2012).
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state provides security to its citizens based on a social contract between the state, who
guarantees the safety of the citizens on the one hand, in exchange for the loyalty of the
citizens on the other (Hobbes, 1996). Good governance includes not just political
institutions, but norms and patterns of interaction among the people (governed and
governors) and effective socio-economic systems (Dorff, 2007).

Legitimate Governance
Effective legitimate governance, namely ―governance in which the governed
believe fundamentally in the legitimacy of the system and people who govern them,‖ is
essential if the state is to ward off becoming a fragile state (Dorff, 2005, p 24). Jackson
(2012) argues that ―security is an integral element of governance more generally, and the
provision of security is a key element of legitimacy‖ (p.264). If the institutions are too
weak to provide security, and the ―perceived legitimacy is inadequate to sustain them, a
cycle emerges in which legitimacy is on a downward path‖ (Dorff, 2005, p. 23).
Legitimacy is lost when the ―state fails to respond to its citizens‘ needs and desires, and
because state power is used unjustly to tyrannize those same citizens‖ (Dorff, 2005, p.
23).

Good Governance Deficit
A good governance deficit, in the form of a weakness or absence of effective
legitimate governance, implies an erosion of the security system as the provision of
security is a key element of legitimacy (Dorff, 2008; Jackson, 2012). According to
Zartman (1995), the breakdown of good governance, law, and order follows when a state,
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as a decision-making, executing, and enforcing institution can no longer take and
implement decisions it reaches at the cabinet level.
Although the debate about what constitutes a stable - fragile - failing - failed state
continues, what is clear from the literature is that failed states reach a stage where they
are unable to provide sufficient security for their population because the structures
guaranteeing law and order have either totally or partially collapsed (Thürer, 1999). The
Global Policy Forum Report (2003) considers failed states as having official governments
and fully collapsed states are characterized by their complete absence - the distinction
between them is to some extent a matter of degree. Central to a failed state is that it is
unable to maintain an effective use of force and lacks an effective judicial system to
guard the rule of law and promulgate judgments that are internationally regarded as
legitimate and sound (especially in commercial matters). A failed state is unable or
unwilling to fulfill international obligations (such as in debt repayment), and cannot
prevent various forms of transnational economic crime or the use of its territory for the
perpetration of violence (politically motivated or otherwise) against other states in the
international system (Global Policy Forum Report, 2003).
The United States Government Accountability Office (USGAO) defines failed or
failing states as ―nations where governments effectively do not control their territory,
citizens largely do not perceive the governments as legitimate, and citizens do not have
basic public services or domestic security‖ (2007, p. 5). If government no longer has free
access to all its territory, it has lost effective control, and if citizens no longer have access
to basic local government and community services, they may no longer see their
government as legitimate. The integrative human security approach framing the present
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study reflects access to such services and thereby serves as a measure of latent state
fragility. This study questions whether existing measures of state fragility measure the
potential or root causes of that fragility? If not, then we have a case of latent state
fragility.
In the Fragile States Strategy, the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) uses the term fragile states to include those that fall along a
spectrum of failing, failed, and recovering from crisis (2005; see also Table 2.2).

Table 2.2
Fragile States (Failing, Failed, Recovering States)
Vulnerable States

Crisis States

States unable or unwilling to adequately
assure the provision of security and basic
services to significant portions of their
populations and where the legitimacy of
the government is in question. This
includes states that are failing or
recovering from crisis.

Central government does not exert
effective control over its own territory or
is unable or unwilling to assure the
provision of vital services to significant
parts of its territory, where legitimacy of
the government is weak or nonexistent,
and where violent conflict is a reality or a
great risk.
Source: (USAID, 2005)

The most severe form of fragile states are crisis states, where conflict is ongoing or at
great risk of occurring and the central government does not exert effective control over its
territory, is ―unable or unwilling to assure the provision of [security] services to
significant parts of its territory,‖ and holds ―weak or non-existent legitimacy among its
citizens‖ (USAID, 2005, p.1). In support of this line of argument, the National Security
Council (NSC) in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) report,
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defines weak states as ―lacking the capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities‖
(CIA, 2003, p.20). The strategy document also describes some weak states as ―lacking
law enforcement, intelligence, or military capabilities to assert effective control over their
entire territory‖ (CIA, 2003, p.20). Effective control implies that the government
agencies have full and unchallenged access to all of the land in the country without using
force, coercion, or negotiations with gangs or militias for such access.
Dorff (1999) looks at the essential characteristics of the failed or failing state: the
state loses the ability to perform the basic functions of governance, and it loses
legitimacy. Some of these basic functions include the protection of the state against
foreign invasion, guarantee of survival, protecting quality of life and sustainability
(human security in the broadest sense), and protection against civil and communal strife.
Increasing criminality and widespread corruption is prevalent in all aspects of society,
including political and economic institutions where a burgeoning informal economy is
characterized by black markets, extortion, and widespread criminal activity (Dorff, 1999).
Hawkins and Semerad (2001) describe these states as ―incapable of maintaining even
minimal levels of public order and productivity‖ (p. 31). Fragile, weak, failing, and failed
states do not have the capacity to establish and maintain an effective security system.
Subsequently, the security system develops gaps in the provision of services to the
population and these gaps may be filled by private security companies (PSCs).
In states with a GGD where, among others, PSCs‘ and corporate capital‘s
financial, managerial, and technical resources surpass the state‘s, ―the role of private
security within global security assemblages can often be seen as crucial to both the
continued functioning of state authority and the operations of international capital
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(Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p. 14).13 Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) acknowledge
that in a weak state the proliferation of private security may be an indication of state
weakness, but could also be a reflection of state empowerment through the ―shifts in
governance‖ (p. 6).14

THE SECURITY SYSTEM
As the above discussion has illustrated, some states today are not able to perform
security functions anymore because they have essentially become failed states. This
section examines specifically what makes a security system effective, including the
security system functional space, security system main actors, and the security system
deficit. The security system includes statutory agencies such as the police, judiciary, and
intelligence that are security actors, which are classified as part of the security sector as
well as non-statutory actors, such as PSCs. The security system functional space consists
of the functions that the different security actors perform, or ought to perform, that may
help to prevent a country from becoming fragile, or even failed. The security system main
actors are all the actors that contribute to stabilizing the state, but may actually promote
state fragility due to their lack of capacity or capability. I call this gap in the security

13

A ―range of different global and local, public and private security agents…interact, cooperate and
compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of security governance‖ (Abrahamsen &
Williams, 2009, p. 3).
14

Their findings are within the context of global private security companies operating in diamond-rich
Sierra Leone and oil-rich Nigeria.
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system a security system deficit, indicative of good governance deficit, which in turn may
negatively affect the legitimacy of the government. The effectiveness gap in the security
system is often filled by PSCs. Again, the SFI may show such a state to have little formal
fragility when in fact latent state fragility is present.

Effective Security System
The term security in this study is used holistically and goes beyond individual
services and therefore the study refers to the security system and not to the security
sector. Möller (2009) limits the term security sector to the armed forces in charge of
national security and the agencies charged with elements of human security, in other
words the police, judiciary, intelligence, and penal system. The aforementioned agencies
are statutory agencies. Moreover, Möller (2009) posits that there are also non-statutory
agencies that include PSCs. The security system consists of different security actors such
as the police, home affairs, defense, intelligence, judiciary, correctional services,
legislature, as well as non-state security actors such as PSCs, and NGOs including thinktanks and other civil society organizations that have an interest in the security system and
holding the government accountable for good governance. This study defines the security
system in line with a 2006 European Commission report to the Council and the European
Parliament as ―all state institutions and other non-state entities with a role in ensuring the
security of the state and its people‖ (Commission of the European Communities, 2006,
emphasis mine). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC, 2007) defines the security and justice
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system of a state ―as including all those institutions, groups, organizations and individuals
– both state and non-state – that have a stake in security and justice provision‖ (p.22).
Clare Short, the former British Secretary of State for International Development,
champions the ―inter-related issues of security, development and conflict prevention‖
(Schnabel, 2012, p.55). The importance of having a healthy security system which would
provide the platform for sustainable development and therefore a natural counter-measure
to conflict generation was identified in the late-1990s (Schnabel, 2012). Consequently, it
is safe to state that a deficient security system is not conducive to sustainable
development and could serve as a predictor of state fragility once sustainable
development fails (Schnabel, 2012). The World Development Report (World Bank,
2011) highlights the significance and linkages between conflict, security, and
development. In a fragile state where citizens do not have equal access to security,
justice, and jobs because of the absence of governance or deficiency in legitimate state
institutions, threats from organized violence, and internal and external conflict cannot be
successfully thwarted (World Bank, 2011).
The World Bank now recognizes that ―improved security and justice establish a
context of credible exchange that can encourage markets, allow human development to
proceed, and provide space for innovation‖ (World Bank, 2011, p. 5). Security system
stability plays a vital role contributing to state stability by decreasing the drivers of state
fragility. Conversely, security system deficits can increase state fragility, and in fact,
could serve as a predictor of state fragility.
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Security System Functional Space
The deficiency in a state‘s security system is measured in terms of the deficiency
in what this study calls the Security System (SS) Functional Space as depicted in Figure
2.1.

Figure 2.1 Security System Functional Space

Security system functions do not relate to the security system actors in a one-to-one
relationship, but in fact overlap and manifest in dynamic relationships. Parliament
promulgates legislation and exercises political oversight. Cabinet (Ministries) exercise
political oversight and generate policy. Core external security actors such as the armed
forces defend the territorial integrity and protect the economic system. The non-statutory
forces such as PSCs fulfill security roles where the state‘s security services have eroded
and offer to protect the state against internal and external threats, where they can
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contribute to international crisis management, and help prevent violent conflict. Core
internal security actors such as the police, intelligence, and customs enforce laws, defend
territorial integrity, protect the economic system, prevent violent crime, and protect the
state against internal and external threats. The judicial/penal actors enforce laws. Civil
society helps to keep the state accountable for its actions and policy-making. Clearly, the
provision of safety and security to its citizens is one of the core responsibilities of the
state and the security system is comprised of several actors and institutions involved in
the provision of that security (SAG, 1996; Waltz, 1979).

Security System Main Actors
Security actors fall into four main categories: ―core security actors,‖
―management and oversight bodies,‖ ―justice and the rule of law,‖ and ―non-statutory
security forces‖ (OECD-DAC, 2007, p. 22). For this study, core security actors are
divided into internal and external actors. Core internal actors consist of the police,
customs, and intelligence, whereas core external actors consist of the defense forces and
intelligence. These core actors have the authority of the state to protect the territorial
integrity of the state from foreign invasion and safeguard its sovereignty, to secure the
safety and security of its citizens through the enforcement of the national laws of the
country to prevent violent conflict, and to protect the economic and political systems by
adhering to and enforcing the country‘s constitution.
Ministries (executive actors) play a crucial role in formulating policies, managing,
and overseeing the activities of the departments of police, customs, justice, correctional
services, defense, and intelligence. Legislative actors promulgate legislation to administer
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the country and act as an oversight body for government departments. The justice and
correctional services departments, as represented by the courts and prison services, are
responsible for adjudicating cases where citizens are charged with violating the civil and
criminal laws of the country, and for trying and processing those found guilty through the
correctional services department.
Non-statutory security actors consist of, among others, PSCs who fulfill a market
and societal demand for their services, where the state no longer can or will provide those
security services that the citizens require or need, or where their services are more costeffective. When public security system actors that serve to maintain law and order cease
to exist or no longer have the capacity to function in failing states, PSCs may step in to
fill that void left by them either on their own initiative, or by the state insourcing their
services to help with those functions,15 or by the public who can afford those services.
The main actors of the security system (Figure 2.2) are identified as follows:

15

The term ―contracting in‖ will be referred to as ―insourcing‖ throughout the remainder of the study.
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Figure 2.2 Security System Main Actors

Security System Deficit
The gaps in the security system manifest themselves when a state has become
inefficient and ineffective in the provision of security to itself and its population, or even
worse, if it is the cause of insecurity (Hänggi, 2004). Moreover, the security system
becomes dysfunctional when it has deficient governance (Hänggi, 2004). When the
security system develops a deficit it could manifest in any one, a combination, or all of
the security system actors, their roles, responsibilities, and actions. They should be
―working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent
with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance which in turn
contributes to a well-functioning security framework‖ (Hänggi, 2004, p. 4). Based on this
understanding, security system gaps may occur when the state can no longer defend its
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borders effectively against external aggression, enforce its national and international laws
through its core security actors, and its judiciary and correctional services can no longer
effectively enforce these laws or effectively process the offenders respectively.
Fragile, weak, failing, and failed states generally have a dysfunctional security
system that is chronically underfunded, unable to control state sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and subject to internal conflict or criminal activity (Jackson, 2012). To function
effectively, a security system has to fall under good governance and this can only be
manifested when a state enjoys legitimacy among its population with good oversight
mechanisms. Preliminary findings in the case of several fragile states show that the
effectiveness gap in the security system is often filled by PSCs, as the state is no longer
capable of performing necessary security functions for its population (Carmola, 2010).
Some security functions, such as the protection of personnel and property, are being
taken over by PSCs, as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. Having PSCs present and
functioning in these fragile states to complement or even fulfill some of the deficient
security functions of the local security actors, raises the question: are PSCs evidence of a
state moving towards fragility? Moreover, are PSCs taking the initiative to fill the gaps in
the security system caused by a state‘s good governance deficit, or is it the state that
insources the services of PSCs because it lacks the capacity and capability to provide
such security services to its population?
If the security system is ―not inclusive, is partial and corrupt, unresponsive,
incoherent, ineffective and inefficient and/or unaccountable to the public,‖ then we have
a security system deficit (Schnabel, 2012, p. 53). The security system is not inclusive
when it serves only certain segments and not the whole population and is partial to
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serving some (wealthy) communities well, while neglecting other (poorer) communities.
For the purposes of this study, a stable state has a monopoly over the legitimate use of
force and the provision of security to its population. When a state can no longer provide
security to its population – one of its core responsibilities – such a state has developed a
security system deficit. As the state clearly plays a pivotal role in the provision-ofsecurity debate, this study addresses the security system functions of the state as
performed by the security system actors and the impact that state fragility has on the
functionality of the security system. Many states today are not able to perform security
functions anymore, while at the same time, security functions are being taken over by
PSCs. PSCs can contribute to stabilizing a fragile state by helping to overcome some of
the security system deficits, as long as proper control and accountability mechanisms for
PSCs‘ activities are in place.
According to Krahmann (2003), security governance is related to the ―emergence
of structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate
their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of
binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority‖ (p. 11). PSCs can
help stabilize the state by filling the gap in the security system caused by governance
deficits. The role of PSCs subject to proper state oversight mechanisms, accountability,
and transparency may help to complement the state‘s efforts to provide its population
with effective security. Consequently, PSCs may make a contribution to the state in its
efforts to regain credibility, legitimacy, and efficiency, and help move it from fragility
towards stability. It is in this sense that PSCs might enhance state stability. The security
arrangements in some countries are not entirely private as the state retains a key role
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through setting the legal framework within which the PSCs have to function and by
integrating public forces into private security structures (Abrahamsen & Williams,
2009).16 This does not necessarily indicate an erosion of public authority, but rather a ―rearticulation of public ⁄ private, global ⁄ local distinctions and relations‖ (Abrahamsen &
Williams, 2009, p. 12). The next section discusses the idea of outsourcing in general and,
more specifically, examines its utility for providing state and human security.

OUTSOURCING
Outsourcing may be defined as shifting functions to outside contractors that were
previously performed in-house (Gupta & Gupta, 1992). Outsourcing is widely accepted
as a way to access external expertise and technology, reduce costs, return to core
business, and improve services (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995; McIntosh, Shauness, &
Wettenhall, 1997, as cited in Aulich & Hein, 2005). At both the macro- and micro-levels,
outsourcing may be an appropriate alternative and a justification for giving up the state‘s
monopoly of the legitimate use of force because of its other responsibilities such as
education, welfare, and healthcare, especially in an environment of scarce resources, as
the state is obligated to be efficient and effective in its service delivery.

16

By way of example, the head of security at one of the PSCs in Nigeria is a former director of the
Nigerian State Security Service (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009).
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Advantages
Outsourcing may reduce costs and free up assets. Organizations that have
outsourced part of their in-house operations report substantial savings (Harland, Knight,
Lamming, & Walker, 2005). One of the biggest advantages of outsourcing and a
powerful incentive for an organization is the potential of cost-saving, thereby offering
cost-effective services and increasing the profit margin. Another advantage is the
achievement of an organization‘s tactical goals, such as enhancing its expert base and
making it more efficient and externally focused on the people it serves. Outsourcing can
enable organizations to concentrate on core functions, while offering the opportunity to
partner with other organizations whose resource base complements one‘s own (Harland
et al., 2005, p. 834). It is suggested that outsourcing increases adaptability and flexibility
by helping to create smaller and more flexible workforces to meet changing business
conditions (Greaver, 1999; Patterson & Pinch, 1995). A recent Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) study performed an analysis on U.S. government spending on private
security services as opposed to having a full-time government employee perform the job
(CBO, 2008, p. 14; Franke, 2010). The study found that the costs of outsourcing did not
differ much from the costs of having a comparable military unit performing the same
functions. The big difference was that during peacetime, the services of the outsourced
private security are no longer required and the contract does not have to be renewed,
whereas the full-time government employee remains on the government‘s payroll,
thereby accruing added costs to the government (CBO, 2008; Franke, 2010, p. 13).
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Shortfalls
In determining the full costs of outsourcing, governments need to factor in costs
for vendor searches, contracting costs, costs of managing, and costs of transition once the
outsourcing ends (Aulich & Hein, 2005). In addition, ―promised cost saving and service
improvements are often exaggerated or distorted‖ by private companies (Aulich & Hein,
2005, p. 43).
Loss of expertise and institutional memory is a potential consequence of
outsourcing (Aulich & Hein, 2005). The moment government outsources to the private
sector, those skilled government employees in the area of work outsourced, may decide
to move to the private sector where they are likely to get higher salaries. This is a loss of
skills which the government cannot afford and along with the exit of such employees,
institutional memory is also lost (Aulich & Hein, 2005). The key is to vet the private
companies thoroughly and select them based on merit and track record, and to have
proper control mechanisms in place, which would include early warning of service
delivery deficits. Outsourcing assumes effective management and oversight mechanisms
(Franke, 2010). However, in a private company‘s quest to maximize profits, overpricing
and cheating become a concern as reports show how private companies were charged
with ―fraud, overbilling, wasteful spending, and inadequate planning and oversight‖
(Franke, 2010, p. 14). As there is insufficient management and oversight of the activities
of PSCs, in addition to the incentives of PSCs not necessarily aligning with their clients‘
interests, outsourcing is not always desirable (Franke, 2010, p. 14; Singer, 2005).
A recent study of experts appointed by the White House and Congress found that
outsourcing could impact ―government‘s long-term ability to perform its mission and
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undermine the integrity of government‘s decision-making‖ (Franke, 2010, p. 16; Shane &
Nixon, 2005). Watchdog groups have also alleged that: (1) ―competition appears to have
sharply eroded;‖ (2) ―even the most sensitive and secret government jobs are now being
outsourced‖ (for example, around 70% of the intelligence budget in the United States
goes to private contractors); (3) the most successful contractors are no longer the most
effective, but have succeeded in duping the government into believing they have special
skills to offer; (4) contracting makes the government less accountable because private
companies are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act; and (5) business leaders do
not have to stand for re-election as politicians do (Franke, 2010, p. 16; Shorrock, 2008).
The danger of cutting costs by making employees redundant is that by doing so a
government may find itself in a position where it would be obliged to contract private
companies, and many times contract the very people that have been laid off at a much
higher cost (Franke, 2010). According to a House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform memorandum, Blackwater, a now defunct U.S.-based private
security company,17 billed the U.S. government $1,222 per day for one private security
specialist, which adds up to $445,891 per annum, per contractor (US Congress, 2007, p.
14). At the same time, an army sergeant‘s daily costs for salary, housing, and subsistence
pay ―range from approximately $140 to $190 per day, depending on rank and years of
service, and annually from $51,100 to $69,350‖ (US Congress, 2007, p. 14). Private
security companies decide which contracts to take and when to walk away from contracts

17

Now operating under the name ―Academi.‖
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that are no longer profitable or have become too dangerous (Franke, 2010). Such
behavior may hold serious consequences for the government such as when government
troops are left in the lurch by services prematurely terminated by the contractors (Franke,
2010, p. 18; Isenberg, 2006). Moreover, private companies are only accountable to their
shareholders and so a culture of impunity is allowed to develop for the actions of private
companies doing government contract work (Franke, 2010). The absence of effective
legislation regulating the activities of the private security companies breeds such a culture
of impunity. This in turn ―leaves responsible industry players and investors without the
guidance they require and less responsible players to indulge in contractual fraud and
price gouging‖ (Franke 2010, p. 19).
The best that the international community has done thus far to regulate the private
security and military companies is the so-called Montreaux Document. This document
describes international law as it applies to the activities of these companies and provides
guidance to states whenever these private security companies are present in an armed
conflict (Franke, 2010). Experts from seventeen governments together with
representatives of civil society and private security and military companies participated in
these deliberations during the period 2006-2008. The document lists recommendations
for the industry to follow along the lines of good state practice, including the verification
of companies‘ track records and their vetting procedures to hire staff (Montreux
Document, 2008). However, as a document offering guidance to states and effective
oversight of the private security sector, it could only offer partial guidance for calls from
the PSCs for better guidance and oversight of their activities. These gaps in the Montreux
Document were addressed to the degree possible when 58 companies on November 9,
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2010 signed the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
(ICoC) to help set clearer standards for PSCs and to ―build an oversight and
accountability framework to help ensure that PSCs operate according to the standards‖
(Buzato, 2010, p. 9). The initiative is to help better governance of PSC activities, create
compliance and accountability, establish objective and measurable standards of behavior
as well as ―external independent mechanisms for effective government and oversight‖
(Buzato, 2010, p. 9).
Stranger (2009) argues that there is a new reality of greater involvement by the
private sector in a post-industrial foreign policy, and that using the private sector can only
be successful if there is sufficient transparency and accountability. To ensure
transparency and accountability, relevant mechanisms may include:


public disclosure of PSC contracting regulations, practices, and processes;



public disclosure of general information about specific contracts, if necessary
redacted to address national security, privacy, and commercial confidentiality
requirements;



publication of an overview of incident reports or complaints, and sanctions taken
where misconduct has been proven, if necessary, redacted to address national
security, privacy, and commercial confidentiality requirements; and



oversight by parliamentary bodies, including through annual reports or
notification of particular contracts to such bodies (Montreux Document, 2008, p.
17).

Additionally, there have to be safeguards so that private actions are in the best interests of
national and international security. Krishnan (2011) argues that unless ―control,
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management, and oversight issues are resolved and appropriate roles for contractors
clearly defined, intelligence outsourcing will be more of a problem than a solution for
national security‖ (p. 206). Government may well outsource some of its intelligence
services from a position of strength, ―thereby limiting the roles of private security and the
scope of its contribution‖ (Krishnan, 2011, p. 207). The aim should be to reduce the
influence of the private sector on national security policy (Krishnan, 2011). Ultimately,
government has to take responsibility for the state‘s intelligence services, analyses, and
policy recommendations and cannot have the private security industry control such a core
government competency. Krishnan (2011) concludes that there is no outsourced solution
to good government. Good governance is a pre-requisite for outsourcing for efficiency
reasons, especially core competencies such as intelligence services.
In order to determine the parameters of outsourcing of security functions, the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report emphasized that ―only those functions
that must be performed by DOD should be kept by DOD‖ and any function that is not a
core government function can be provided by the private sector (Franke, 2010, p. 11;
QDR Report, 2001). Core and non-core functions are determined by whether or not they
are directly necessary for waging war (Franke, 2010). According to Krishnan (2011), it is
critical to clearly define inherently governmental functions, thereby restricting the role of
private business and the scope of its contribution to the core government functions.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted the United States to use PSCs on a
scale never seen before in history (Tiefer, 2013). We know from media reports that PSCs
assigned to both countries ―operated at the very limits of the boundary area between what
they can be allowed to do and what is inherently governmental and beyond what they
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should do‖ (Tiefer, 2013, p. 236). Examples include the Abu Ghraib case where PSCs
used scandalous interrogation techniques and the Nisour Square incident where innocent
civilians were mistaken for enemy combatants and killed (Tiefer, 2013). Brown (2013)
concedes that just as there is no easy way of making government actors accountable to
the people, there is no easy way to assure accountability when it comes to outsourcing.
The mechanisms for ―keeping government actors accountable are nuanced and complex‖
and a ―constitutional accountability approach to privatization would not comprehensively
solve the problem of unaccountable contractors‖ (Brown, 2013, p. 1403). However, it
lays the groundwork for establishing a network of controls.

CONCLUSION
The approach to human security underlying the present research combines
physical protection and material security, tackles underdevelopment and insecurity
simultaneously, and links freedom from want and freedom from fear by introducing an
integrative approach to human security, that acknowledges the universalism of these
freedoms, while at the same time measuring latent state fragility and components of
structural violence.
This study argues that a stable state should have a legitimate monopoly on the use
of force and be able to provide its population all the security system functions at the
macro-level and the micro-level. In this study, I use the micro-level where a stable state
should be able to provide its population with personal, community, economic, and
political security. A stable state may outsource part of its security system functions and
remain stable, provided there has been no deterioration in the provision of security
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system functions to the population as a result of such outsourcing. Security is seen as an
integral element of governance, and the provision of security is a key element of
legitimacy (Jackson, 2012). If the institutions are too weak to provide security and the
perceived legitimacy is inadequate to sustain them, legitimacy is on a downward path and
lost when the state fails to respond to its citizens‘ needs and desires in a reasonable and
expected fashion (Dorff, 2005). A good governance deficit, in the form of a weak or
absent effective legitimate governance, implies an erosion of the security system (Dorff,
2008; Jackson, 2012). For PSCs to be able to enhance state stability, proper control
mechanisms, accountability, and transparency of their activities is required.
Good governance cannot be outsourced and should be a pre-requisite for
outsourcing (Krishnan, 2011). Outsourcing may be an appropriate alternative for giving
up the state‘s monopoly of the legitimate use of force because of its other responsibilities
such as education, welfare, and healthcare, especially in an environment of scarce
resources. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR, 2001) emphasized that only
those functions that must be performed by government should be kept by government and
any function that is not a core government function can be provided by the private sector.
In this study, I use a conceptual frame that applies the aforementioned
components of personal and community, economic and political security, to examine the
presence or lack thereof of state provisions of human security. The analysis examines the
extent to which the private security industry enhances the state‘s economic and security
capacities. Furthermore, the study explores the extent to which the state of SA may suffer
from a good governance deficit. The security system concept is applied to determine the
prevalence of a security system deficit that affects governance and state fragility, while
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outsourcing assesses the extent to which the private security industry strengthens good
governance or contributes to a GGD in SA. The following chapter presents the case of
SA where the numbers of PSCs are growing and more security functions are assumed by
PSCs. Given some functions traditionally assumed by the state are now provided by the
private sector, one might ask about the legitimacy and stability of the state and wonder if
outsourcing leads to a new form of fragility not measured by standard state fragility
measures, which I call latent fragility. I examine this type of latent fragility in more detail
by looking at the increasing numbers of PSCs performing security system functions in
SA, and the possible effects this might have on the quality and effectiveness of SA
governance. In addition, I examine the extent to which human security is threatened,
using the components of human security that are threatened as further indicators of latent
state fragility.
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CHAPTER 3

THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA
SA is Africa‘s second wealthiest state after Nigeria in total Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), and has the continent‘s most powerful military (CIA, 2013). Yet, despite
these impressive statistics, the country continues to battle high direct and structural
violence. The economic divide that was defined along racial lines in the past is today
defined across class lines – between the haves and the have-nots.18 After apartheid
policies were used to keep a minority white population in control of the country through
systemic social engineering,19 SA became a democracy in 1994. However, the democracy
is showing signs of growing impatience from the labor unions whose members are still no
better off economically than during the apartheid years, and an economic growth rate that
does not help to create job opportunities to address the high unemployment rate.
Correlated with these issues is the high rate of violent crime and an expanding police

18

The Gini co-efficient, which measures income inequality (from 0 [complete equality] to 1 [complete
inequality]), illustrates increasing risk to economic security and may possibly predict an increase in racial
tensions. Between 1996 and 2011, SA showed the following trends: black South Africans‘ Gini score
increased from 0.54 to 0.56; colored South Africans‘ increased from 0.49 to 0.51; Indian South Africans‘
improved from 0.50 to 0.44 and white South Africans‘ improved from 0.49 to 0.43.
19

Afrikaans word for separateness.
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service with one of the bigger budgets among all the national government departments,
yet apparently unable to combat crime effectively. In addition, SA has the world‘s largest
private security industry. This chapter examines specifically the role of the private
security industry as part of SA‘s security system and its role in enhancing or eroding the
state‘s stability, with questions beginning to be raised about early signs of possible rising
ethnic tensions in the country (Barnard, personal communication, April 30 & May 10,
2013; Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013).
This chapter is divided into a brief background description concerning SA‘s racial
policies; the sanctions era; the role of PSCs in the security system and its effect on state
stability; the types and numbers of PSCs that operate in SA; the outsourcing of services
by the SAG to the private security industry; public trust in government and especially the
SAPS; and ethnic relations.

Background
The former British Empire set the stage for the segregated policy of the South
African Nationalist government, imposing this policy during its colonial rule of SA
(Giliomee, 2003). The Union of SA came into being on May 31, 1910 as a dominion of
the British Empire. The British monarch was represented by a governor-general and
under the governance of the British monarch, the Natives Land Act of 1913 was passed,
which made it ―illegal for Africans to acquire land outside their own areas‖ (Boahen,
1989, p. 71).
The majority of white South Africans are made up of Afrikaners whose Dutch
Reformed Church shaped their Christian beliefs. This religious denomination advocated a
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Biblical foundation for apartheid, which significantly influenced the policies of the ruling
class by providing a moral justification for the apartheid system (Giliomee, 2003). The
National Party (NP) came to power in 1948 and under the leadership of then-Prime
Minister Dr. D. F. Malan, officially introduced the segregated policy of apartheid
(Giliomee, 2003; Mandela, 1994; Muller, 1969).
Apartheid was presented to the electorate and the rest of the world as a policy
whereby different ethnic groups could live separately, yet be equal as good neighbors.
However, at the heart of apartheid was a system of racial segregation in the ―interests‖ of
avoiding racial tensions, since people of color were treated as second-class citizens and
the whites‘ privileges could not be seen to be threatened by the black majority. Black
South Africans were denied the right to vote during elections and were not allowed to
participate in the governing of the country. Residential areas were set aside separately for
whites and blacks to live in, which was enforced through legislation. The segregation
between whites and blacks permeated every facet of life, such as separate schools,
churches, public amenities, and sports facilities. Blacks were not free to move about
inside the country without having a pass book on their person.20 Moreover, marriages
across the color line were illegal and punishable with imprisonment. Apartheid was born
out of the belief that people from different racial groups could exist together peacefully
provided they lived separately, each within their own residential areas, and did not mix

20

This document was akin to a passport – a travel document used to gain access to other geographical areas
within SA.
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socially. These systemic changes took place after the National Party came to power in
1948.
In response to the institutionalized apartheid policies, the ANC abandoned its
policy of peaceful resistance to the apartheid government and resorted to armed conflict
in order to overthrow the government through its armed wing, UmKhonto we Sizwe
(Spear of the Nation) (Thompson, 2001).21 Before becoming the Prime Minister of the
Union of SA in 1948, Dr. Malan was a pastor of the Dutch Reformed Church, the largest
white religious denomination in the country. The apartheid government promulgated
legislation which institutionalized racism, and this policy permeated South African
society. Since the ANC was founded in 1912 in reaction to the discriminatory practices
against them by the white minority government and to promote black interests, it
practiced peaceful resistance against the government of the day until it decided to take up
arms against the SAG in 1961. The ANC‘s attempts at peaceful protest for social change
from 1912 through the late 1950s had little impact. Up until the 1950s, the
disenfranchised non-white population (Blacks, Coloreds,22 and Indians/Asians) practiced
non-violent resistance against the political system, which denied them some of their basic
human rights. This resistance turned violent in the late 1950s (Krog, 2000). These events
laid the foundation for the justification of affirmative action and Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) policies after the country transitioned to democracy in 1994.

21

UmKhonto we Sizwe is a Zulu phrase.

22

These are South Africans of mixed white and non-white parents.
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Africa has had its share of ethnic tensions in the past, with the most recent and
vivid being the horrific slayings between the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda. SA has nine
different ethnic groups of which the Zulus and Xhosas are the largest. Both Presidents
Mandela and Mbeki are of Xhosa origin and since they are no longer the president, there
appears to be a decline of the Xhosa influence in government, and the rise of Zulu
influence with Zuma, who is of Zulu origin and the incumbent president. Many senior
positions in government, particularly in the security system are now being earmarked for
Zulu‘s and this has fueled a new ethnic tension (Barnard, personal communication, April
30 & May 10, 2013; Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013). The score for racial
goodwill ―declined from 55% in 2009/10 to 50% in 2010/11‖ while President Zuma
―failed to rebuke [the ANC Youth League President], Julius Malema for his racial slurs‖
(SAIRR, 2012, p. 819). Speaking at the University of SA‘s College of Human Sciences
on January 13, 2014, former president Mbeki said: "When a minister comes from a
certain region, so will the officials in that department" (Mail & Guardian, 2014). He
called it a "homeboy" occurrence and went on to state that part of the ANC‘s task was to
―bury the demon of tribalism. But in SA, 102 years later, tribalism is raising its head
again" (Mail & Guardian, 2014). Mbeki stated that this is one of the challenges that needs
to be addressed (Mail & Guardian, 2014). Zulus, especially, are considered for cabinet
appointments to the security system such as the State Security Minister Cwele and the
Minister of Police Mthethwa, and the Deputy Minister of Finance Nene and Minister of
Public Enterprises Gigaba, who are all from KwaZulu Natal. There is also concern about
the rising racial tensions because of government intervention in the economy that fosters
the rich becoming even richer while it does not address the problems of the real poor in
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SA (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013; Heinecken, personal communication,
April 11, 2013; Hermann, personal communication, May 1, 2013; Lekota, personal
communication, May 23, 2013).23
According to the SAIRR (2012), ―the evident failure of affirmative action and
BEE to assist more than a small elite is sparking more criticism‖ (p. 819). In fact, racial
tensions between coloreds and blacks appear more pronounced than between blacks and
whites (Barnard, personal communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013; Cronje, personal
communication, June 10, 2013; Groenewald, personal communication, April 17, 2013;
Hermann, personal communication, May 1, 2013; SAIRR, 2012, p. 819). Affirmative
action and BEE are based on national demographics, yet the population distribution in the
provinces does not necessarily reflect the national racial breakdown. More than half the
national colored population live in the Western Cape Province and outnumber the whites
by almost two million in that province. There are 2.813 million coloreds compared to
893,000 whites, and 1.64 million blacks living in the Western Cape (SAIRR, 2012, p.
20). As a consequence in the Western Cape, ethnicity-based preferential treatment results
in underrepresentation in colored South Africans. This flaw in the ethnicity based
preferential treatment may be a further cause for the ongoing deterioration in racial
relations in SA and may serve as an additional indicator of latent state fragility.

23

Unemployment grew from 1.98 million in 1994 to 4.47 million in 2012 (SAIRR, 2012, p. 258). In the
―expanded definition of unemployment, it measures anybody without a job who wanted to work and was
available to take up employment in the reference period;‖ using the expanded definition, unemployment
grew from 3.67 million in 1994 to 7.62 million in 2012 (SAIRR, 2012, p. 259).
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Increased black support for the predominantly white Democratic Alliance (DA)
opposition political party shows a softening of the racial divide between blacks and
whites (SAIRR, 2012, p. 819). On the other hand, according to the SAIRR (2012), the
proportion of South Africans who believe that race relations are improving for the period
2000 to 2011 dropped from 74% to 48% (p. 814). Moreover, the number of South
Africans confident in a happy future for all races dropped from 74% in 2000 to 65% in
2011 (SAIRR, 2012, p. 813). According to Moeletsi Mbeki, an analyst and entrepreneur
who is the brother of the former president Thabo Mbeki, BEE has struck a ―fatal blow
against the emergence of black entrepreneurship by creating a small class of unproductive
but wealthy black crony capitalists‖ (The Economist, 2010, p. 1). From the
aforementioned, it would appear that BEE and affirmative action policies inadvertently
pose a challenge to economic security in SA. These are factors that have not been taken
into consideration by the State Fragility Index (SFI) when determining SA‘s stability
ranking.24 Therefore, the present research sets out to determine whether the existing
measures of state fragility really measure fragility to determine a country‘s level of
stability.

The Sanctions Era
During the tumultuous and often violent years that followed the late 1950s into
the early 1990s, SA increasingly became isolated from the rest of the world and

24

The aforementioned information stems from interviews I conducted and should be read within the
context of the results presented in Chapters 5, 6 & 7.
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eventually had a range of economic, financial, cultural, and religious sanctions imposed
against it. This exacerbated the already fragile position it assumed in the international
community with a sports‘ boycott and expulsion from the International Olympics, as well
as an arms‘ embargo imposed against SA in the 1970s (Giliomee, 2003). SA was not
invited to participate in cultural and religious exchanges and conferences, such as those
hosted by the World Council of Churches, in an effort to force the SAG to abandon its
apartheid policies. Before imposing comprehensive sanctions against SA in 1986, the
United States, for instance, applied a policy of constructive engagement, which was
based on ―shared interests, persuasion, and improved communication‖ as articulated by
former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker (1993; see
also Ungar & Vale, 1985, p. 244). This policy was an attempt to increase American
prestige and serve as a counter-balance to the Soviet influence in southern Africa during
the Cold War (Crocker, 1993). The policy endorsed collaboration rather than public
coercion of apartheid SA. Conditions tied to this policy were the diplomatic solution to
the South African-controlled former German colony of South West Africa (Namibia), and
the withdrawal of Cuban troops and advisors out of Angola (Ungar & Vale, 1985).
However, South African blacks and other anti-apartheid groups became more
antagonistic towards the United States and pressured them to disinvest in SA (Rodman,
1994). In 1983, the U.S. Congress under the presidency of Ronald Reagan voted against
new IMF loans to SA, banned new investments and U.S. loans to the South African
public sector, and halted the trade in Krugerrands (Rodman, 1994). As violence and
repression inside SA intensified, SA declared a state of emergency in 1985, and in 1986
the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA), which
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effectively replaced constructive engagement. The CAAA banned imports of ―iron, steel,
agricultural goods, coal, uranium (after 90 days), and textiles; exports of crude oil,
refined petroleum products, nuclear technology, and computer sales (to the government);
new bank loans; and new investments with the exception of the reinvestment of profits
from South African subsidiaries‖ (Rodman, 1994, p. 322). Scandinavian countries
imposed even tougher sanctions and the European Community imposed a ban on bank
loans and new investments. The most stringent private economic sanctions were imposed
by international banks, which isolated SA from international capital markets (Rodman,
1994). Initially, this kind of international pressure galvanized the resolve of the whiteminority to continue with apartheid and to use its powerful security forces to enforce its
racist policies (Potgieter, 2007). In fact, SA went on to manufacture its own weapons and
became an arms exporter.

Civil Unrest
Being pro-West, SA‘s geo-political strategic position on the southernmost tip of
Africa within the context of the Cold War, and the Soviet Union‘s quest for influence in
Southern Africa, served as an impetus for SA to develop the most powerful security
forces on the African continent (Potgieter, 2007). During the Angolan war,25 South
African troops fought enemy combatants who were supported eventually by the former
Soviet Union and 65,000 Cuban troops at the height of the war. After the South African
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Commonly referred to as the South African Border War or the Angolan Bush War, which lasted from
1966-1989. See Crocker (1993); Geldenhuys (2008); Breytenbach (2002).

62

military troops completed their tour of duty, they were reintegrated into all spheres of
civil society.26 Having fought enemy combatants in Angola, and having mainly ANC
operatives inside SA who desired the forceful overthrow of the SAG, the
decommissioned South African troops regarded these operatives as enemies of the state.
This mindset was not conducive to building trust between the different racial groups in
SA. SA experienced two states-of-emergency in the 1980s where the security forces were
given wide-ranging powers to help contain the civil unrest (Barnard, personal
communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013). Giliomee (2013) suggests that the need for
group identity and the fear of extinction by the Afrikaners fed into the justification of
their system of apartheid. Ultimately, there were a number of factors that fed the conflict
in SA:


Tension brought about by the minority white South Africans‘ (of which the
majority are Afrikaners) need for safety and security against the black majority.
The whites were always in the minority, yet they held onto exclusive political
power and enforced a system of government based on racist and segregationist
policies through their powerful security forces.



The need for black South Africans to restore their self-esteem, political, and
human rights. Blacks had waged peaceful resistance to the policies of
governments that discriminated against them since 1911 when the ANC was
formed (Mandela, 1994). This resistance turned violent in the early 1960s when

26

Most of the troops were conscripts who had to complete two years‘ military service.
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the armed wing of the ANC called Umkhonto we Sizwe under the leadership of
Nelson Mandela was formed. In response to growing state-sponsored violence,
the ANC, representing the majority of South African blacks, decided it could no
longer use peaceful means to change the constitution to include blacks in
governing the country. It was mainly the South African Police (SAP) that
struggled to keep SA stable during the years of civil unrest.


Tension brought about through the whites‘ and blacks‘ need for self-actualization.
The whites and blacks strived to maintain a positive self-concept. The apartheid
government used a highly effective security apparatus under the leadership of
Prime Ministers Vorster and Botha.27 The blacks used the ANC‘s Umkhonto we
Sizwe to meet this need. The big difference between the two groups was that the
blacks gained increasing international support while the SAG was increasingly
being isolated by those same countries that were supporting the ANC and the
liberation of all black South Africans. The international community increasingly
viewed SA as a pariah state and whites as racists.
It is within the context of the Cold War and SA‘s liberation forces that obtained

refuge, training, and support from especially the Soviet Bloc countries that SA‘s security
forces took on the task of containing the liberation struggle at all costs. Former president

27

The secretive Afrikaner Broederbond played a constructive role in enhancing the Afrikaner community
and started negotiations with the ANC (Esterhuyse, 2012).
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P.W. Botha often spoke of the total onslaught against SA, which required a total strategy
to cover security, political, military, and economic matters (Potgieter, 2007).28
The violent backlash from the non-white population began to take its toll on civil
society and parts of SA were made ungovernable by the suppressed masses to force the
apartheid government to the negotiating table (Gevisser, 2009; Krog, 2000).
Ungovernable took the form of civil unrest in areas that the police did not regard as a
priority for performing regular policing functions, such as crime prevention, while they
were fighting against the liberation struggle by hunting down ANC cadres inside and
outside the country (Potgieter, 2007).29 The traditional role of the police in maintaining
law and order had morphed into a role where they were less focused on traditional
policing functions, and more focused on supporting the apartheid government‘s racial
policies by enforcing apartheid legislation and upholding the apartheid system. The 1976
school riots in the black residential areas made those areas ungovernable as the schools
were burned to the ground in protest against being forced to learn Afrikaans, which was
associated with the language of the oppressor.
The violence took on many forms such as street riots, planting of bombs that
killed and maimed citizens indiscriminately, attacks on military bases and other sensitive
key points such as fuel depots, student uprisings where schools and books were burned,
and the establishment of so-called kangaroo ―courts‖ in the townships. These ―courts‖

28

See Aron (2003); Kissinger (1957); Wohlstetter (1959).
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A core group of political activists or revolutionaries, such as the Umkhonto we Sizwe operatives.
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were established by township leaders where blacks who were suspected of being
government informants were tried and executed through necklacing in the community to
serve as a deterrent to others who may have been tempted to become paid government
informants (Potgieter, 2007).30 It was the mass rioting by the blacks that brought regular
life in many areas to a standstill and forced the SAG to declare a state of emergency in
1985, and again in 1986 to preserve the way of life that apartheid had created for the
whites.31 These states of emergency were essential to protecting the white residential
areas from the riots and uprisings while leaving the townships at the mercy of the
instigators and agitators, and according wide powers to the security forces (Potgieter,
2007). It was within this political context that the private security industry continued to
grow. As the SAP concentrated more on supporting the SAG‘s political control of the
country, the SAG encouraged collaboration with the private security industry to fill the
gaps left by the SAP as it shifted priorities away from normal policing duties to support
the political status quo (Irish-Quobosheane, personal communication, April 25, 2013).
Starting in the late seventies, PSCs were mainly used for guarding strategic installations,
as armed response units, for installing electronic hardware (alarms), for conducting
investigations and risk management, and cash-in-transit operations. This type of private
security support freed up the SAP to focus on support of the apartheid government.

30

The death through necklacing took place when an unused car tire was filled with gasoline, set alight and
placed around the neck of the informant, who suffocated from the toxic fumes and eventually burned to
death.
31

Mass rolling action takes place when masses of people march through the streets protesting and causing
damage to property in most cases.
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The two most important and powerful organizations during this period (1948–
1994) were the ANC and the governing National Party (NP). The South African
intelligence community, especially, realized during the 1980s that SA could not survive
under apartheid with Mandela and other prominent ANC leaders incarcerated
(Esterhuyse, 2012; Sparks, 1995; Waldmeier, 1998). Together with the business
community who felt that the punitive economic sanctions would eventually cripple the
country, the intelligence community, enlightened Afrikaner and English-speaking
businessmen, especially prominent Afrikaner business leader Dr. Anton Rupert,32 clerics,
and academics, placed pressure on the SAG to enter into negotiations with the ANC to
formulate a political settlement for all South Africans in the best interests of the country.
A series of negotiations as well as unilateral decisions made by the NP government to
reach an acceptable political settlement for the majority of the population, eventually
ended the system of apartheid de facto in the early 1990s and de jure on April 27, 1994
when the first democratic elections ever were held in SA. These negotiations took place
within the context of political violence across the country and amidst an alleged statesponsored third-force consisting of security force operatives inciting racial tensions and
violence by perpetuating the apartheid system (De Klerk, 2009; Giliomee, 2003).

32

Dr. Anton Rupert was a South African tobacco tycoon who promoted equal rights during the apartheid
era, and the second wealthiest businessman at the time only to the Oppenheimer family, who control the
Anglo-American and De Beers mining giants [relinquished control in 2008] (The Guardian, 2006).
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The Role of PSCs
PSCs have been active in SA since the peaceful resistance to the apartheid
government turned violent in the 1960s.33 Initially, the security police and later the
military were used as the lines of defense against the acts of violence committed by the
liberation forces. At that time, neighboring Namibia since independence was
administered by SA. Once the armed insurgency by the South West Africa People‘s
Organization (SWAPO) - another liberation force in the then-South West Africa escalated in the late 1960s, the South African military was deployed alongside the
militarized SAP to contain the acts of violence. The SAP eventually withdrew from that
conflict when military conscription was lengthened from 9 to 12 to 18 months, and
eventually to 2 years. The SAG now had the manpower to replace the police force, but
more importantly, the armed insurgency within the context of the Cold War took on a
stature that required military action for which the police force was not trained nor
equipped to handle. It was at this stage in the 1970s that the SAP began to reduce its
conventional policing functions inside SA. It began to focus its resources on suppressing
and containing the liberation struggle inside SA and PSCs began to fill the security gaps
left by the shift in police priorities, such as guarding property for paying clients, guarding
strategic installations, such as petroleum depots and government buildings, and as armed
response units to homes and businesses (Irish-Quobosheane, personal communication,
April 25, 2013).

33

See footnote 3 in Chapter 1 for a definition of a PSC.
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As the acts of violence by the liberation forces escalated, the prevalence of PSCs
increased at an average annual rate of 30% since the late 1970s (Irish, 1999; IrishQuobosheane, personal communication, April 25, 2013). Graph 3.1 below shows the
growth of the private security industry over ten years from 2001 to 2011.

Graph 3.1 Active PSCs and Active Private Security Officers Source: PSIRA (2012)

According to the SAIRR (2012), the growth in the private security industry can be
directly related to the SAP withdrawing from some of its traditional functions, private
property increasingly being used by the public such as shopping malls, and the perception
that the police are unable to protect the public effectively. A culmination of the end of the
Cold War in 1989/90 and the transition to democracy in SA in 1994 contributed to the
further rise of South African PSC activities outside and inside the borders of SA. Within
the context of the end of the Cold War and SA‘s past involvement in military excursions
in neighboring states and states further afield, a large number of people with experience
in counterinsurgency live in SA, and many owners and managers of PSCs have military,
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police, and intelligence training and experience (Irish-Quobosheane, personal
communication, April 25, 2013). Moreover, the end of the Cold War introduced a phase
where countries cut back on their military budgets and reduced their personnel worldwide by an estimated six million people (The Economist, 2012). This resulted in an
oversupply of trained soldiers who were not quite willing to join civilian life and found
themselves contributing to the burgeoning growth of the PSC industry. According to
Singer (2008), ―many members of the most ruthless military and intelligence units once
affiliated with either the communist regime in the Soviet Union, or the apartheid regime
in SA have found employment in the [private security] industry‖ (p. 215).
In 1989, quite a few SA Special Forces were assigned to the SAP to assist with
countering transnational crime and ended up going under-cover for the police (Barlow,
personal communication, April 25, 2013).34 After meeting with De Beers and Anglo
American Security managers who enquired from Barlow how he was able to successfully
infiltrate and penetrate crime syndicates, Barlow was contracted to set up a covert
operation for De Beers in Botswana known as Debswana to infiltrate the diamond crime
syndicates and cartels (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013). This illustrates
that the statutory security actors could not meet the community‘s security needs.
Executive Outcomes (EO) was established to train South Africa‘s Special Forces in
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Barlow served in the pre-1994 SA Defense Force in the conventional, unconventional, and covert units,
formerly in charge of the Western European section of the Civil Cooperation Bureau (Governmentsponsored organization during the apartheid-era that functioned under the authority of the Minister of
Defense, General Magnus Malan). He is also founder of now defunct private military company Executive
Outcomes and is presently the Chairman of STTEP (Special Tasks Training Equipment and Protection)
International – a private security company.
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covert operations. Subsequent to 1994, several ANC Umkhonto we Sizwe members
joined the ranks of EO and worked alongside their erstwhile enemies in Africa and the
Far East. This specialist expertise was an unfortunate loss to the SANDF.
The police suffered the same fate as the military in SA after democracy set in.
Certain units such as the Organized Crime Unit and the Narcotics Unit were shut down as
they were deemed superfluous (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013; Burger,
2014; Kohler-Barnard, 2013f). This resulted in a loss of specialized police skills. The
police received special training from the British metropolitan police and the ―FBI came
and trained what was known as the Scorpions‖ (Barlow, personal communication, April
25, 2013).35 The Scorpions rapidly degenerated into another crime syndicate and so the
SAG was forced to shut them down. The Scorpions were replaced by the Hawks, which
tried to follow the British method of policing and has a ―special investigative unit that
follows a quasi-FBI approach of which none can function [in SA] because we are not
England and we are not the United States‖ (Barlow, personal communication, April 25,
2013). The result of the manipulation of the military and the police by ―allies‖ has
resulted in thousands of ex-military and police who either started their own security
companies, or joined an extant PSC where they could apply their skills (Barlow, personal
communication, April 25, 2013). Since Barlow left EO in 1997 and it closed its doors in
January 1998, he became chairman of Special Tasks Training Equipment and Protection
International (STTEP) - a private military company (PMC) (Barlow, 2007).

35

The Scorpions was the Directorate of Special Operations - a unit under the jurisdiction of the National
Prosecuting Authority of SA, responsible for investigating crime and corruption.
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Another security area concern for SA is the loss of some of its intelligence
capabilities. PSCs monitor cell phones on behalf of the police and the intelligence
services because they do not always have the capability (Barlow, personal
communication, April 25, 2013).36 The private sector increasingly turns toward private
security to ―provide them a platform of apparent stability and security‖ so that they can
run their operations as they should, since they can no longer rely on the police to do it
(Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013; see also Graph 3.1). South African
citizens and businesses spend around R6 billion (USD 600 million) annually on private
security because they feel that the SAG does not do enough to keep them and their
property safe in a climate of very high crime rates (Kohler-Barnard, 2012h). According to
Kohler-Barnard (2012h), Shadow Minister of Police and member of the Portfolio
Committee on Police, ―more and more government departments, state entities and even
state security agencies and the police themselves use private security firms‖ (p.1).
After 1994, unlike the former SAP during apartheid, the SAPS had to deploy their
officers to cover the whole of SA and not just the white residential areas, which in turn
placed a strain on their limited manpower (Koornhof, personal communication, April 17,
2013). As a result of this reality, the private security industry saw the gap that developed
in the security system of not providing sufficient security and the economic forces of
supply and demand dictated the growth of the industry (Koornhof, personal
communication, April 17, 2013).

36

Loss of intelligence capabilities is not readily reported due to the sensitive nature of such information.
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To illustrate, as recently as November 2012, South African wine and fruit farmers
experienced labor unrest in the Western Cape. At the same time, the SAPS were strained
in dealing with countrywide strikes, requiring the farmers to rely on the services of PSCs
to protect their lives and property. The SAP Minister, Nathi Mthethwa (2013), said that,
―the South African private security industry is increasingly performing functions which
used to be the sole preserve of the police. This has, and will continue to have a serious
influence on the functioning of the criminal justice system as a whole‖ (p.1). Gaps in the
provision of basic security services by the state, combined with decreasing public
confidence in the ability of the SAPS to provide efficient and effective security services,
deserves further analysis. The questions may rightly be asked, whether the prevalence of
PSCs is a result of these gaps developing, and if the increasing prevalence of PSCs has a
negative effect on the security system in conjunction with these gaps?
The rise in the private security industry may certainly explain in part observed
improvements in SA‘s SFI measures. However, when one looks at one of the indicators
of latent state fragility proposed in this study, such as high crime rates that threaten
private and community security, it appears that the growth in the private security industry
has not had a meaningful impact on the gaps that have developed in the security system.
The fact that many of the human security challenges reside in Africa, and SA represents a
potentially significant regional partner in global efforts to address them, this means that
any indications of state fragility in SA could bode ill for much of the African continent.
As well, SA has received recognition as a significant regional and international leader by
joining Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) to form the emerging economic bloc
known as BRICS. It is also known that SA is a pivotal state for U.S. strategy in Africa
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(Cochran, 2000/1). Moreover, SA has become the second strongest economy in Africa
and according to the SFI, among the top stable states. As such, SA has become a pivotal
state beyond the African continent, which means it has become:
So important that its collapse would spell transboundary mayhem:
migration, communal violence, pollution, disease, and so on. A pivotal
state's steady economic progress and stability, on the other hand, would
bolster [its] region's economic vitality and political soundness and benefit
American trade and investment (Chase, Hill, & Kennedy, 1996, p. 153).
According to the Center for Systemic Peace (2011), SA has shown a consistent
improvement in state stability between 1995 and 2011, with its SFI score decreasing from
13 to 6 over those same years, with a score of 25 indicating extreme state fragility. SA
has consistently improved from a moderately fragile state in 1995 to low fragility in 2011
(Table 3.1).

Table 3.1
State Fragility Index for SA

Source: Center for Systemic Peace (2011)
74

Key
Extreme Scores

Source: Center for Systemic Peace (2011)
Indicators of state fragility, reflected in the effectiveness and legitimacy scores, 37 which
include security, political, economic, and social scores, show a steady improvement over
the same sixteen-year period (Table 3.1). According to these figures, it seems safe to
assume that SA is becoming more stable. But, how is this supposed increasing stability
related to the outsourcing of security functions?

What Types and Numbers of PSCs Operate in SA?
The type and number of PSCs are largely determined by the market (Table 3.2).

37

See Chapter 4 for definitions of these concepts.
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Table 3.2
Category of Security Service and Number of Businesses
Category of Service
Security Guard (Industrial and
Commercial)
Security Guards – Cash in Transit
Body-guarding
Security Consultant
Reaction Services
Entertainment / Venue Control
Manufacture Security Equipment
Private Investigator
Training
Security Equipment Installer
Locksmith / Key Cutter
Security Control Room
Special Events
Car Watch
Other
Insurance
Security and Loss Control
Fire Prevention and Detection
Consulting Engineer
Dog Training

Number of Businesses
6,324
2,300
2,776
2,572
2,836
3,068
1,084
1,875
2,328
2,012
743
2,488
3,168
2,069
446
171
144
86
32
8
Source: PSIRA (2012)

The number of registered active PSCs from 2001 through 2011 increased from 5,491 to
8,828 representing a 60.77% increase. For the same period, the number of PSC personnel
increased from 194,525 to 411,109 representing a 111.30% increase (PSIRA, 2011, see
also Table 3.3 & 3.4).
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Table 3.3
Registration of Active PSCs and Active Security Officers

Source: PSIRA (2012)

Table 3.4
Total Number of Registered Private Security Officers (Active and Inactive)

Source: PSIRA (2012)
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These figures indicate that the SAG has increasingly become dependent on the
services of the private security sector. According to the Minister of Police, the SAPS
spent close to R100 m (USD 16.6 million) on PSC services in 2005 and 2006 (Da Costa,
2007).38 Taljaard (2008) asserts that SA would not be able to function without PSCs
against the background of the PSC labor strike in 2006 over poor working conditions and
low salaries. This strike (mainly by guards protecting property) exposed people and
property to criminal activity, which the SAPS could not effectively contain while the
private security services ceased to function for the duration of the strike (Fivaz, personal
communication, June 3, 2013). The national crime statistics are presented in Graphs 3.23.6, where an increase in aggravated robbery, business and house robberies, car
hijackings, commercial crime, shoplifting, and murder during the nation-wide security
guard strike in 2006 are obvious.
Graph 3.2
Aggravated Robbery 2003/04 – 2011/12

Source: ISS (2012)

38

These are the only publicly available data that could be sourced.
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Graph 3.3
Trio Crimes 2003/04 – 2011/12

Source: ISS (2012)

Graph 3.4
Commercial Crime and Shoplifting 2003/04 – 2011/12

Source: ISS (2012)
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Graph 3.5
Murder and Attempted Murder Trends 1994/95 – 2011/12

Source: ISS (2012)
Graph 3.6
Percentage increase in crime between 1994/95 – 2011/12

Source: SAIRR (2012)
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Although the level of violent crime seems to be stabilizing, the latest crime statistics
(2012-2013) show that this is not the case. For example, house burglaries show an
increase of 3.6%, carjacking an increase of 5.4%, the murder rate an increase of 0.6%,
and the attempted murder rate an increase of 6.5%, over the preceding year (Crime Stats
SA, 2013). In response to the latest crime statistics, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS)
states that ―government‘s approach to crime is not working;‖ and with serious and violent
crime increasing, ―these are the worst figures we have seen in ten years‖ (ISS, 2013b,
p.1). Moreover, violence ―should be treated as a serious crisis which stands in the way of
South Africa‘s social and economic development‖ (ISS, 2013b).

Private Security Response
The aforementioned rise in the private security industry is a response to the
SAG‘s inability to provide sufficient security services (Barnard, personal communication,
April 30 & May 10, 2013; Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013; KohlerBarnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013). The latest crime statistics may make
one wonder whether the private security industry is effectively addressing personal and
community concerns. Before answering this question, it is important to understand the
role and self-conception of the South African private security industry.
The increase in aggravated robbery perpetrated over the period 2006-2007 (Graph
3.2) when security guards were on strike is evidence of the extent to which the SAG has
become dependent on the functioning of a viable private security industry. In response to
this strike, President Mbeki stated in his State of the Nation address:
The increase in the incidence of particular crimes during the security
workers‘ strike should have brought home to all of us the fact that the
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security industry cannot be handled simply as a private affair of the
private sector. Quite clearly the regulatory system that we have in
place is inadequate. This applies to such issues as wage levels,
personnel vetting systems, enforcement of guidelines on cash-delivery
vehicles, and so on (Mbeki, 2007).

From the national crime data, we observe that during the nation-wide strike by
security guards the crime rate increased in all the categories above, except attempted
murder (Graphs 3.2- 3.5), which the state could not contain. This is possibly indicative of
a security gap that has developed in the security system, which private security is ready
to, or has already filled. The SAG may have lost its capacity to fill this security gap if the
PSCs decide to withdraw from delivering security services.
The Soccer World Cup hosted in SA in 2010 was evidence of an excellent
collaborative attempt by the SAG and the PSCs to ensure sufficient and effective security
to all who attended the event from around the world (African Business, 2012; Fivaz,
personal communication, June 3, 2013; Hitchcock, personal communication, April 23,
2013; Pik Botha, personal communication, June 5, 2013). The success of that World Cup
event is evidenced by the many positive media reports and FIFA‘s accolades concerning
the peaceful event (The Guardian, 2010; The Huffington Post 2014; FIFA, 2010).
However, the collaboration between the PSCs and the SAG has since deteriorated
because of the drive by the SAG to regulate the industry even further, which is viewed
unfavorably by PSCs who see government interference in what is private business driven
by profit motives (African Business, 2012).
In June 2012, the Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, tabled a Private Security
Industry Regulation Amendment Bill in Parliament, which sought to restrict the foreign
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ownership of security companies and give the Police Minister the power to determine the
percentage of ownership and control in different categories of security businesses
(Kohler-Barnard, 2012h). After receiving presentations made by the public and the
private security industry to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police, a report was
compiled to provide the Committee with a brief summary of the public submissions that
were made on the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) Amendment
Bill. The PSIRA is the public body that regulates the private security industry and
controls the practices of private security service providers in SA. They work to ensure
that PSCs are held accountable for their behavior and to exert proper control over their
activities, such as the vetting of PSC officers, issuing of licenses to conduct business,
investigating charges of illegal activities, and payment of yearly dues. The PSIRA reports
to the Minister of Police, who has a vested interest in the causes and results of the
outsourcing of security system functions to the private security industry, especially when
it offers services that the SAPS could and should be providing to the population (Burger,
personal communication, May 28, 2013). Some of the submissions made by the private
security industry were the following:


There is an attitude of distrust between the PSIRA and the private security
industry.



The PSIRA is dysfunctional and does not effectively communicate with
the private security industry.



The private security industry was not consulted in the drafting of the Bill.
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The private security industry must be accessible to promote employment
and redress past discrimination, particularly at the entry level. While
regulation is important, the Act must not constitute a barrier to entry.



The use of regulations should be discouraged and minimized.



Foreign ownership amendments are irrational and therefore in breach of
the rule of law; constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property in
violation of Section 25(1) of the Constitution; and amount to
constructive expropriation and give rise to an uncompensated
expropriation of property in violation of Section 25(2) (b) of the
Constitution.



The vagueness of the legislation lends itself to interpretation, providing for
exemptions with no detail on who would qualify and how to obtain them.



It is not clear who will benefit if ownership is sold pursuant to the Act.



The proposed Bill might contravene the provisions of World Trade
Organization‘s (WTO) General Agreement of Trade in Service
(GATS) commitments, where SA has undertaken full market access
(Article XVI) and national treatment commitments (Article XVII) with
respect to investigation and security services.



Negative signals to foreign investors may result in oligopolies as the
number of PSCs decrease.
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The request of the reduction in foreign ownership of PSCs constitutes a
violation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement between the United
Kingdom and SA (South African Parliament, 2012, pp. 1, 8, 9, 11).39

The Portfolio Committee on Police unanimously decided to send the Private Security
Industry Regulation Amendment Bill back to the SAPS law advisors and the Police
Secretariat to be overhauled (Kohler-Barnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013).
Although there seemed to be agreement that the private security industry should be
regulated, the forced sale of 51% of foreign-owned private security companies to South
Africans, and prevention of any foreigner living legally and permanently in SA from
working in the private security industry was contentious (Kohler-Barnard, 2012e).
Regarding the costs of security to the population, residents are taxed to pay the SAPS
R67 billion a year (USD 6.7 billion), and for those who can afford it an additional R6
billion (USD 600 million) to the private security industry. The Bill would potentially
have led to massive job losses, decreased investment in SA, and become a security risk to
all South Africans (Kohler-Barnard, 2012e). In order to harness the indispensable role
that private security plays in delivering security services to the paying South African
population, the SAG is pressing for more regulation of the private security sector in
hopes of gaining more effective control over the industry.
SA is home to the largest private security market in the world as measured by
percentage of GDP (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009). SA‘s GDP in 2012 was USD 384

39

The report does not contain motivations for the statements that were made. The provision of private
security services by UK-based PSCs to SA falls within the ambit of the Agreement.
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billion, while the private security industry‘s turnover was approximately USD 10 billion
(Kohler-Barnard, 2012i). This amounts to 2% of SA‘s GDP. According to the PSIRA
(2011), there are around 1.36 million registered security officers, making it the second
largest employer after the agricultural sector. Jenny Reid, president of the South African
Security Association (SASA), observes that PSCs have grown in number and size in
response to the excessive lawlessness ―because the government has not convinced South
Africans it is able to contain the threat, the private sector has filled the vacuum and
provided a service that is absolutely necessary‖ (African Business, 2012, p. 1).
Approximately two million registered private security personnel (active and inactive)
suggest the public‘s lack of confidence in the SAG‘s ability to provide sufficient and
effective security to its population.
Berg and Gabi (2011) argue that the industry has ―continued to grow in response
to the insecurities associated with the democratic transition‖ (p. 5). Of particular concern
to the SAG is the number of foreign-owned private security companies such as G4S,
ADT, and Chubb that allegedly employ more than half of SA‘s private security personnel
(African Business, 2012). The Minister of Police claims that the ownership of these
security companies poses a threat to national security because of potential foreign
influence on SA‘s security and even covert penetration of SA‘s security by foreign
intelligence officers; however, the Shadow Minister of Police has requested him to
provide evidence to the Portfolio Committee on Police to support his concerns (KohlerBarnard, 2012h). The Minister has not been able to do this, especially since all PSCs that
are registered with the PSIRA have passed all security checks (Kohler-Barnard, 2012i).
In the PSIRA Amendment Bill submissions made to Parliament on October 26, 2012, the
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Security Industry Alliance asserted that ―foreign ownership within the private security
industry breaches SA‘s obligations under a number of international trade agreements and
treaties and is inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic‖ (Parliament, 2012, p.8).
The Amendment Bill indicates the SAG‘s push for majority South African ownership in
these companies (African Business, 2012; Irish-Quobosheane, personal communication,
April 25, 2013).
African Business (2012) reports that Reid argues that foreign-owned companies
should not be of concern, but rather regulating the number of illegal fly-by-night
companies should be the top priority. As the costs of private security services soar, the
clients who are under financial strain tend to look to these fly-by-nights as a cheaper
alternative to the more expensive ones (African Business, 2012). These companies,
mainly in the guarding sector, are normally the ones that fail to pay their annual dues to
the PSIRA as there is no proper oversight within such companies (Irish-Quobosheane,
personal communication, April 25, 2013). These companies employ personnel who are
not properly vetted or who change from one company to the next to avoid being exposed
as bad apples often due to their previous track records in the industry.

Outsourcing
A combination of generous voluntary severance packages to mainly white police
officers after the newly formed SAPS in 1994, growing public concern for the rampant
growth in crime, the burgeoning growth of the private security industry, and the
moratorium on recruiting police officers from 1995-2002 that resulted in a net loss of
20,000 officers, have all served as drivers for the SAPS to consider outsourcing to
87

address the gaps in services (Minnaar & Mistry, 1999). A moratorium on recruiting
police was imposed when the new SAPS was formed in 1994, as it absorbed
approximately 40,000 additional officers from the police forces of the former selfgoverning homelands, which produced a financial burden on the SAPS wage bill
(Newham & Lancaster, 2013).
Today, with the number of private security officers outnumbering the police 3:1,
members of the public are more likely to encounter a private security officer than a
member of the SAPS. Organizational restructuring, poorly managed affirmative action
and BEE policies, lack of capacity, capability, and resources have negatively affected the
level and quality of service the police provide (Hermann, personal communication, June
5, 2013).40 The high violent crime rate, growth of the private security industry, and the
outsourcing of some of the core security system functions such as intelligence and
forensics, are evidence of these negative effects. The SAPS have vacancies and in an
attempt to meet the affirmative action requirements, positions are often left vacant until a
suitably qualified black candidate can be identified (Burger, personal communication,
May 28, 2013; Hermann, personal communication, June 5, 2013; SAIRR, 2012, p. 819).
Outsourcing non-core functions and services such as administration,
transportation of prisoners, and guarding of premises, would not only be cost-effective,
but also would improve the performance of the police service that would enable them to
focus more on their core functions, such as visible policing and criminal investigations

40

Hermann is the Chief Executive Officer of the Solidarity Movement that includes the trade union
Solidarity, and AfriForum, one of the biggest civil rights organizations in SA.
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(Schönteich, 1999). Schönteich (1999) posits that the traditional approach to fighting
crime ―where the criminal justice system is a state monopoly, is obsolete‖ (p. 1). He
asserts that many developed states have a private security industry that is actively
involved in their criminal justice system (Schönteich, 1999). However, the SAPS oppose
such outsourcing for fear of fuelling the public discourse and outcry that they cannot
combat crime effectively, and are losing control over their core functions of combating
and investigating crime, maintaining order, and upholding the law (Minnaar & Mistry,
1999). According to opposition parties, media, and the general public, the question
remains whether control has not already been lost. With the release of the latest crime
statistics, an increase in the violent crime rate is a reflection on police inefficiency and
incapacity (Kohler-Barnard, 2013d). The dilemma is the growing number of PSCs even
as the SAPS have increased the number of police officers and have one of the bigger
budgets in the SAG.
Part of the explanation for the increasing growth in the private security industry is
the fact that the SAPS insources part of its core security functions such as intelligence,
criminal investigations, and forensics (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013;
Burger, personal communication, May 28, 2013; Fivaz, personal communication, June 3,
2013). This takes place because the SAPS have lost the capacity to provide such services,
or at least have been perceived by the general public to have done so (Burger, personal
communication, May 28, 2013; Fivaz, personal communication, June 3). Businesses and
private individuals who experience inadequate basic SAPS services most often utilize the
services of the PSCs.
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A further indictment of police performance appears to come from the analysis
done by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) showing that 1.65 million
crimes went unreported in SA in 2011, which means that of the 3.25 million crimes
committed in 2011, only 51% were reported, indicating a lack of public trust in the
police‘s ability to effectively provide personal and community security (SAIRR, 2012, p.
730; see Table 3.5). Unreported crime to the SAPS is captured by the Stats SA Victim
Survey (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5
Crimes Reported and Not Reported

Source: Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2012, p. 39).41

41

(a.) ―Stats SA says a crime such as sexual assault is generally under-reported by households and the
figures should therefore not be regarded as an accurate source of sexual offences data. Although data from
victim surveys is more likely to elicit better disclosure of criminal incidents than information from police
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According to the Stats SA Victim Survey, three murders a day go unreported (SAIRR,
2012, p. 730). As further evidence that the SAG may be losing its monopoly on the
legitimate use of force, in the response by Kohler-Barnard (2013d) to the Minister of
Police Budget Speech on May 30, 2013, she stated that 20% of their detectives are
without the most basic training, 27,000 police officers with firearms have no license,
16,500 officers are without driver‘s licenses, and 32.8% (R20.5 billion or USD 2.05
billion) of its R67.9 billion (USD 6.79 billion) budget was set aside for paying civil
claims made by the public against the SAPS. These claims were for having been ―shot,
raped, beaten, robbed, hijacked, raped in cells, illegally detained, run over, wrongfully
arrested, tortured or murdered (compensation paid to the victims‘ families)‖ (KohlerBarnard, 2013d). Moreover, it would appear that notwithstanding one of the bigger
budgets in the overall national budget and an increase of police officers to almost
200,000, overall crime has increased from ―2,085,757 to 2,126,537, an actual increase of
40,780 reported crimes since the last year‖ (Kohler-Barnard, 2013e). Additionally, only

records, they can also be subject to undercounting as some victims may be reluctant to disclose information
of a sensitive nature. In the case of sexual offences, disclosure may additionally be hampered by the
possible presence of the perpetrator in the household being interviewed‖ (Statistics South Africa, 2012, p.
39).
(b.) ―The SAPS information is based on recorded cases collected from the administrative departments of
police stations across the country from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012. The victim survey on the other
hand, collected both household and individual information from face-to-face interviews with 31 007
households that excluded institutions such as prisons, hospitals, care centers, and military barracks. Victim
surveys usually produce higher crime estimates. The reason is that victim surveys sometimes deal with
incidents that may not necessarily match the legal definition of crime. For instance, households told Stat
SA researchers that they had reported 118 000 residential robberies while only 17 000 cases were recorded
in official SAPS reports over roughly the same period. There are exceptions where households may report
more crimes to the police than they do to victim survey researchers. Note ―a‖ above is an example of this in
the case of sexual offences‖ (Statistics South Africa, 2012, p. 39).
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one in ten victims reported being raped to the SAPS, which means that while the official
statistics show 70,000 rapes reported during the past year, more accurately 700,000
women, children, and men were raped (SAIRR, 2012).
It would seem that these statistics should be strong arguments for greater
collaboration with the private security industry and less resistance by the SAPS towards
the outsourcing of services to the industry, in the interest of combating crime. However,
the Minister of Police during his most recent budget speech stated that the private
security industry is becoming more diversified and as a result, ―the lines between private
security, private intelligence and private military have become vague and blurred‖
(Mthethwa, 2013). Moreover, in his budget speech, he stated that the private security
industry is ―increasingly performing functions which used to be the sole preserve of the
police…and will continue to have a serious influence on the functioning of the criminal
justice system as a whole‖ (Mthethwa, 2013).
Minnaar and Mistry (1999) argue that the debate whether to outsource certain
SAPS functions and services to the private security industry arose because private
security had penetrated traditional areas of public policing. The main areas of concern
were the true motivations of the private security industry‘s involvement, in other words,
was it for profit or a genuine concern on the part of the SAG to fight rampant crime
(Minnaar & Mistry, 1999)? The SAG is still concerned about the lack of transparency
and proper control mechanisms over the private security industry (Mthethwa, 2013).
Mthethwa‘s (2013) concerns do not suggest better collaboration between the private
security industry and the SAPS. It places the relationship on a more adversarial footing
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with the possibility of more stringent government regulation of the private security
industry to come.
A further factor that may complicate this debate is the issue of the security
industry‘s primary role as that of ―protecting its clients and their assets, versus the public
police‘s role of crime prevention and combating crime,‖ in other words, the question of
the ―effectiveness of loss prevention versus offender prosecution as a crime deterrent‖
(Minnaar & Mistry, 1999, p. 40). In SA, where policing is spread thin, the role of the
police has changed to reacting to a crime after it has taken place (and been reported)
rather than crime prevention. In this case, police reaction does not benefit the victim
although society may benefit if the criminal is tried, found guilty, imprisoned, and
rehabilitated before being set free again. Society can only hope that the criminal does not
commit another crime. On the other hand, the private security industry is about crime
prevention. The security needs of the paying customer take precedence and by taking
preventive measures, such as installing security alarms and being in immediate contact
with the armed response control room, the potential victim is better protected against
crime than would be the case if he were solely reliant upon public policing (Schönteich,
1999). Individuals who are protected by the PSCs are more secure than people who have
to rely on the police for personal and community security, which further erodes public
trust in the SAPS.
A contributory factor to the tension that has developed about what should be
outsourced, is the country‘s constitution, which prescribes that ―the objectives of the
police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to
protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and
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enforce the law‖ (SAG, 1996). The SAPS is apparently not meeting the expectations that
SA‘s constitution stipulates.

Public Trust and the SAPS
In apartheid SA, the former SAP focused on punitive policing and enforcing
apartheid legislation rather than community policing with a focus on crime prevention
and protection. This use of the SAP produced a police force that developed a deficit in its
ability to conduct community policing with a focus on combating and solving crime for
all citizens. It is against this background that the new SAPS was formed in 1994
consisting of members of the erstwhile SAP, members of the liberation forces, and the
nine different police forces of the nine self-governing territories within SA. The new
SAPS had to retrain its officers to conduct crime prevention rather than enforce racist
legislation. It was during this transition period that international organized crime
syndicates gained a foothold in SA (ISS, 2013; Van Wyk, personal communication, April
21, 2013). There were also challenges of establishing a uniformed SAPS consisting of
nine disparate police forces from the nine self-governing territories that each had their
own standards of training, expertise and effectiveness. It has taken time to establish a
standard of policing, which is still in the making. In addition, the erstwhile SAP policed
the mainly white residential areas and contained the civil unrest to the mainly black
townships. While the former SAP policed mainly white residential suburbs, the new
SAPS had to police all of the territory of SA and this posed a challenge to insufficient
human and financial resources, which does not help the SAPS in its efforts to combat
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crime. In the meanwhile, crime levels increased and SA citizens who could afford it
turned to the private security industry for more effective protection against crime.
Concerning security effectiveness, sovereign states have the responsibility to
provide security to their citizens and corruption in the police and criminal justice system
poses a threat to political security (Krause, 2002). Recent research conducted by the
SAIRR found many incidents alleging and confirming the police‘s involvement in very
serious and often violent and premeditated criminal behavior (Ndebele, Lebone, Cronje,
2011).42
For example, public trust in the police is declining as some police officials are
themselves involved in the most heinous crimes, and two former police commissioners
were found to be corrupt and were fired, setting a bad example for the rank-and-file
(Burger, personal communication, May 28, 2013; see also Ndebele, Lebone & Cronje,
2011). Fear of police brutality and mistrust of the police officers due to their participation
in crime, fraud, and corruption, is on the rise (Burger, personal communication, May 28,
2013). The SAPS Crime Intelligence Division has been the subject of allegations and
reports of misconduct and abuse of power. Evidence of the SAPS using excessive force,
which is tantamount to police brutality and abuse of authority, included abusive behavior
by the SAPS Tactical Response Unit in a restaurant in Melville and another at a bar in
Hillbrow, Johannesburg, during 2011 (Burger, personal communication, May 28, 2013).
There was also the incident of the assault and killing of Andries Tatane by members of

42

See Ndebele, Lebone & Cronje (2011) for a list of these crimes perpetrated by SAPS officers.
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the Public Order Police Unit (POP) during a protest march in Ficksburg, Free State, on
April 13, 2011 (Burger, personal communication, May 28, 2013; IOL, 2011c). Tatane
participated in a service delivery strike with thousands of other protesters who were
protesting poor local government service delivery in their township. After being
confronted by a group of police who began to kick and beat him with batons, an unarmed
Tatane suffered two fatal gunshot wounds to his chest by two police officers. This
incident caused public outrage because of his unnecessary death. In another incident on
April 23, 2011, the police assaulted the owner and patrons of a sports bar in Cape Town
for public misconduct. On April 26, 2011, Jeanette Odendaal allegedly crashed into a
stationary police vehicle when she parked outside the Kempton Park police station and
while sitting in her car was shot in the head by a police sergeant and died (Burger,
personal communication, May 28, 2013; IOL, 2011a). On the same day, one court in
KwaZulu Natal sat to hear how five police officers allegedly strangled a person in
custody; while in another court, fifteen police allegedly beat a suspect in custody to death
(Burger, personal communication, May 28, 2013; IOL, 2011b). The ―consequence of
poor policing in areas where there is a high level of crime,‖ such as the traditional black
township of Khayelitsha near Cape Town, has prompted the ―Western Cape Government
to institute a new Security Act‖ (Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013). This
Act will create a post of ―police ombudsman‖ to look at the whole question of policing in
the Western Cape, and more particularly in places like Khayelitsha and elsewhere, where
there is poor policing (Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013; IOL, 2013f).
This move was necessary because the ―national police is just not efficient to do the job
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properly,‖ which creates an insecure situation for members of the community (Van Zyl,
personal communication, April 8, 2013; IOL, 2013f).
Undue political interference in the appointment process of senior officials in stateowned enterprises is an area that needs to be addressed (SAG, 2012, p. 55). The
prevalence of corruption influences the appointment of senior officials in government and
state-owned enterprises. The National Development Plan (NDP) advocates that economic
development can only take place when citizens are afforded the level of human security
that would foster economic growth.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to give background concerning SA‘s racial policies
and initial signs of rising ethnic tensions, with the past two presidents being Xhosa, while
the incumbent president Zuma is Zulu. During the presidencies of Nelson Mandela and
Thabo Mbeki, Zulus were marginalized from government jobs in general (IOL, 2012c).
Zulus are the largest ethnic group in SA with the Xhosas being the second largest. Today,
there appear to be signs that preference is being given to Zulus, with many being
appointed to senior positions in the security system (2012c). SA cannot afford to have
ethnicity-based preferential treatment and should have policies in place that pre-empt
this. After many decades of civil strife, loss of life, loss of prestige, and eventually
isolation as the pariah of the world, SA became a democracy through a negotiated
settlement between white and black South Africans. Having experienced systemic racial
policies over many years, the new democratic SA instituted policies such as affirmative
action and BEE in an effort to redress the wrongs of the past. Although these policies
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were formulated with good intentions, their implementation has not had the intended
success. In fact, racial quotas drive these policies with important positions being left
unfilled thereby undermining the security system‘s ability to provide much needed
security services. ―The evident failure of affirmative action and BEE to assist more than a
small elite is sparking more criticism and may in time help bring about constructive
reform‖ (SAIRR, 2012, p. 819). The policies have made an elite few extremely wealthy,
while the majority of the population continues to live in abject poverty. At the same time,
the SAIRR (2012) reports a decline in racial relations.43 The increasing inequality
between the races presents a challenge to economic security and makes SA ―one of the
most unequal societies in the world‖ (IOL, 2014a, p. 1).
Today, 20 years after SA became a democracy, these affirmative action and BEE
policies are viewed as discriminatory by the minority population groups because they are
not merit-based, but race-based (IOL, 2014b). It is hoped that the racially-based apartheid
policies of the past will serve to discourage the continued use of these well-intended BEE
and affirmative action policies that have not been effectively implemented. It is against
this backdrop that SA has developed its private security industry to become the world‘s
largest.
Next, economic sanctions and civil unrest besieged the country for many years
and served as some of the reasons for the growth of the private security industry,
especially concerning the guarding of strategic government installations during the 1970s

43

Racial goodwill deteriorated from 55% in 2009/10 to 50% in 2010/11 (SAIRR, 2012, p.305, 306).
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and 1980s. As the private security industry grew, it diversified. Since the advent of
democracy in 1994, the SAG has viewed the growth of the private security industry with
suspicion because it employs many of the former security force operatives who served in
the apartheid system. However, there have been attempts to foster collaboration between
the industry and government, but to little avail. The SAG acknowledges the inevitability
of the industry and its contribution to securing some of the population, but there has not
been a concerted effort from government to show the industry that it is integral to the
security system and that it is a welcome part of government strategy to help bring down
the high levels of crime. We see that PSCs that operate inside SA have been successful,
but recent statistics call into question whether they are able to successfully fill the void
left by the SAPS, and whether they are able to overcome the lack of public trust in the
SAG‘s ability to provide personal, community, and economic security.
The number of registered active PSCs over the past decade has increased by
60.77%, while PSC personnel increased by 111.30% and indications are that this growth
will continue in the foreseeable future (IOL, 2014c). There are 20 major categories of
security services provided by the industry of which the top six are industrial and
commercial security, special events, entertainment venue control, reaction services, bodyguarding, security consultancy, and cash-in-transit security. These are services formerly
offered by the SAPS that over time have either been outsourced or insourced as the need
arose.
The SAG is concerned about the private security industry encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of the SAPS. Economic considerations for outsourcing of non-core security
system functions are considered appropriate. However, when core security system
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functions are outsourced because of the loss of SAPS capacity and capability, this study
suggests that we can no longer speak of outsourcing. This type of outsourcing has now
morphed into insourcing, at which point the state begins to lose some control over its core
security functions, which are now in the hands of the private security industry. Finally,
sub-par leadership in the SAPS, complicity in serious crime by police officers at all
levels, high rates of violent crime, and unfulfilled promises of widespread economic
prosperity are undermining public trust in the SAG.
Having a relatively large police force, and a private security industry larger than
the police and military forces combined, yet burdened with high direct and structural
violence rates, indicates that SA may suffer from latent state fragility not identified by
commonly used measures of state fragility. Despite the well-documented improvements,
the challenges facing the SAG juxtaposed against the lowering fragility levels highlights
SA‘s paradox: on the one hand SA has very moderate to low rates of formal fragility,
while on the other hand the country faces many serious challenges, especially with regard
to the provision of personal, community, political, and economic security to its
population, one of the fundamentals of democratic governance. The South African case
offers insights into the concept of latent state fragility possibly playing out in other parts
of the world as well such as the United States. The next chapter discusses the
methodology used for the analysis of the South African case.
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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Since 1994 when SA became a democracy, the country has made remarkable
progress in uplifting previously disadvantaged population groups. The community of
nations accepted SA into its fold again and trade with these countries normalized. Over
the past 20 years, indications are that the country has progressed from a moderately
fragile state to one with low fragility (Center for Systemic Peace, 2012). In the afterglow
of the hugely successful hosting of the Soccer World Cup in 2010, SA was heralded as a
great democracy underscored by the widely used State Fragility Index (SFI), which
showed that SA had moved from moderate to low fragility. When SA won the hosting of
the Soccer World Cup, it made concerted efforts to contain crime and deal with it
effectively. A combined effort by the security forces and the criminal justice system, in
collaboration with the private security industry, had a positive impact on reducing crime
levels in the country.
Since the 2010 Soccer World Cup, notwithstanding a huge increase in police
numbers and the police budget, direct and structural violence is on the rise again. SA was
a violent democracy during the 1990s into the 2000s (ISS, 2013b). In addition, SA is
home to the world‘s largest private security industry (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009).
The SAG has outsourced some of its core security functions to the private security
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industry. The preceding chapters have identified the key question this study aims to
address: Do existing measures of state fragility really measure fragility? This question is
at the heart of this research and guides the analysis. Related sub-questions include:


Is SA more fragile than commonly used measures lead us to believe?



Do governance and security deficits in SA indicate a latent level of state fragility,
making SA less stable than widely believed?



What role does the outsourcing of key security functions play in protecting or
undermining, personal, community, political, and economic security and stability
in SA?



How does the growth of the private security industry affect these dynamics?
To understand the complexity of the security situation in SA in all its nuance, my

research enables me to determine whether the existing measures of state fragility really
measure fragility. I do this by interviewing security experts in the field. The SFI indicates
that a country has high fragility when it experiences major political, social and economic
challenges. In order to assess the nature and magnitude of these challenges for SA, I
interviewed leading South African security experts and practitioners. This approach
provides richer data than secondary analysis of existing quantitative data would by itself.
With this research, I hope to gain an understanding of the role that the security
system and its actors play in the state fragility debate, with particular emphasis on the
role of the SAPS and the private security industry. It is anticipated that this research may
offer insights into the concept of latent state fragility. This concept predicts that when
non-traditional indicators of state fragility or instability are present, such as high violent
crime, huge social disparities, endemic corruption, high unemployment and poverty rates,
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and poor service delivery, especially with regards to the provision of security to its
population, we have a case of latent state fragility. This study intends to show that the
human security components of personal, community, economic, and political security
have to be considered as integral factors of good governance. Moreover, when a state has
seen its private security industry grow to where it becomes larger than its police and
military forces combined, one has to wonder whether the outsourcing of security system
functions to that industry contributes to or erodes the stability of the state.
I have divided this chapter into six sections, including concepts and variables,
hypotheses, data collection, limitations, data analysis, and criteria for quality of research
designs, where I also discuss validity, reliability, and ethical considerations.

Concepts and Variables
Although all the statistical data indicate that SA is a stable democracy, it hosts the
largest, most, and rapidly growing number of PSCs that assume an ever-increasing array
of security functions. This calls into question the state‘s monopoly on the provision of
security and its ability to ensure the security of its citizens in light of direct and structural
violence in the country. The prevalence of direct violence begs the question of whether
the state may not be able to ensure the security of its population. It is questionable
whether outsourcing presents a solution given the increasing violent crime rates with the
concomitant growth in the private security industry. This research uses semi-structured
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interviews, review of official documents,44 and secondary data analysis to examine the
current security context in SA and the state‘s ability to provide for the security of its
citizens.
SA has shown a consistent improvement in state stability from a moderately
fragile state in 1995 with a State Fragility Index (SFI) score of 13, with 25 being
extremely fragile, to low fragility in 2011 with a SFI score of 6 (Table 3.1). State fragility
is defined by the SFI in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy scores, which include
security, political, economic, and social scores; SA has shown a steady improvement over
a sixteen-year period (Table 3.1). According to this index, SA overall is becoming more
stable (Center for Systemic Peace, 2011). In fact, SA is the most advanced country
economically and politically in Africa, but shows signs of what we find in fragile states.
Figure 4.1 below depicts SA as having one of the lowest levels of fragility among African
countries.

44

Du Toit & Du Toit (2012); SAG (2013); Ndebele, Lebone, & Cronje (2011); PSIRA (2013); PSIRA
(2011); SA Parliament (2012a); SA Parliament (2012b).
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Figure 4.1 State Fragility Index

Source: Center for Systemic Peace (2012)

The literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, focuses on four key topics, namely good
governance, security, state fragility, and outsourcing to PSCs as appropriate measures for
determining the security dilemma(s) underlying one of Africa‘s key pivotal states.
Showing direct and structural violence over the past 20 years against the backdrop of the
SFI categorizing SA as a stable state, prompted me to test additional key factors
pertaining to security and good governance that the SFI does not take into consideration.
The SFI Security Effectiveness score is a measure of general security and
vulnerability to political violence and is based on two assumptions: (1) the residual
effects of low level and/or short wars diminish relatively quickly; and (2) the residual
effects of serious or protracted wars diminish gradually over a 25-year period (Center for
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Systemic Peace, 2012, p. 4). Neither of these two assumptions is applicable in the case of
SA. SA has not experienced a low level and/or short war, neither has it experienced a
serious or protracted war since 1903. According to the SFI, SA has no fragility in this
category. However, the SFI does not take into consideration the elements of human
security such as personal, community, economic, and political security, which are being
threatened in SA. These are latent indicators of state fragility.
Security Effectiveness in my study is defined in terms of the violent crime rate.
The higher the crime rate the less effective the security system. Wyler (2008), Carmola
(2010), Rotberg (2004), Schnabel (2012), and Jackson (2012) agree that with rampant
corruption, high levels of crime, incapacity of a state to control criminal activity over all
its territory, ineffectiveness and inefficiency, and lagging peace and stability for its
citizenry, we have not only direct threats to the physical well-being and security of
individual citizens, but also the makings of a fragile state. The following variables were
used to measure security effectiveness: accountability and transparency, levels of crime,
and capacity of a state to control criminal activity over all its territory. My study
operationalizes accountability and transparency in terms of the Parliamentary oversight as
exercised by the Portfolio Committee for Police to whom the Minister of Police has to
give a yearly report of the state of policing in SA. My study compares this report with
opposition parties‘ critique of the state of policing. Levels of crime are measured by the
SAIRR as well as the SAPS. The capacity of the state to control criminal activity over all
its territory is measured in terms of the areas where most of the violent crime is
committed and areas where most of the PSCs are active. In order to measure security
effectiveness, I asked questions pertaining to the private security industry, levels of
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crime, law enforcement, the role of the PSIRA, and outsourcing (for exact interview
questions, see Appendix C).
Political Effectiveness is defined by the SFI as ―a state that has regime stability,
total number of coups events, including successful, attempted, plotted, alleged coups and
forced resignations or assassinations of chief executives, and current leader‘s years in
office,‖ and the SFI score shows SA to have low fragility in this category (Center for
Systemic Peace, 2012, p. 4). The SFI does not take into consideration the levels of
corruption, abuse of power, maladministration, sub-par leadership, and government
policies favoring one racial group over another. Political Effectiveness in this study is
defined in terms of government inclusivity of all racial and ethnic groups according to
their proportional representation in the population, the effectiveness of the security
system and effective government as measured by the SAIRR, and due political process as
measured in terms of responses obtained from semi-structured interviews. Schnabel
(2012), the World Bank (2011), Wyler (2008), and Jackson (2012) state that when a
government is not inclusive, is partial and corrupt, has a dysfunctional security sector,
and lacks effective government, it has become fragile. The following variables were used
to measure political effectiveness: government inclusivity, functional security system, and
effective government (the presence of corruption and abuse of power). Inclusivity is
measured in terms of government policies that favor one racial group over another. A
functional security system is measured in terms of the size of the private security
industry. Effective government is measured according to the level of corruption and
abuse of power. In order to measure political effectiveness, I asked questions pertaining
to the security system, state response to crime, private/public security collaboration,
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public trust in the SAPS, and levels of crime (for exact interview questions, see Appendix
C).
The SFI measures Political Legitimacy by governance inclusion as determined by
―factionalism,‖ no discrimination against ―5% or more of the population,‖ and no
―political salience of elite ethnicity, and polity [regime] fragmentation‖ (Center for
Systemic Peace, 2012, p. 8). The SFI shows the Political Legitimacy score for SA to
indicate low fragility (Center for Systemic Peace, 2012, p. 4). Political Legitimacy in my
study is measured in terms of inclusivity in positions in government and in terms of all
citizens having equal access to security. The aforementioned data and the extent to which
there is a social divide between the haves and the have-nots are determined largely from
data obtained during my semi-structured interviews. In order to measure the social divide,
I asked questions pertaining to the private security industry and the growing social divide
(for exact interview questions, see Appendix C).
Schnabel (2012, p. 10) and the World Bank (2011, p. xvi) agree that the lack of
inclusivity and of equal access to security helps manifest state fragility. The following
variables were used to measure political legitimacy: inclusivity in security and securityrelated cabinet posts and positions in government, and equal access to security. In order
to measure political legitimacy, I asked questions pertaining to the security system, social
divide, public trust in the SAPS, and governance effectiveness (for exact interview
questions, see Appendix C).
In order to operationalize good governance, I considered the role that the security
system plays in influencing state fragility through qualitative analysis by coding the semistructured interviews. I used semi-structured interviews to revisit the categories identified
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in the literature, such as human security, good governance, state security, and outsourcing
to better gauge some of these indicators that are not used by the State Fragility Index
(SFI). Unfortunately, there has not been any quantitative research on state fragility in
contexts where we find high private security industry prevalence in a state with direct and
structural violence. The questions that I asked fall into the two broad categories of overall
perceptions regarding the security situation inside SA and perceptions of the
effectiveness of private security in SA. In order to measure good governance, I asked
questions pertaining to the security system, law enforcement, perceptions of the provision
of private security, outsourcing, and crime (for exact interview questions, see Appendix
C).
I also conducted secondary data analysis of local or international private security
companies that offer security services in a variety of capacities, such as armed security
services, security-related advice and training, intelligence-gathering services, and
securing fixed assets, such as government, commercial, and residential buildings through
accessing data provided to the PSIRA. Outsourcing is widely accepted as a way to access
external expertise and technology, reduce costs, return to core business practices, and
improve services. Operationalization of the concept of outsourcing takes place through
secondary data analysis of the PSIRA statistics of the types and numbers of PSCs and the
numbers of active and inactive private security officers and through qualitative analysis
by coding the semi-structured interviews. In order to measure outsourcing, I asked
questions pertaining to the security system, private security collaboration, public trust in
the police, and levels of crime (for exact interview questions, see Appendix C).
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At the outset of this research, I explore the extent to which an examination of
personal, community, political, and economic security would confirm the SFI‘s
indication of moderate to low state fragility, or if SA presents a case of latent state
fragility.

Hypotheses
The aforementioned variables are appropriate measures as the literature points to
states becoming fragile when any one or combination of negative values of these
variables is present. I test the following hypotheses:
H1. Outsourcing of basic security system functions to PSCs is indispensable to
maintain an efficient security system in SA.
H2: Human security decreases as the effectiveness of the security system
decreases.45
H3: The effectiveness of the security system is directly correlated with political
effectiveness and good governance.46

45

Personal security decreases with the increase in violent crime; Community security decreases as violent
crime increases; Community security decreases with the rise in ethnic tension; Political security decreases
as the level of corruption increases; Economic security decreases with unequal access to socio-economic
opportunities through government policies; Political security decreases with unequal access to power
sharing through government policies.
46

Security system effectiveness decreases as abuse of power increases; Security system effectiveness
decreases due to lack of leadership; Security system effectiveness decreases as the level of corruption
increases; Security system effectiveness decreases as the legitimacy of government decreases; Good
governance decreases through affirmative action/BEE policies; Human security decreases as political
security decreases; Security system effectiveness decreases as the social divide increases; As ethnic
political discrimination increases, political legitimacy weakens.

110

Data Collection
I was able to obtain crime statistics, private security company statistics, and
unemployment rates through existing data, while security system effectiveness, ethnicitybased preferential treatment, sub-optimal political leadership, abuse of power, corruption,
and unequal access to socio-economic opportunities, I measured through conducting
semi-structured interviews. In preparation for data collection, I developed an interview
guide, which included an informed consent form. As my study focuses on the security
system and good governance, with particular emphasis on the role of the police and the
private security industry, it was most appropriate to interview officials with current or
past work experience in or related to the security system, including police, justice,
intelligence, NGOs, private security industry, legislature, and academia. My interview
instrument contained questions relevant to these groups of interviewees. Each individual
subsample required slightly revised interview instruments containing questions specific
to each group because of their particular expertise and knowledge.47 I conducted the
interviews in English or Afrikaans and was able to translate/interpret from English to
Afrikaans and vice versa while conducting the interviews. The consent form was
prepared in English and was available in Afrikaans for the interviews. Although SA has
eleven official languages, the language for conducting business, politics, and media
reporting is English (SAIRR, 2012, p. 83).

47

See Appendix C.
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I conducted my research in two phases. During the first phase, I collected raw
data without interacting with the interviewees in order to get a better understanding of the
contemporary security context in SA and to help me identify gaps in knowledge that I
intended to fill with interview data. I accessed databanks for crime statistics,
unemployment rates, poverty indices, and PSC data,48 as well as parliamentary committee
data, and media reports to develop a baseline of reference for the security context in SA
against which to compare the perceptions offered by my interviewees. To establish the
level of SA‘s stability or fragility, I used the following SFI key indicators of state
fragility as most relevant for my study: Security Effectiveness, Political Effectiveness,
and Political Legitimacy, as these are the areas where the SAG is ranked as having no
fragility, yet appears to have the most challenges.49
During the second phase, I conducted 45 semi-structured interviews. This study
does not present the findings of a representative sample; however, all the interviewees are
experts in their own right. Thirty-nine of the interviewees were male (one Indian, two
colored, nine black, and 33 white), and six female (white). Although every effort was
made to have interviewees from across the racial, political, and gender divide, in my
efforts to approach high profile government leaders, a number of agreed appointments
were cancelled, and others did not materialize. Most of my interviewees are, or were at
one stage in their professional careers, directly or indirectly involved with the security

48

See Tables 3.1-3.5; Figure 4.1; and Graphs 3.1-3.6.

49

See Table 3.1.
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system in SA, and are current or former government representatives, parliamentarians, in
the private sector, media, NGOs, and academia (see Appendix A, Table A.1).
I had access to many interviewees through my previous work as a diplomat where
I had contact with some of them in different capacities. I used snowball and purposive
sampling to access those interviewees with whom I had no previous contact by asking my
interviewees at the very end of the interview if they could refer me to someone else who
would be able to contribute to my research study.50 In some cases, the current interviewee
would reach out to the following interviewee because of the sensitive nature of the work
they conducted or were involved with in the past. I had set up interviews with my initial
interviewees and informed them that their participation in my study was crucial because
of their first-hand experience or expertise in the subject matter. During this phase, I
conducted semi-structured interviews because this technique allowed for flexibility to
take advantage of the flow of the interview with the interviewees. Most of these questions
were open-ended to afford participants the opportunity to give as broad an answer as
possible.51 Interviews were scheduled for 45 minutes, but most of my interviewees
allowed me to interview them for much longer. Questions were selected to elicit as much
information as possible on good governance, police capacity and capability, growth in the
private security industry, perceptions of security, and perceived state fragility. It was
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―In the snowball technique, you use key informants to locate one or two people in a population and get
handed from informant to informant and so the sampling frame grows with each interview‖ (Bernard, 2006,
p. 193).
51

See Appendix C for a list of the questions.

113

important to establish a level of trust with each participant before delving into questions
that were more sensitive. I did this by explaining my background and subsequent career
path to allay any fears of perceived hidden agendas and by starting with a non-threatening
question to make the interviewees more comfortable. For example, could you please tell
me a little about yourself and any career/experiences in the security field? I obtained prior
permission from every interviewee to digitally record the interview before doing so, and
these recordings were useful to avoid potential misunderstandings. I relied on memory
and note-taking to document additional body language and any other matters concerning
the interviewee‘s reactions and demeanor during the interview to ensure that I captured
nuance.
Upon completing the final draft of this dissertation, I offered the interviewees a
copy of the relevant dissertation chapters highlighting the sections where I quoted them
directly or referenced the interview with them. I asked them to review the context in
which I quoted or referenced them before completing the dissertation and publishing any
parts of it, allowing them to provide feedback or withdraw their information as they
perceived necessary. Confidentiality of the interviewees was promised in the final
product, unless they provided written permission to attribute to them directly on the
record. Only six interviewees requested strict confidentiality and they will be referenced
on deep background.52 For those interviewees who did not respond to my first request for
permission to use their names, I sent three subsequent follow-up requests informing them

52

Referencing interviewees ―on deep background‖ means that information shared by the interviewee can be
used in the story or article, but ―not attributed to anybody by name or otherwise‖ (Newman, 2002, p. 118).
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that, unless I heard otherwise, I would quote them by name in the dissertation and
subsequent publications. In the absence of a response from them, I used their names and
positions and gave them a final opportunity, together with the remaining interviewees, to
review my quotes or interview references before finalizing the dissertation. A complete
list of all interviewees, including short biographical information, and their current and
past institutional affiliations, is included in Appendix B.

Limitations
The debate around the general safety and security of the population and the role of
PSCs is a politically charged subject and sensitive matter. My interviewees in both
government and the private security industry may have been understandably guarded
with the information they were willing to share for fear of inadvertently exposing security
system deficits on the side of the state, and the vested interests that PSCs have in
ensuring a continued source of revenue from their operations. I may have faced biased
interviewees with hidden political agendas that may have influenced their responses to
the interview questions. I used probing questions to address these concerns to be sure to
access as much information as possible and validate information across interviews to
counter these potential biases and obtain sufficient data for my research project. Crime
statistics are dependent upon those crimes that have been reported to the authorities. The
amount of crime not reported for fear of reprisals, lack of faith in the effectiveness of the
police, or because the victims who live out in the townships and countryside do not have
any means of travelling great distances, or communicating to report acts of crime and
violence, or for any other reason, might skew any available quantitative data.
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Interviewees‘ lack of support and understanding of my research study may have
limited my efforts to elicit rich data from them during the interviews. However, all
interviewees were experts in the field and they were purposefully selected based on the
fact that they are experts. A further limitation may be the criticism that qualitative data is
too subjective, impressionistic, and difficult to replicate, while it is also not easily
generalizable. However, while the case study method may limit the extent to which
broader conclusions may be drawn, it does not preclude them. Furthermore, using
secondary quantitative data to cross-validate findings increases the robustness of the
results.
A close examination of the additional human security components, such as healthcare, environment, and food security extend beyond the scope of the present study and
ought to be addressed in a follow-up study.

DATA ANALYSIS
It was imperative to keep an accurate record of data so that the reader would be
able to follow how I arrived at the results and conclusions from the data collected (Yin,
2009). As new insights were found during the interview process, the questions were
adapted and updated. By way of example, during one of my interviews, in response to my
question on the level of crime, the interviewee soon began to talk about the prominent
role of organized crime in SA. From that point on, I asked interviewees about their
insight into organized crime in SA. Another example happened during my interview with
a farmer who informed me of events that were not covered in the media or elsewhere,
which prompted me to ask further probing questions concerning his views on the
116

effectiveness and efficiency of the SAPS. In effect, analyses were carried out in parallel
with the data collection. I maintained the chain of evidence throughout the iterative
process through voice recordings and transcripts. After producing the transcripts of the
interviews, I identified themes that arose from the text of the transcribed interviews and
supporting documentation and arranged them to see how they related to one another. This
process allowed me to further revise and specify my theoretical frame (Chapter 2). I read
through the text and identified key patterns that bore a direct link to the main research
question using in vivo coding through NVivo software. The themes I identified are
depicted in Figure 4.2. NVivo software allowed me to develop categories according to
the themes that I identified from the transcripts and documentation within those
categories and to arrange and track them throughout the qualitative data. The software
also stored all documentation that contains references to the identified themes. Based on
the interview questions and the responses that I received, I identified recurring themes in
the transcripts and supporting documentation, compiled a list of those themes, and used
that list to create nodes in the software program. As I read the transcripts and documents,
I highlighted the broader context around those themes looking for relevant patterns. The
flow chart below (Figure 4.2) compiled from the NVivo project presents the key themes
related to the central concepts of good governance (GG) and security as defined in
Chapter 2, with parent, child, and grandchild nodes/codes identified in the qualitative
data.53

53

A parent node/code would be named a ―main theme‖ with a ―sub-theme‖ being a child node/code, and a
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Figure 4.2 NVivo Project

Coding Process
Responses to the interview questions were coded by two independent coders to
facilitate thematic analysis. I read through all the responses to the questions and identified
recurring themes. Overall, six themes emerged related to GG and 12 related to security. I
constructed a codebook based on these themes (Figure 4.2) and provided outside coders
with interview excerpts and the codebook, and instructed them to assign codes to each
interview excerpt after meeting with them to discuss the research project. Coding by the

―sub-sub theme‖ being a ―grandchild node/code‖.
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coders were recorded with each excerpt and, upon completion of the coding exercise, we
compared assigned codes across coders that yielded an initial intercoder reliability score
of 92% (see below). Of the recurring themes, the 18 that were most applicable to my
study, and which made up my codebook, were as follows:


Good governance (67 sources; 730 references)54



Corruption within the SAG (45 sources; 151 references)



Crime syndicates (22 sources; 44 references)



Political destabilization (9 sources; 21 references)



New social divide (37 sources; 56 references)



Socio-economic successes/challenges (34 sources; 120 references)



SA security (65 sources; 636 references)



Security system deficit (66 sources; 645 references)



Growth of SAPS and challenges (53 sources; 310 references)



SAPS lack of capacity and capability (66 sources; 620 references)



Lack of trust (67 sources; 507 references)



Crime statistics (31 sources; 86 references)



Violent crime (40 sources; 148 references)



Outsource of security (41 sources; 107 references)

54

In NVivo, sources is the collective term for my research materials—recorded and transcribed interviews,
official government and parliamentary documents, press releases, media reports, NGO documents,
photographs, as well as memos that record my ideas and insights. A reference is a count of the number of
selections within a source that have been coded to any theme. The same selection coded to two different
themes would be counted as two references (NVivo, 2012).
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Growth of private security and challenges (54 sources; 441 references)



Private security threat (30 sources; 74 references)



Foreigners in private security (17 sources; 29 references)



Intelligence challenges (15 sources; 34 references)

Intercoder Reliability
I recruited two independent coders and gave them the codebook to use as a guide
as they coded the references mentioned above chosen from the transcripts of three
interviews. The three interviews were chosen based on the number of excerpts from those
interviews that made up 10% (475) of all the interview excerpts (4,759), which is the
NVivo accepted norm for qualitative analysis (NVivo, 2012). Results from the coding
were evaluated to determine intercoder reliability by comparing the codes from each of
the two coders to those of the researcher, which yielded an intercoder observed
agreement value of 0.99 for the 18 themes. Therefore, the coders were in agreement an
average 99% of the time for the themes. In order to determine how much better than
random chance the observed agreement was, the NVivo software calculated Cohen‘s
Kappa for the two independent coders and the researcher. The average Kappa value was
0.97 indicating that the 99% agreement observed for all the themes is 97% better than
expected by chance.55 As a last step, I met with each of the two coders to discuss their
impressions of the codebook, the coding process, and where their interpretations of
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See Appendix G.
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language assignment to codes might differ. Based on this discussion, I resolved the
remaining discrepancies between them and me, as the researcher, by revisiting their
coding differences, discussing them, and explaining how I made my decisions; these
steps resulted in their reassigning their coding after gaining better insight.

Validity, Reliability, and Ethical Considerations
To meet the test of construct validity, my study defines the change in the security
services offered by the state as opposed to PSCs fulfilling some of these security
functions, and identifies ―operational measures that match the concepts‖ (Yin, 2009, p.
42). The measures include crime statistics, state fragility indices, unemployment rates,
and NVivo themes prevalent in responses to semi-structured interview questions. There
may be certain shortcomings with official crime statistics because not all crimes are
reported. I used three methods to increase construct validity. Firstly, I used multiple
sources of evidence, such as the official crime statistics released by the SAPS. I also
interviewed several experts with deep knowledge of crime and anti-crime initiatives.56 I
asked them and others to reflect on recent security trends and official crime statistics.
Secondly, I established a chain of evidence by way of capturing all the relevant quotes
and statistics within the NVivo software program. Thirdly, I asked two experts with
knowledge of the current state of security in SA to review the findings of my analysis on
crime data.
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These include Burger, Chris Botha, Kohler-Barnard, Fivaz, Anonymous ―4,‖ Anonymous ―5.‖
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Internal validity is mainly an issue with explanatory case studies where I have
explained how and why events have led to the use of PSCs in SA. Clearly, the private
security industry is a for-profit industry and I have to take into consideration that a
contributory factor to the growth of the industry is the profit motive capitalizing on the
fear of crime by the end-users for their services. Perhaps the private security market has
become so lucrative that PSCs have burgeoned in growth and the resultant surplus of
companies will be proactive in looking for and even creating business opportunities.
External validity is mainly an issue of my studying SA in an exploratory mode to find out
about SA, and to further develop a model that can test my theoretical and conceptual
frame of latent state fragility in another country context.
Reliability is mainly an issue of making every step of the research process
operational to the extent possible, so that another researcher may repeat the procedures
and come to similar conclusions. This is possible through the NVivo software, which has
stored all the relevant data on the interviewees, the content of the interviews both in voice
and transcription, supplementary documentation, interview instruments, and themes
coded for purposes of this study. This would be accessible for another researcher to
repeat the procedures.
To address ethical considerations and the protection of human subjects, I
prepared an informed consent form, obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
from Kennesaw State University‘s (KSU) IRB Board to interact with human subjects,57

57

See Appendix D.
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and treated information received as confidential, which includes the processing of
sensitive results. I communicated with each interviewee electronically and asked for
permission to cite them by name. Thirty-nine interviewees responded positively and six
more requested anonymity. I also forwarded the draft dissertation to every interviewee
before publication so that they could see in which context their comments were used. I
honored specific requests by citing those six as ―anonymous‖ 1-6. I did not offer the
participants any form of inducement to participate in the interviews. Further concerns
were that bias may have been introduced into the study by the interviewees‘ political
leanings during the interviews. I compensated for this by ensuring that the interviewees
from Parliament were representative across the political spectrum, including present and
former government representatives. I interviewed representatives from the African
National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance (DA), Congress of the People (COPE),
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+).58 I anticipated far more
frank and open interviews from former government officials because they are no longer
on the payroll of the government, and therefore may not feel inhibited to talk freely as
they are not in any danger of losing their job. Therefore, I interviewed both active and
retired members of government. Using this methodology, I analyzed the results, which I
present in the following three chapters.
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See Appendix A, Table A.1 for a list of interviewees and their political party affiliations.
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CHAPTER 5

HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Chapter 2 established that personal, community, economic, and political security
are important indicators of direct and structural violence and serve as measures of latent
state fragility in the present context. High levels of violent crime impact public trust and
levels of behavior in communities, and could have a negative impact on social cohesion.
Political security is one of the important aspects of human security focused on the
protection of basic human rights. One of the main sources of threat to basic human rights
comes from the state in the form of corrupt police. States are created to provide security
for and ensure the well-being of its population so that individuals may pursue their lives
in peace. Promoting human security is about the state honoring its side of the social
contract. Unequal access to economic opportunity as evidenced by poverty and
unemployment are two of the main threats to economic security.
Notwithstanding SA being Africa‘s wealthiest state in total Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and having the continent‘s most powerful military, the country continues
to battle high direct and structural violence (CIA, 2013; SAIRR, 2012). All the data show
that SA is a stable democracy, while the numbers of PSCs are growing and more security
functions are assumed by PSCs. This calls into question the state‘s ability to ensure the
security of its citizens (in the broader sense of human security).
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Human Security
Human security is about guaranteeing that the opportunities brought today by
development will not be lost tomorrow (UNDP, 1994). It is about a freedom from fear,
freedom from want, and a life of dignity. Human security offers a ―link between the
concept of security and human beings‖ (Goetschel, 2004, p. 26). The analysis of the
provision of human security in the SA context focuses on personal and community
security, economic security, and political security.

Personal and Community Security
During my interview with Jan-Jan Joubert, political editor of the Beeld
newspaper, he stated that the ―stigma of incarceration was lost‖ when one looks at the
names and the number of present-day, high-ranking political and government leaders who
spent time in prison during the liberation struggle.59 Juxtapose this to the present-day
very high levels of crime and corruption in SA, and one can understand why it is easy for
SA to have Africa‘s largest prison population (Joubert, personal communication, May 20,
2013).60 Of course, these two groups of prisoners were imprisoned for two very different
reasons, the former for (illegal) political activity and propagating the violent overthrow of
the government at the time, and the present for violent crime, fraud, and corruption.
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Political editor of the Beeld newspaper (the largest Afrikaans language daily newspaper in South Africa),
reporting on Parliament since 2001, in particular the Intelligence (State Security) Portfolio.
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According to the SAIRR (2012), the prison population in Nigeria (Africa‘s most populous country with
168 million people) in 2011 was 50,000, while in SA with a population of 51 million the prison population
was 162,000.
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For the present analysis, personal and community security are combined because
the linkages are high given the fact that ―violation of physical integrity also impacts on
community trust and levels of behavior in communities‖ (Werthes et al., 2011, p. 18). A
large number of violent acts have a ―negative impact on social cohesion,‖ irrespective of
whether it is committed by state or non-state actors (Werthes et al., 2011, p. 18). Personal
security concentrates on the basic threats caused by physical violence irrespective of
whether it is from states, groups, or individual persons (Werthes et al., 2011). Security
system effectiveness in the areas of personal and community security are conceptualized
as the capacity of a state to control criminal activity over all its territory through a
security system where there is accountability and transparency. Testing hypothesis H2,
Human security decreases as the effectiveness of the security system decreases,61
revealed the following results.
Secondary data obtained from the statistical databases of the Center for Systemic
Peace, the PSIRA, Institute of Security Studies, and the World Bank revealed that,
overall, SA‘s crime situation improved steadily over the past decade up until 2011.62
Since 2002-2003, the overall crime rate decreased by 21%. However, this trend changed
recently when a 3% increase in total crime levels was recorded in the two-year period
between 2007-2008 and 2009-2010, caused largely by increases in property-related
crimes such as theft and commercial crimes (ISS, 2012). Since 2002-2003, property-
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See footnote 3 in Chapter 1.
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See Graphs 3.2-3.5.
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related crime increased by 0.3%, while overall violent crime decreased by 2.3% (ISS,
2012, p. 1).
By 2011, serious crime levels had decreased dramatically over a decade by 21%
(ISS, 2012, p. 12). However, SA‘s murder and violent crime rates were still far higher
than the world average, with 30.9 South Africans in every 100,000 becoming the victims
of homicide (ISS, 2012). This means that in the period 2011-2012, a total of 15,609
murders were recorded by the police, an average of a little less than 43 per day (ISS,
2012). SA‘s murder rate in 2011 was just under twice that of the average for Africa,
which is 17 murders per 100,000, and three times more than the global average of 6.9
murders per 100,000 (ISS, 2012). Latest crime statistics for 2012-2013 were ―presented
in a very vague manner this year…where the SAPS only released percentage increases
and decreases but no exact figures or ratios‖ (ISS, 2013a). For the first time in many
years, there were increases in 2013 in key serious violent crimes in the following:


Incidents of murder increased by 650 cases, a 4.2% increase.



Attempted murder rates increased by 6.5% in the past year.



Total aggravated robbery increased by 1.2%.



House robbery (which is about 17% of aggravated robbery) increased by
3.6%.



Carjacking (which is 9% of aggravated robbery) increased by 5.4%.



Truck hijacking (which is one per cent of aggravated robbery) increased
by 14.9%.



Residential burglary rose by 3.3%.



Business burglary rose by 1.7%.
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Theft out of and from motor vehicle rose by 3.6%.



Commercial crime (which include crimes such as cybercrime and

corruption) increased marginally by 0.6% in the past year (ISS, 2013a).
After reviewing the latest crime statistics, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS)
concluded that ―between the beginning of April 2012 and the end of March 2013, SA
experienced one of the worst years in the last decade from a crime reduction point of
view‖ (ISS, 2013a). One of the conclusions made by the ISS was that ―violence remains
unacceptably high and should be treated as a serious crisis which stands in the way of
SA‘s social and economic development‖ (ISS, 2013a, p. 1).63
Current data may indicate that the level of trust in the effectiveness of the security
system is decreasing. According to Burger (personal communication, May 28, 2013), a
former Assistant Commissioner of the SAP and presently Senior Researcher at the
Institute of Security Studies (ISS), public trust in the police is declining as some of them
are involved in the most heinous crimes such as rapes, robberies, murders, and attempted
murders, theft and fraud, ATM bombings, kidnapping, hijacking, common assault, assault
with the intent to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH), and drug trafficking.64 Fear because
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Aggravated robberies increased by 19.3% since 1994-1995 (SAIRR, 2012, p. 714); since 2003-2004,
business and house robberies have increased by 333% and 79% respectively; commercial crime has
increased by 57% since 2003-2004; intent to inflict grievous bodily harm has declined by 1% since 19941995 (SAIRR, 2012, p. 715); murder has shown a steady decrease for the period 1994-1995 to 2011-2012
from 67 to 31 per 100,000 of the population, although this is still three times the world average; and
attempted murder has shown a steady decrease for the period 1994-1995 to 2011-2012 from 69 to 29 per
100,000 of the population (See Graphs 3.2-3.4). A summary of additional crime statistical analysis can be
found in (ISS, 2012; 2013a; 2013b).
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See Ndebele, Lebone, & Cronje, 2011.
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of police brutality, mistrust because of the police officers‘ participation in crime, and
police fraud and corruption, are all on the rise (Burger, personal communication, May 28,
2013). According to a 2012 report, ―SA has one of the world‘s highest rates of recorded
police homicide, with 566 civilians killed in 2010 as a result of police action‖ (The Star,
2012). According to Barlow (personal communication, April 25, 2013), invariably crime
is committed by police in uniform who even perpetrate rape. These cases have caused
many citizens to mistrust the police and increasingly people turn to private security for
their security needs (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013). The interviews
and statistics are highly indicative that the perception of community security decreases as
violent crime increases and as trust in the police deteriorates.
Community security focuses on protecting people from their loss of traditional
practices and membership of certain groups, for example, ―organization, racial or ethnic
group from which people derive cultural identity‖ (UNDP, 1994, p. 31[f]). The security
of individuals as members of the larger community requires the ability to pursue their
livelihoods free of discrimination. A number of interviewees expressed concern about a
perceived rise in ethnic tensions. Fivaz, the first National Police Commissioner of
democratic SA appointed by President Nelson Mandela, asserted that SA has a class
divide and an ethnic divide where the ―Zulus don‘t want to work under Xhosas, and
Xhosas don‘t want to work under Sotho‘s‖ (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3,
2013). This type of emerging ethnic trend is a ―wake-up call‖ and should be ―nipped in
the bud,‖ (Ramatlakane, personal communication, May 24, 2013). In the year 2000, 74%
of the population believed that race relations were improving, while in 2011 this number
dropped to 48% (SAIRR, p. 814). Dr. Niël Barnard, former Head of the National
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Intelligence Service from 1980 through 1992 who started negotiations with Nelson
Mandela and the ANC, shares this same concern when he stated that many senior
positions in government are now being ―reserved for Zulus,‖ and this has caused a ―new
ethnic tension on the rise - I have not the slightest doubt about that‖ (Barnard, personal
communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013). Mike Kuhn (personal communication, May
15, 2013), a former long-serving senior National Intelligence officer and presently
director of a private security company, asserted that after 1994 the Xhosas were the
dominant beneficiaries, and after Zuma came to power in 2008, the Zulus became the
predominant beneficiaries – ―you can see it in the appointments that he makes in senior
positions.‖
Ngonyama (personal communication, May 21, 2013) stated that there is some
―manipulation of ethnicity by leaders to remain in power.‖ Barnard (personal
communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013), who was deeply involved with the
establishment of a new democratic SA, believed that it would take the passage of time for
the new SA to achieve a level of understanding and tolerance among the racial groups to
realize that everyone is equal. He observed that over the past 20 years, since SA became a
democracy, there were ―growing signs of unease – not only at a racial level between
whites and blacks, but also between the so-called coloreds and Indians on the one hand,
and the blacks on the other‖ (Barnard, personal communication, April 30 & May 10,
2013). In 2011, only 48% of the population believed that race relations were improving
compared to 74% in 2000 (SAIRR, 2012, p.814). Barnard (personal communication,
April 30 & May 10, 2013) explained that in the Western Cape Province, where 55% of
the provincial population is made up of coloreds, the ANC national government insists on
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applying the proportional demographics of the country where 80% of the national
population is made up by the black people. This means that the majority of the coloreds
are not employed in senior positions by government departments, ―not in the security
field, and specifically not in the correctional services field‖ (Barnard, personal
communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013). This anomaly has caused ―serious problems
brewing right now‖ in the Western Cape between these two racial groups (Barnard,
personal communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013).
The second area of concern for Barnard (personal communication, April 30 &
May 10, 2013), as mentioned earlier, is the rise in the ethnic divide among black people
for the ―first time in many years.‖ Previously, it was what was euphemistically referred to
as the ―‗Xhosa Nostra‘ – Xhosas from the Eastern Cape‖ during Mbeki‘s rule, and now it
is the Zulus under President Zuma (Barnard, personal communication, April 30 & May
10, 2013). A third area of concern for Barnard (personal communication, April 30 & May
10, 2013) is the issue of xenophobia, which is being fueled by the estimated 6-7 million
plus illegal aliens from throughout Africa working in SA who are taking the scarce jobs
which South Africans could be performing, and that has led to rising tensions between
these two groups. The worst xenophobic attacks in SA occurred in 2008, which left ―62
people dead and displaced between 80,000 and 200,000 people‖ (SAIRR, 2012, p. 702).
In June, 2012 more than 500 foreigners (Chinese, Pakistani, and Ethiopian nationals)
were displaced after their shops were looted and petrol-bombed (SAIRR, 2012, p. 703).
A further cause for the rise in these tensions is the general feeling among the employers
that ―people from outside the borders of SA are much harder workers‖ because they come
from circumstances in their own country where they are worse off than in SA (Barnard,
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personal communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013). Overall, the statistics and interviews
infer the perception that ethnic tensions negatively affect community security.

Political Security
Political security in this context focuses on the protection of basic human rights,
the rule of law, and judicial due process free from state repression. Corruption in the
courts and the police can interfere with the provision of those rights. Therefore, it is
important to examine the level of corruption in the SAPS and the judiciary. A corrupt
criminal justice system is a source of threat to people‘s security and an indicator that a
state is not keeping its side of the social contract promoting human security. The
promotion of human security is about the state‘s capacity to negate threats to the health,
welfare, and quality of life of its citizens so that they can pursue their lives in peace
(Krause, 2002; Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Testing hypothesis H2,65 revealed the following
results.
Dr. Elrena Van der Spuy, Deputy Dean of Post-Graduate Studies in the Faculty of
Law at the University of Cape Town, stated that ―political alliances are quite clear‖ and if
you look at the ―corruption under both Selebi and Cele‖ and what has been happening to
the ―intelligence component of the police has people really concerned that there is
political interference‖ (Van der Spuy, personal communication, May 13, 2013).66
Corruption is widely believed to be endemic and has ―become a way of life…in senior
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See footnote 12 in Chapter 1.
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Selebi and Cele are the two most recent former Commissioners‘ of Police.
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levels of government‖ (SAIRR, 2012, p. 849). Van der Spuy (personal communication,
May 13, 2013) expressed concerns about the ―drop in morale‖ among the police and
―institutional ailments of the system‖ consisting of, inter alia, ―police brutality and
corruption.‖ Mluleki George (personal communication, May 21, 2013), former ANC
underground operative in security structures and the military and former political
prisoner, was also concerned about the ―serious corruption in the police service where
case dockets get lost because of bribes that have taken place.‖ Pieter Groenewald
(personal communication, April 17, 2013), former Chairperson of the Portfolio
Committee on Defense and presently Member of Parliament for the Freedom Front Plus
(FF+), expressed the same sentiments about the lack of good governance with ―police
dockets disappearing and prosecutors who are bribed.‖ According to retired assistant
police commissioner Chris Botha (personal communication, April 17, 2013), some
members of the local police are in the ―pockets of the gang leaders, so the possibility of
corruption is always there.‖
Frans Van Niekerk (personal communication, May 27, 2013), a 30-year veteran
law enforcement specialist within the trans-national organized crime environment, stated
that organized crime stimulates corruption and ―creates the perception within certain
groups that they have become untouchable‖, and those groups then start acting with ―total
impunity, which they are allowed to do because they never get addressed by the system
and that is the biggest threat [to security].‖ Van Niekerk (personal communication, May
27, 2013) stated that ―there is corruption everywhere‖ and did not want to point only to
the corruption within the SAPS. According to a recent study by the unit of risk analysis at
the SAIRR, 70% of the population thought that corruption was just as bad in the private
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sector as it is in government (SAIRR, 2012, p. 849). Fivaz (personal communication,
June 3, 2013) was concerned about the high number of allegations of corruption against
government officials, and ―very senior government officials who have been labeled as
corrupt.‖ He highlighted another concern about the number of police officers who appear
daily in the media as a result of corruption, where the ―court system is not effective‖ and
in the ―eyes of many our safety and security in South Africa is not up to standard.‖67
There are accusations by the bench that as the result of poor police work, they are duty
bound to acquit very serious criminals (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013).
On the other hand, police point a finger at the alleged poor prosecution for the reason that
they have lost cases (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013).
The NDP reports that the level of corruption in SA increased between 2001 and
2010 with SA slipping from 36th position to 69th in world rankings (SAG, 2012, p. 56;
Transparency International, 2013). Within the ranks of the SAPS, a previous
commissioner, Jackie Selebi who was appointed by President Mbeki and who was also
president of INTERPOL from 2004 until 2008, was convicted on a charge of corruption
and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 2010 (Kohler-Barnard, personal
communication, May 8, 2013). Selebi spent 229 days in prison before being released on
medical grounds, while the state spent R17 million (USD 1.7 million) on his legal
defense team (Kohler-Barnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013). His successor,

67

See Kohler-Barnard (2012b) for allegations against the former head of crime intelligence; IOL (2013) for
a media report on the Guptagate matter; and Ndebele, Lebone & Cronje (2011) for a summary of criminal
cases against the SAPS in terms of rapes, murders and attempted murders, robberies, theft and fraud, and
other crimes, in support of the response received from Fivaz (private communication, June 3, 2013).
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Bheki Cele, who was appointed by President Zuma, was dismissed in 2012 after he was
found guilty by the Public Protector of improper and unlawful conduct for the
maladministration of the leasing of property for the SAPS (ISS, 2012). The South African
Police Union (SAPU) also accused Cele of nepotism after he appointed family members
and friends to senior positions in the SAPS (ISS, 2012). Chris Greyling, former Special
Forces operative, presently President of the Pan-African Security Association,
underscored this pervasiveness of nepotism ―often at high level within government,‖
ensuring that the ―distribution of available funds are within the families that have earned
themselves the right - in their own perception - to make that kind of income‖ (personal
communication, April 15, 2013). Both these commissioners were political appointees
with no former police experience. Mulangi Mphego, head of the SAPS Crime
Intelligence Division during Selebi‘s term of office, faced criminal charges for his unit‘s
engagement in unlawful activities during the investigation into corrupt activities of
Selebi, which ultimately led to Mphego‘s resignation in 2009 (Burger, 2012). He was
replaced by Lieutenant General Richard Mdluli, who together with two other senior
crime intelligence officers and a court clerk, had criminal charges of murder and
corruption pending against them withdrawn, in spite of a large amount of evidence
against them (Burger, 2012).
According to Kohler-Barnard (2012b), in addition to these charges, there are a
number of other allegations of corruption, nepotism, and maladministration.68 During his
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See Kohler-Barnard (2012b) for the list of further allegations.
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court hearing in 2011, Mdluli presented a report of an alleged conspiracy among highranking ANC members to undermine President Zuma‘s run for a second term of office,
thereby indicating the misuse of police intelligence sources for political purposes
(Burger, 2012). This type of mismanagement by high level officials ―blemishes the
morale and image of the SAPS,‖ which effectively interferes with the SAPS mandate to
protect and serve the South African population (Burger, 2012). Accusations of sub-par
leadership from the Minister of Police, Mr. E. N. Mthethwa, may be understandable when
he is accused of interfering to protect Mdluli and of benefiting from the SAPS Secret
Service Account in the amount of Rands 195,000 (USD 19,500) for personal use
regarding renovations to his private residence (Burger, 2012). Crime Intelligence Chief
Financial Officer, Major-General Solly Lazarus, appeared in court on December 11, 2012
on charges of theft, fraud, and corruption relating to the looting of the Crime Intelligence
slush fund (Kohler-Barnard, 2012a). Lazarus was arrested along with Colonel Heine
Barnard who were both accused of benefitting personally from the slush fund to the tune
of R1.2 million (USD 120,000) (Kohler-Barnard, 2012a).
The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) Annual Report for 2009-2010
revealed that over the past twelve years the number of criminal cases opened against the
police officials increased by 285% while the total number of complaints against SAPS
increased by 146% (SAG, 2010, pp. 69, 101). In 2011-2012, the Independent Police
Investigative Directorate (IPID), formerly the ICD, received 4,923 complaints in relation
to the actions of SAPS members (Kohler-Barnard, 2013c). Of these, 720 were deaths, 88
domestic violence cases, 2,320 allegations of criminal offences, and 1,795 misconduct
cases. On March 12, 2012, Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa stated that the SAPS spent
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over R300 million (USD 30 million) on civil claims against its members over the last
three years as a result of corruption, wrongful arrests, negligent conduct, murder, rapes,
and other violent crimes by the police (Kohler-Barnard, 2013a). In February 2013, the
IPID reported that three constables had been arrested for rape (Kohler-Barnard, 2013c).
Ngonyama, Member of Parliament and spokesperson and public secretary of the
Congress of the People (COPE), expressed concern at the ―high levels of corruption
within the police services‖ and that ―[you] often find that case dockets have been stolen‖
(Ngonyama, personal communication, May 21, 2013). On the matter of police corruption,
Dr. Derica Lambrechts, lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University
of Stellenbosch, found that ―gangsters will confirm that the police are on the payroll of
the gangs,‖ which means that the ―police will receive money to turn a blind eye‖, or
―there will be a tipoff to say that a police raid is imminent‖ (Lambrechts, personal
communication, April 16, 2013). She found that in Manenburg, a suburb of Cape Town,
the ―monopoly of violence is split between organized criminal groups and the state‖
(Lambrechts, personal communication, April 16, 2013).
The interviews, court proceedings, and crime statistics presented above are highly
indicative that with growing corruption in the police and criminal justice system, human
security is threatened as the state cannot seem to negate threats to the welfare and quality
of life of its citizens. Corruption interferes with the provision of those rights and in this
sense political security decreases. These indicators point to the presence of latent state
fragility.
Political security focuses on the protection of basic human rights, the rule of law,
and judicial due process free from state repression. Unequal access to power sharing is
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measured in terms of government policies with a focus on racial differences through
affirmative action and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). On government policies
with a focus on racial differences, Cronje expressed concern about police capacity,
stating that the ―weakening of the SAPS is due to affirmative action and its
demilitarization destroying the chain of command at a critical point in time‖ (Cronje,
personal communication, June 10, 2013). According to Deon Van Zyl, Judge of the High
Court of SA from 1984 until 2007 and Inspecting Judge of Prisons from 2008 until 2011,
there is still definitely a strong racial divide prevalent in SA (Van Zyl, personal
communication, April 8, 2013). ―I was really hoping that the new SA would develop into
a new non-racial country, but unfortunately this hasn‘t been so‖ (Van Zyl, personal
communication, April 8, 2013). Van Zyl believes that the BEE and the affirmative action
policies have led to people being appointed into ―positions they are not qualified and
properly trained for,‖ and there is still ―far too much emphasis on racial matters‖ (Van
Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013). The constitution states that there must be
attempts to have appointments representative of race and gender, ―but that doesn‘t mean
that just about every single person appointed should be either black or women‖ (Van Zyl,
personal communication, April 8, 2013). He observed this trend in appointments to the
bench.
Many former SAPS officers and military personnel took the voluntary severance
package with the looming affirmative action policies of the SAG being implemented and
offered their expertise to the private security industry, which may have contributed to the
growth in the industry (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013). Of course, the
prospect of earning higher salaries in the private sector is attractive and should be
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factored in as a possible reason for the exodus from the government. Either way, the
result is an erosion of capacity as the ―SAG purges knowledge and experience, replacing
that with insufficiently trained and experienced resources‖ (Barnard, personal
communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013). Quantitative secondary data analysis and
interviews conducted for this project seem to affirm the overall assessment that political
security decreases as the citizens have unequal access to power sharing through
government policies including BEE and affirmative action. These policies deny qualified
citizens employment opportunities and through such policies the quality of general
service delivery to the population, and their quality of life is negatively affected. BEE and
affirmative action policies were introduced for the noble cause of redressing the wrongs
of the apartheid system, which discriminated against all non-white population groups.
These were two policies that formed part of the negotiated settlement between the ANC
and the erstwhile apartheid government (Barnard, personal communication, April 30 &
May 10, 2013). However, the application of these policies is flawed and therein lays the
challenge for SA. Ethnicity-based preferential treatment undermines the quality and
efficiency of service delivery particularly in the security system. Current political practice
in SA has sparked a number of legal actions by the aggrieved parties whose racial profile
did not fit the national demographics required to fill the vacancies. Instead of basing the
appointments on national demographics as is current practice (see Chapter 3), it might be
advisable to apply proportional demographics in an effort to alleviate rising ethnic
tensions. Application of proportional demographics takes the racial composition of the
provinces into consideration and gives that preference over the application of national
demographics to the provinces, in the interests of improved service delivery, racial
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reconciliation, and nation-building. SA cannot afford to put race over qualifications to fill
much needed positions, especially in the security system, where mounting challenges
require bold leadership and immediate response.

Economic Security
Unemployment and under-employment are threats to economic security and both
can be somewhat addressed by an existing social safety program as provided by either the
state, or the private sector, or a combination of the two (Werthes et al., 2011). A critical
aspect of economic security is citizens having equal access to economic opportunities
regardless of their ―social background, religion, ethnicity, and gender‖ (Werthes et al.,
2011, p. 19). Testing hypothesis H2,69 revealed the following results.
Economic security is measured foremost in terms of unemployment and levels of
poverty. Unequal access to socio-economic opportunities is measured in terms of
government policies with a focus on racial differences through affirmative action and
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). SA‘s unemployment rate as a percentage of its
total labor force decreased from 27.1% in 2003 to 25.0% in 2012 (World Bank, see Table
5.1). However, this downward trend since 2003 includes a rise between 2008 and 2012
from 22.7% to 25.0% (World Bank, see Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1
Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) in SA
2003
27.1

2004
24.7

2005
23.8

2006
22.6

2007
22.3

2008
22.7

2009
23.7

2010
24.7

2011
24.7

2012
25.0

Source: World Bank (2014)

In the eighteen year period between 1994 and 2012, general unemployment
increased in SA by 125%. Black unemployment increased from a little more than1.6
million in 1994 to 3.8 million in 2012 (an increase of 135%), for coloreds from 260,000
to 464,000 (79%), and for whites from 42,000 to 117,000 (178%) (SAIRR, 2012, p. 126).
Despite well-established BEE and affirmative action programs and repeated promises
made by the ANC government (Mandela, 1994; Mbeki, 2007) to improve the living
conditions for all South Africans, particularly the formerly oppressed blacks, the statistics
indicate a less than satisfactory outcome of these policies and present a bleak picture for
the future of the country. The considerable increase in unemployment since SA‘s
transition to democracy may be correlated with the observed rise in various levels of
crime.
Fivaz stated that people have a ―tendency to simplify the safety and security
issues in this country‖ (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013). He is of the firm
belief that any government has to have a ―platform conducive to combating crime based
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on four pillars,‖70 and weaknesses in any one of those pillars will result in a skewed
platform to fight crime (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013). One of the four
pillars is socio-economic concerns - unacceptably high levels of unemployment and
poverty - and ―the mistake people make is to say crime stems from poverty or
unemployment‖ (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013). Absolute poverty has
declined in SA. The number of people living on less than $2 a day dropped from 6.81
million in 1996 to 1.36 million in 2011 (SAIRR, 2012, p. 321). However, social welfare
continues to expand to have a positive impact on the poverty levels, which obviously
makes the increasing number of beneficiaries dependent upon the state at least
temporarily (SAIRR, 2012, p. 819). Unfortunately, the social welfare program is the
biggest source (and in many instances the only source) of income for a third of the
households in SA and now reaches approximately 16 million people (SAIRR, 2012).
These stellar efforts have created an expectation from the ANC support base that the
government must improve on those efforts. There has been a significant increase in the
uptake of social grants over the past decade. In 2001, the beneficiaries of social grants
numbered 3.45 million people compared to 16.49 million in 2013/14 (SAIRR, 2012, p.
583). Social grants totaled R97 billion (USD 9.7 billion) in 2011/12, which made up 10%
of total government expenditure and almost 4% of the country‘s GDP. However, the
SAG has not fostered an economic climate for increasing growth and job creation to be
able to sustain its social welfare programs, and it has failed to educate the less educated
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The four pillars are: effectiveness of legislation and the commitment of government; criminal justice
system; socio-economic; and value-and-norms system of society.
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and to give them market access to improve their life-style (Cronje, personal
communication, June 10, 2013). Unemployment is one of the factors and certainly a very
important factor; however, ―India has unemployment and they have a lower level of
violent crime per capita than SA‖ (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013).71 In
further addressing the unemployment problem, Fivaz stated that as the SAG no longer
meets the heightened expectations of the many disadvantaged people, it ―creates
grievances and eventually you are going to have an eruption‖ (Fivaz, personal
communication, June 3, 2013).
SA experiences on average ―3000 service-delivery protest actions per month‖
(Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013).72 These are protests staged by the
community against their local government concerning the pace and quality of basic
service delivery (SAIRR, 2012). Some of the interviewees tie the lack in quality of local
government service delivery back to the flawed application of BEE and affirmative action
policies, which in turn manifests itself in qualified people not being employed by local
government because they do not satisfy the national demographic requirements that these
policies dictate. Service delivery protests relate to the public perception that often times
services are not provided by the most qualified people thereby increasing the potential for
further aggravating ethnic tensions.
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India has a population of 1.2 billion, compared to South Africa‘s 53 million, with an unemployment rate
of 3.4% in 2012 (World Bank, 2013). In 2011, India‘s violent crime rate per 100,000 people was 3.46
(NationMaster, 2014).
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―In October 2012, Tokyo Sexwale, Minister of Human Settlements, said there had been 11, 000 service
delivery protests across the country in 2011‖ (SAIRR, 2012, p. 812).
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Burger (personal communication, May 28, 2013) asserted that people may say
that poverty in itself is not a cause of crime, but ―poverty certainly increases the risk of
victimization‖ because of the desperate situations people find themselves in where drugs
and alcohol are habitually abused. Ramatlakane (personal communication, May 24, 2013)
affirmed that ―petty crime is up because of the high levels of unemployment.‖ Roelf
Meyer, former Minister of Police, Defense, Constitutional Affairs, and Chief Negotiator
for the National Party Government for a democratic SA, stated that ―high levels of crime
are attributable to poverty and unemployment‖ (Meyer, personal communication, April
24, 2013). Anonymous ―3,‖73 a former senior security official and presently managing
director of a private security company, agreed with the sentiments about the relationship
between unemployment and petty crime when he said that the ―increase in petty crime is
a direct result of the unemployment levels in the country‖ (Anonymous ―3,‖ personal
communication, May 6, 2013). He called pick-pocketing, theft of items out of stores,
breaking and entering into motor vehicles, and bag snatching ―opportunity crimes‖
(Anonymous ―3,‖ personal communication, May 6, 2013). Irish-Quobosheane supported
this sentiment when she stated that ―petty crimes are crimes of need rather than crimes of
greed‖ (Irish-Quobosheane, personal communication, April 25, 2013). A senior
government advisor asserted that ―petty crime in my view is probably the only crime
category that has a very big social component, so if people don‘t eat, they steal a laptop‖
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(Anonymous ―1,‖ personal communication, May 3, 2013).74 Dr. Willie Breytenbach,
Professor of Political Science at Stellenbosch University, expressed concern about the
high level of the ―unemployment rate at 25% plus on the low side and close to 40% on
the high side‖ (Breytenbach, personal communication, April 9, 2013). He stated that it
seemed that SA is ―not making any progress in terms of getting unemployment levels
down‖ (Breytenbach, personal communication, April 9, 2013). Hlubi Radebe, former
ANC underground operative in the intelligence sector, presently a businessman,
expressed concern for the ―depressed society‖ in the townships where crime is rampant,
where the ―poor social conditions make many people hopeless, and with them unable to
provide for their families, petty crime is bound to be on the increase‖ (Radebe, personal
communication, May 31, 2013). Both statistics and information gathered during the
interviews are indicative that economic security decreases as citizens have unequal access
to socio-economic opportunities either directly or inadvertently affected by government
policies. These indicators also point in the direction of latent state fragility.

DISCUSSION
Results of the flawed application of affirmative action and BEE in SA, show that
security system effectiveness has decreased as a result of government policies based on
ethnicity based preferential treatment. Today, there is a sentiment that affirmative action
and BEE policies are outdated and ineffective and more and more leaders from across the
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political spectrum are condemning these policies as failures, disadvantaging the very
people that they were supposed to help. With the high level of unemployment and
perceptions that many blacks may be under-qualified to fill vacancies, the SAG should
consider launching skills based training and targeted educational programs to prepare the
under-qualified, unemployed, and under-employed more effectively to compete in the
market-place.
Interviewees expressed concern that some positions in the security system are not
filled because there aren‘t any qualified black South Africans to fill the vacancies and
qualified candidates among the colored, white, and Indian communities are not
considered because of the flawed application of BEE and affirmative action policies. This
policy also affects the promotion of candidates from among non-black population groups
who are overlooked because they do not fit the affirmative action and BEE prescribed
demographics. The recent court case won by the trade union Solidarity bears witness to
the sub-optimal application of affirmative action (Hermann, 2013). The court ruled that a
police officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Renate Barnard, was not promoted to the rank of
superintendent because of her race, that service delivery was sacrificed in the interest of
applying national demographic quotas, and she had been discriminated against by the
SAPS. In general, service delivery is not well served under the flawed application of
ethnicity based preferential treatment (Hermann, 2013). This study suggests that the
filling of vacancies by non-black population groups in the interim will help with better
service delivery, while under-qualified black candidates undergo training and better
education to prepare them to assume national, provincial, and local government civil
service positions.
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Community security as a component of human security focuses on protecting
people from their loss of traditional practices and being a member of a certain group.
Interviewees point to a concern they have with the appointment of predominantly Zulu
South Africans to senior positions in government, especially within the security system.
Indications are that President Zuma, who is a Zulu, has a preference for appointing
members of the same ethnicity to positions within the security system, overlooking
qualified persons from other ethnic groups. Moreover, interviewees point to colored
South Africans, who make up more than 50% of the population in the Western Cape
Province, that are only considered for 10% of the vacant positions in the Western Cape
security system based on the proportional national demographics of their population
group to the rest of the national population. According to some of the interviewees,
notwithstanding the coloreds being in the majority in the Western Cape, they are denied
employment opportunities because of the flawed application of affirmative action policies
in that province (Hermann, personal communication, June 5, 2013). Subsequently,
interviewees point to an increase in ethnic tensions, especially between the colored and
the black South Africans. The results show that as government positions are increasingly
offered to members of one ethnic group, political legitimacy weakens. These indicators
point to the presence of latent state fragility.
The strength or weakness of a state is therefore to be determined not only on the
basis of its capacity to resolve problems that threaten its security in terms of armed
insurgency or ethnic strife, but on the basis of its capacity to pre-empt threats to the
health, welfare, and ―level of life‖ of its citizens (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). According to my
interviewees, it is apparent that current practices of ethnicity based preferential treatment
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do not foster constructive race relations and respect for the dignity of all South Africans.
They actually contribute to the reduction in the quality of life of those who are being
discriminated against because of the flawed application and effects of ethnicity based
preferential treatment. Some of the interviewees agree that these policies have a place in
society to continue to redress the wrongs of the former apartheid system, but the flawed
application increases racial tension between the black majority and the rest of the
population. The data and my research findings affirm that community security decreases
with the rise in ethnic tensions. These indicators further point to the presence of latent
state fragility.
Within the context of human security, political security as one of its components
focuses on the protection of basic human rights, the rule of law, and judicial due process
free from state repression. Corruption in the courts and the police as depicted above can
interfere with the provision of those rights. The high level of corruption in the SAPS and
crime perpetrated by police officers and to a lesser extent the judiciary interfere with the
provision of basic human rights to the population. The results of this study show that
political security decreases as corruption increases. These indicators also point to the
presence of latent state fragility.
Interviewees and data obtained during my study have shown the many cases of
police corruption and complicity in some of the most heinous crimes committed in SA.
Interviewees have expressed deep concern for the lack of public trust in the SAPS
because of the misconduct, poor training, corruption, sub-par leadership, and the
concomitant high levels of crime. Concerns were expressed by some of the interviewees
about backlogs in court cases, lack of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms,
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poor case preparation and prosecution, which sees dangerous criminals back on the
streets because of unsuccessful prosecution. The results show that as the level of
corruption increases, political security decreases. These indicators point to the presence
of latent state fragility.
My results show that economic security decreases as citizens have unequal access
to socio-economic opportunities, and their ability to gain employment regulated by
flawed ethnicity based preferential treatment. Additionally, SA displays serious social,
security, and structural challenges, which undermine investor confidence in the country‘s
future. Therefore economic security indicators also point to the presence of latent state
fragility. The rampant violent crime is symptomatic of a society that requires a holistic
approach by government to address the challenges posed by rising personal, community,
economic, and political insecurity. In Chapter 6, I will examine the extent to which the
security system challenges and the outsourcing of security system functions to the private
sector affect latent state fragility in SA.
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CHAPTER 6

OUTSOURCING SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This chapter examines SA‘s security context with specific focus on the security
system deficits and the effects of outsourcing of security functions on the overall
provision of security. The term security in this study is used holistically and goes beyond
individual services and therefore, the study refers to the security system and not to the
security sector. This study defines the security system as ―all state institutions and other
non-state entities with a role in ensuring the security of the state and its people‖
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006, italics mine). Only when a state at
least has a legitimate, accountable, and politically controlled security system with good
oversight mechanisms can good governance be established (Jackson, 2012). Based on the
aforementioned, and in an attempt to answer the question whether a security system
deficit fosters latent state fragility, this chapter examines the extent to which the security
system is determined by political effectiveness and good governance (see H3, Chapter 4).
Security system effectiveness is measured in terms of the violent crime rates (see
Chapter 5). In this study, political effectiveness is measured in terms of levels of
corruption and abuse of power. Cronje (personal communication, June 10, 2013) suggests
that the reason for collaboration with the PSCs is obvious when one considers that
corruption among police officers is widespread and break-ins at police stations happen
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too often where weapons are stolen. He argues that it would be a better use of police
resources not to be involved in guarding duties and to outsource that function to the
private security industry (Cronje, personal communication, June 10, 2013). Limited
police resources could be used more effectively in core security system functions, such as
crime investigation, intelligence gathering, and forensic analysis than guarding buildings
or entrance points to government buildings, which are non-core security system
functions. The PSIRA was viewed by Kohler-Barnard as a ―defunct body, infested with
corruption, financially challenged, and challenged in terms of resources‖ (personal
communication, May 8, 2013). Notwithstanding the financial challenges, the chairperson
of the PSIRA, Mr. Bopela, earns ―R1.5 million rand a year (USD 150,000) and, one of
the senior officials who was appointed at R295,000 a year (USD 29,500), received a
salary raise of R995,000 a year (USD 99,500) within three months of his start date,‖
according to Annelize Van Wyk, Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Police and
ANC Member of Parliament (Van Wyk, personal communication, April 21, 2013).75
Mistrust of the SAG is growing because of the police officers‘ participation in
crime, fraud, and corruption, which are all on the increase (Burger, personal
communication, May 28, 2013; see also Chapter 5). Fivaz (personal communication, June
3, 2013) stated that SA has a serious problem with corruption and questioned the opinion
of the nation about the wrongs and the rights of society, suggesting that SA‘s values and
norms system have been compromised because people are killed indiscriminately as
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For comparison purposes, the annual per capita income for all South Africans in 2011 was R39,245
(USD 3,925) (SAIRR, 2012). Receiving a salary increase of 337% is extreme in any semi-government
institution in SA.
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indicated by consistently high violent crime rates. He expressed deep concern when a
person is ―shot and killed for a cell phone,‖ when there is no value for human life (Fivaz,
personal communication, June 3, 2013). Greyling (personal communication, April 15,
2013) argues that the corruption levels that have increased in the SAPS cause a lack of
credibility in the SAPS. The SAPS have sufficient budgetary funds to perform their
functions, but they are not able to use those resources properly because of the ―caliber of
police officers and the corruption that has come along with this cadre deployment that has
eroded the capacity of the SAPS,‖76 according to Dr. Lindy Heinecken (personal
communication, April 11, 2013), former researcher and Deputy Director of the Centre for
Military Studies (CEMIS) at the South African Military Academy and presently
Associate Professor of Sociology at Stellenbosch University. ―The ANC's [cadre]
deployment strategy systematically places loyalty ahead of merit and even of
competence, and is therefore a serious obstacle to efficient public service‖ (Areff, 2012,
p. 1).
In another example of corruption, Mosiuoa Gerard Patrick Lekota, President and
Leader of the Congress of the People (COPE),77 a former ANC Minister of Defense in the
Mandela Cabinet, and former Premier of the Free State Province, referenced the
Guptagate incident that took place on April 30, 2013. He expressed concern that the
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―Cadre deployment fosters a disrupted chain of command‖ and corruption is not reported because of the
cadre deployment policy, where loyalists to the ANC will not speak out against other loyalists for fear of
negative repercussions (Heinecken, personal communication, April 11, 2013). Cadres are essentially
brothers-in-arms where loyalty to the ANC is placed ahead of competence and merit.
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extremely wealthy Guptas have ―such a lot of money and are able to bypass the
President,‖ which means that in his opinion, ―anyone in the SAG is up for sale‖ (Lekota,
personal communication, May 23, 2013). If the price is right, corruption at the highest
levels of government does not set a good example for the South African society to follow
(Lekota, personal communication, May 23, 2013). Additionally, the fact that a chartered
Jet Airways Airbus from India landed at the Waterkloof Air Force Base without prior
permission became a national security incident (Lekota, personal communication, May
23, 2013). More importantly, this incident pointed to a major breakdown in the security
system because a civilian airliner chartered by the Guptas, landed at a military base
without any effort by the security system actors to prevent the landing to take place,
therefore compromising the security of the base (Lekota, personal communication, May
23, 2013).78 In essence, foreign businessmen appropriated a military air force base for
their personal use, which points to a serious problem. The fact that the Gupta family is
closely connected to President Zuma, does not bode well when the SAG is regularly
accused by opposition parties of incompetence, corruption, and sub-optimal leadership.
Denials of prior knowledge by senior government department heads seem to indicate that
nobody at the top is likely to carry any of the blame for this incident, where the greatest
responsibility of accountability rests. However, ―issues relating to conflicts of interest,
that perhaps senior politicians‘ relationship with the Guptas is too cozy, are unlikely to be
examined‖ (IOL, 2013). It is apparent from this widely reported incident, which elicited
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See IOL (2013) for a full media report on this incident.
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lively debates in Parliament, that parts of the justice system with investigative and
prosecutorial authority have been undermined. ―The lack of transparent and independent
investigations of governmental abuse of power, ranging from the arms deal to
Nkandlagate and now Guptagate, are not individual failures.79 They are symptomatic of a
much broader and fundamental lapse in political accountability‖ (ISS, 2013, p.1).
Due to the fact that people do not look at organized crime holistically, but
transactionally, ―everybody seems to think that petty crime is opportunistic - it‘s not‖
(Malherbe, personal communication, May 27, 2013). Van Niekerk (personal
communication, May 27, 2013), a thirty-year veteran law enforcement specialist within
the trans-national organized crime environment, stated that petty crime was actually an
indicator of the rise in organized crime, which in turn stimulates corruption. He used the
example of car guards that service public parking spaces, such as shopping malls, who
―fulfill a massive crime prevention service‖ (Van Niekerk, personal communication, May
27, 2013). However, these car guards have to pay money to ―figures in the underworld to
allow them to operate else they get bullied away‖ (Van Niekerk, personal
communication, May 27, 2013). To illustrate his point during our interview, Van Niekerk
hailed one of the car guards on duty to come over to us and the following dialogue took
place:
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The arms deal scandal involved the purchase of military equipment that South Africa could not afford to
operate amidst strong allegations of bribery to win the contracts (IOL, 2013g; IOL, 2007).
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Van Niekerk to Car Guard: ―Boeta‖,80 how much do you pay the guy for
the bib and to work here for the week?
Car Guard: R22 (USD 2.20)
Van Niekerk: Who do you pay the money to?
Car Guard: To my supervisor.
Van Niekerk: But you're a car guard, you work for tips, but you have a
supervisor – is that correct?
Car Guard: Ja.81
Van Niekerk to me: Point made. I rest my case. (Van Niekerk, personal
communication, May 27, 2013)
Van Niekerk believes that certain groups who participate in organized crime have
become ―untouchable and they act with total impunity‖ because they never get addressed
by the criminal justice system and that is the biggest threat to combating this scourge
(personal communication, May 27, 2013).
The corruption perceptions index for 2011 shows SA‘s score at 4.1 out of 10,
where zero means highly corrupt (SAIRR, 2012). The perceptions of changes in
corruption from 2007-2010 shows a 62% increase indicating that SA has become more
corrupt (SAIRR, 2012). Abuse of power is measured by the number of violent acts
perpetrated by police officers, the arms deal scandal in 1999, the home-upgrades scandal
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Afrikaans for ―brother.‖

81

Afrikaans for ―yes.‖
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of President Zuma‘s private home in Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal of over R200 million
(USD 20 million) of taxpayer money (called Nkandlagate), and now the recent Guptagate
scandal.
According to Barlow (personal communication, April 25, 2013), invariably crime
is committed by policemen in uniform who even perpetrate rape. Cronje (personal
communication, June 10, 2013) is in agreement that today there is generally a fear of the
police to a greater extent than during apartheid, with the difference that under apartheid
abuses perpetrated went through the chain of command, and now the chain of command
has collapsed. Today, it is the junior police officer who decides who he is going to
torture, harass, sexually abuse, or even murder (Cronje, personal communication, June
10, 2013). Over the past number of years there were 18 incidents of rape allegations
and/or convictions of police officers, 43 incidents of murder and attempted murder
allegations, 15 incidents of robbery allegations or convictions, 7 incidents of theft/ fraud
allegations and/or convictions, and 17 incidents of other allegations and/or convictions
such as ATM bombings, kidnapping, hijacking, common assault, assault with the intent
to cause grievous bodily harm, and drug dealing (Ndebele, Lebone, & Cronje, 2011).82
Incidents such as these have led to the community viewing the SAPS with suspicion
because they see the SAPS as becoming antagonistic towards the community and people
are simply not sure anymore when approached by a police officer, whether the officer is a
―bona fide member of the SAPS or part-criminal in uniform‖ (Lekota, personal
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communication, May 23, 2013). The level of public ―confidence in the police has eroded
seriously,‖ especially when one hears of the number of cases where women go to police
stations to report rape cases and ―then they get raped there‖ (Lekota, personal
communication, May 23, 2013). Barlow (personal communication, April 25, 2013)
shared the same concerns about the number of rape incidents that are perpetrated by
police officers in uniform. People generally ―do not trust the police, there's no faith in
them‖ and in Barlow‘s opinion, that is why those who can afford it are increasingly
turning to the private security industry for protection (Barlow, personal communication,
April 25, 2013). Van der Spuy stated that if one looks at opinion surveys, the SAPS come
in ―quite low on the confidence ratings and that has partly to do with perception of
corruption and partly to do with their ineffectiveness‖ (personal communication, May 13,
2013).
Mathunzi Mdwaba, prominent South African businessman, stated that at the core
of the failure of SA‘s security, as well as the failure of the police, is the unwritten policy
of cadre deployment, where cadres are appointed to the SAPS and other branches within
the security system, to ―perform on behalf of certain families‖ (Mdwaba, personal
communication, May 27, 2013). This type of behavior by the SAG has people ―scared
and fearful‖ of the SAPS and security is vital to the development of the country –
―without security society can‘t function‖ (Mdwaba, personal communication, May 27,
2013). According to Van der Spuy, the SAPS face ―institutional ailments‖ such as
insufficient training, low morale, loss of specialist expertise, corruption, and abuse of
power (personal communication, May 13, 2013). After Cele was dismissed as National
Police Commissioner in 2011 by President Zuma, the Public Protector Advocate Thuli
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Madonsela found that the acting Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi faced a
―prima facie case of improper conduct and abuse of power, which warrants an
investigation‖, as he was allegedly part of a group within the police that killed an
innocent man and then obstructed justice by failing to cooperate in the murder
investigation (Kohler-Barnard, 2012c).83 Overall, the interview data, secondary statistics,
and media reports are highly indicative that the effectiveness of SA‘s security system
suffers from a lack of political effectiveness as demonstrated by widespread corruption
and abuse of power. These indicators point to the presence of latent state fragility as
personal and community security are threatened.
It is difficult to establish a culture of respect for leadership when the Minister of
Police, Mr. E. N. Mthethwa, stands accused of interfering to protect Mdluli (Burger,
2012). Kohler-Barnard (personal communication, May 8, 2013) underscored the concern
when stating, the SAPS is weakening itself through ―poor leadership, mismanagement of
funds, misallocation of funds, and huge amounts of money being utilized by the minister,
the deputy minister, and the national police commissioner.‖ Examples given by Kohler-
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Complaints in relation to the actions of SAPS members:
 In 2006/2008 – 698 deaths
 In 2007/2008 – 792 deaths
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The IPID was only able to recommend 162 death cases and 383 criminal matters for prosecution in
2011/12. In a reply to a parliamentary question in 2012, Police Minister Mthethwa revealed that 144 SAPS
members had been charged with murder and 91 had been charged with rape in 2011/2012 (Kohler-Barnard,
2013c).
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Barnard of poor leadership and mismanagement of funds are the police stations, which
have ―no running water, no electricity, and some without toilets‖ and yet the top level
leadership must have ―limos, travel in private planes, use the helicopter flights that
should be there to do mountain rescue and crash rescue‖ and instead are being used to
transport VIPs (Kohler-Barnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013).
As the Shadow Minister of Police and member of the Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee on Police, Kohler-Barnard visits police stations randomly to do spot checks.
During one of her visits in the Northern Province in 2013, she inquired of the station
commander whether any police officer was suspended with or without pay. After being
informed that none of the officers fell into that category, she verified the information with
the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), who confirmed that two of that
particular police station‘s members were in court, one for a ―prima facie case of multiple
rapes,‖ and the other for a case of ―multiple instances of indecent assault‖ (KohlerBarnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013). When Kohler-Barnard presented this
information to the station commander, he responded that he ―told them [police
authorities] to suspend them, but they chose not to‖ (personal communication, May 8,
2013). Kohler-Barnard expressed deep concern that such police officers, having
committed these heinous crimes, remain in possession of their service firearms and have
access to all witnesses up until they appear in court. This would help to explain why so
―many witnesses withdraw from cases, or even disappear‖ (Kohler-Barnard, personal
communication, May 8, 2013). Kuhn affirmed this sentiment by stating that a big
complaint in SA today is the ―police that are not seen any more as protectors of the
public; they are seen as part of the criminal gangs‖ (personal communication, May 15,
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2013). Hence, lack of leadership in combination with abuse of power present severe
strain on security system effectiveness in SA.
Abuse of power also influences the preference for one ethnic group over another
when considering senior appointments to government. To this point Ngonyama (personal
communication, May 21, 2013) mentioned cabinet appointments of the State Security
Minister Cwele, the Minister of Police Mthethwa, the Deputy Minister of Finance Nene,
and Minister of Public Enterprises Gigaba, all Zulus, and together with the Minister of
Finance Gordhan are all from the KwaZulu Natal Province. There is some ―manipulation
of ethnicity by leaders to remain in power‖ (Ngonyama, personal communication, May
21, 2013). The powerful security portfolios in the SAG should not be seen to be
dominated by one ethnic group because of SA‘s unfortunate apartheid history and
continuing ethnicity based preferential treatment. During apartheid the SAG used the
security system to further the ideological objectives of the ruling white minority national
government. Cronje (personal communication, June 10, 2013), Fivaz (personal
communication, June 3, 2013) and Barnard (personal communication, April 30 & May
10, 2013) cautioned that Zulu nationalism needs to be watched closely. The
aforementioned responses from some of the interviewees, point to personal and
community security that are threatened. These are two of the indicators, which this study
uses to infer that latent state fragility is present.
If all the population does not have equal access to security, which is a basic
service that any legitimate government ought to offer its citizens, the government may
run the risk of losing its legitimacy as the population feels unsupported (Hermann,
personal communication, June 5, 2013). Cronje (personal communication, June 10, 2013)
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expressed the same concern when he stated that ―no one poor, rich, old, or young has
confidence in the state - I think there's fear of the state.‖ The middle class no longer rely
on the state for security, in which case the state is primarily the provider of security for
the poor (Van der Spuy, personal communication, May 13, 2013). The ―consequence of
poor policing in areas where there is a high level of crime,‖ such as the traditional black
township of Khayelitsha near Cape Town, has prompted the Western Cape Government
to ―institute a new Security Act‖ (Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013). This
Act will create a post of a police ombudsman to look at the question of ineffective
policing, and a breakdown in community relations with the SAPS, and a lack of trust in
the SAPS by the citizens in the Western Cape, and more particularly in places like
―Khayelitsha where there is really poor policing‖ (Van Zyl, personal communication,
April 8, 2013). This move was necessary because the national police are ―just not
efficient to do the job properly,‖ which creates an insecure situation for members of the
community (Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013). Consequently, personal
and community security is threatened inferring that latent state fragility is present.
Joubert (personal communication, May 20, 2013) stated that within the South
African context there was a ―very uneven spread of security resources and a
differentiation in the use of security resources under the previous dispensation.‖ Under
apartheid, the police were ―biased towards the former white areas,‖ which were well
served by them, and ―prejudiced against the predominantly black communities,‖ who
were poorly served (Joubert, personal communication, May 20, 2013). On the other hand,
insofar as the ―maintenance of law under apartheid‖ goes as opposed to policing the
community-at-large, much of the former SAP was focused on black areas because of the
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wide-spread agitation against the apartheid system (Joubert, personal communication,
May 20, 2013). Therefore, although one could argue that a lot of security resources were
focused on predominantly black areas, this was done in a ―punitive rather than a service
delivery‖ manner (Joubert, personal communication, May 20, 2013).
The NDP records the ―often poor performance of the public service‖ and
identifies several weaknesses in the accountability chain with ―blame-shifting often the
response to these weaknesses‖ (SAG, 2012, p. 54). Breytenbach (personal
communication, April 9, 2013) stated that the erosion of the SAPS capacity is manifest in
the township of Kayamandi, just over a mile outside Stellenbosch in the Western Cape,
where this poor community cannot afford private security services and are at the ―mercy
of the SAPS to serve and protect them.‖ The inhabitants say ―the state is either corrupt or
non-existent and they would complain of the very weak state capacity‖ because the SAPS
hardly dispatch to that area when there is an emergency (Breytenbach, personal
communication, April 9, 2013; Greyling, personal communication, April 15, 2013).
There is a high level of interpersonal crime that takes place in the poorer communities,
such as ―murder, attempted murder, assault, and rape‖ because of the poor social
conditions caused by the high levels of unemployment (Burger, personal communication,
May 28, 2013). The national average rate of unemployment is 24-25% and in reality as
high as ―80-90% in the poorer communities,‖ and this is where people become desperate
and tend to abuse alcohol and drugs, which then leads to violence and very often ―results
in people being either seriously assaulted or killed, and leads to a high level of rape‖
(Burger, personal communication, May 28, 2013; SAIRR, 2012).
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There are signs of an increase in the preference for one ethnic group over the
others in terms of appointments to senior government positions, especially in the security
system, while equal access to security is not available to all of the population.
Accordingly, my interviews and supporting data are indicative that as identity group
based preferential treatment increases, and the poorer communities perceive the level of
police service negatively, political legitimacy weakens. These indicators point to the
presence of latent state fragility as personal and community security are threatened.

Security System Deficit
A reply to a Democratic Alliance (DA) parliamentary inquiry has revealed that
16,594 South African Police Service (SAPS) officials do not have valid driver‘s licenses
(Kohler-Barnard, 2012j). As of May 2012, the SAPS had 157,380 operational members.
This means that 10% of these members always have to ride as passengers. This also
means that 16,594 SAPS members who could be out there on the road chasing criminals
are stuck behind desks because they can‘t pass their driver‘s test. In a reply to a DA
parliamentary question, the Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, has admitted that only
19 of 49 aircraft of the South African Police Service Air Wing are currently flying. ―This
is a crucial resource in tackling crime and the fact that the aircraft are grounded, through
what can only be gross mismanagement, is a major crisis.‖ (Kohler-Barnard, 2013b, p.1)
Difficulties that the transition from apartheid to democracy brought along in the
security sector, as well as a ―number of weaknesses in the South African Police Service
(SAPS),‖ have caused the government to outsource some of its security operations to
private companies (Lekota, personal communication, May 23, 2013; Van Zyl, personal
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communication, April 8, 2013). It is because of good governance deficits that the SAG is
compelled to use the services of PSCs simply because they have lost the capacity to
perform those functions (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013). Public
security is increasingly stratified across class lines and access to security is shaped by
one‘s buying power. The middle class no longer rely on the state for security, in which
case the state is primarily the provider of security for the poor (Van der Spuy, personal
communication, May 13, 2013).
Criminal police conduct may contribute to the growth in SA‘s private security
industry,84 which numbers more than 400,000 active officers and outnumbers the SAPS
officers by almost three to one (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013;
Solidarity, 2013; see also Table 3.4). Contributory factors to the SAPS‘ lack of capacity
and capability are the low pay, motivation, and morale of the officers (Burger, personal
communication, May 28, 2013). Clearly, this is a negative reflection on management
issues and a lack of political will to change, according to Burger (personal
communication, May 28, 2013). Under such conditions, the SAPS tend to attract poorly
educated persons to join its ranks (Burger, personal communication, May 28, 2013).
It is increasingly clear that ―poor management supervision, training, and even
recruitment are at the root of many of the problems within the SAPS‖ (Burger, 2013, p.
18). In addition to these problems, the Policy Advisory Council established by the
National Commissioner of Police in 2006, found that a ―general lack of command and
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See Kohler-Barnard (2013c) for a list of the crimes perpetrated by the SAPS officers.
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control within the Police Service at local level, resultant poor levels of discipline and
high levels of corruption,‖ is of grave concern (Burger, 2013, p. 19). In the face of
insufficient political will to implement the recommendations of the Advisory Council, the
SAPS leadership response to the ongoing problems in the police have been met with
―silence, denial, distraction by pointing at the killings of police officials,‖ or verbal
attacks on those who have raised these problems (Burger 2013, p. 20). Another
contributory factor to the SAPS lack of capacity and capability is in the area of
insourcing certain security functions from the private security industry. ―If a government
department cannot rely on the SAPS to protect its assets after hours, such as copper theft
at Escom facilities, then that department will hire a private security company to protect
its property‖ (Koornhof, personal communication, April 17, 2013 ).85 There is concern
that outsourcing contracts are awarded to BEE companies that have ―clear links to the
ruling party‖ and are awarded the contracts at the expense of quality service, and this in
fact contributes to the ―weakening of the capacity of the state‘s security‖ (Heinecken,
personal communication, April 11, 2013; Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8,
2013).
The Report of the Portfolio Committee on Police on Budget Vote 25: Police
(2013-2014), notes that the SAPS cannot be respected as an organization with close to a
―thousand police officers facing a variety of charges for offences ranging from murder,
rape and other serious crimes‖ (SAG, 2013, p. 4). The report acknowledges the ―urgent
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Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) is SA‘s sole provider of electricity throughout the country.
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need to invest money into training and support to police officers in order to get to a stage
where all police officers can wear their uniforms with pride and honor to serve‖ (SAG,
2013, p. 4). The Police Portfolio Committee raised a number of concerns (a) such as the
1,512 employees with previous criminal convictions that are still employed in the service;
(b) the large number of vacancies currently in the Crime Intelligence Program due to the
number of senior managers under suspension, that leads to a certain degree of instability;
(c) 21 members of the Crime Intelligence Program that were suspended in 2012-2013 on
charges including fraud, robbery, theft, murder, and sexual assault, and questioned
whether all members of the unit are vetted before appointment; (d) only 1,019 of the
7,938 members in the crime intelligence environment are in possession of a valid security
clearance certificate; and (e) the number of civil claims that has increased from 3,007 in
2010-2011 to 5,090 in 2011-2012 (SAG, 2013).
In June 2012, there were 153 police stations out of a total of 1,116 where police
officers in the line of duty were without water, sanitation facilities, and electricity
(Kohler-Barnard, 2012d). Police Commissioner Phiyega circulated a letter to top SAPS
management recently in which she ordered a ―purge‖ of convicted criminals from the
SAPS, which is ―populated with murderers, rapists, fraudsters, and other offenders‖;
Phiyega refers to the findings of the audit as revealing ―an unpleasant picture‖ (KohlerBarnard, 2013b). According to Anonymous ―2‖ (personal communication, May 17,
2013),86 the damage caused to the farming community in the Ceres valley in the Western
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Cape (see Du Toit & Du Toit, 2012, and Appendix E), ―speaks volumes of the lack of
police effectiveness‖ in combating crime. Upon requesting more specifics about the role
of the private security industry in providing electronic monitoring services, Barlow
(personal communication, April 25, 2013) responded that ―the state is paying the private
security industry to do it.‖
The Strategic Plan of the South African Police Service 2010-2014, underscores
the ―secondary position of community policing in favor of the intensification of the fight
against crime and corruption‖ (Burger, 2013, p. 16). This strategy further exacerbates the
apparent manifest lack of trust that the community has in the SAPS. The number of
senior officers being ―implicated in criminal activity and corruption is eroding both
public trust and police morale‖ (Burger, 2012, p. 1). The Star (2012, p. 1) daily
newspaper reported how ―allegations of mismanagement at the highest levels has
tarnished the image of the police and how it complicates the lives of ordinary police
members.‖ The one area which the SAPS ―simply cannot control‖ is where the so-called
gangland activities take place (Breytenbach, personal communication, April 9, 2013).
Breytenbach opined that some of the worst violent and petty crimes take place in poorer
communities where the vast majority of the population cannot afford private security
services, and because the police do not patrol the areas, makes those inhabitants ―very
vulnerable‖ (personal communication, April 9, 2013). He opined that the ―state has
become fragile‖ and actually called it ―state failure‖ where law and order has broken
down (Breytenbach, personal communication, April 9, 2013). Barlow (personal
communication, April 25, 2013) affirmed that the SAPS do not patrol those areas, and ―in
fact do not even patrol the wealthier areas.‖
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Crime in SA has increased in absolute numbers over the past 17 years, although it
has decreased in proportion to the population as the trend in both burglary at residential
premises and robbery with aggravating circumstances shows (Hermann, personal
communication, June 5, 2013).87 Compared to the 1994-1995 budget year, the projected
expenditure on police services for the period 2014-2015 will increase by 638%, from R10
billion (USD 1 billion) to R75 billion (USD7.5 billion), while the number of police
officers grew from approximately 90,000 to 199,000 over the same period (Hermann,
personal communication, June 5, 2013; see also Table 6.1). Table 6.1 indicates a massive
increase in expenditures for traditional security system functions since the start of the
new SA. Despite these increases, we do not observe commensurate reduction in the
threats to personal and community security. While crime remains consistently high over
the twenty-year period, the state expenditure for protection services alone rose by more
than 500% (Table 6.2).
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See Kohler-Barnard (2012b) and IOL (2013).
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Table 6.1
Expenditure on Public Order and Safety: 1994/95-2014/15

Source: Solidarity (2013)
Table 6.2
Crime Numbers, Rates, and Government Expenditure on Protection Services, 1994/952010/11

Source: Solidarity (2013)
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In addition to dealing with crime in society, corruption, abuse of power, and eroding
public trust, the SAPS has come under political and public pressures to do something. To
respond quickly, the SAPS morphed into a more traditional law enforcement agency with
punitive methods of crime fighting, and in the process became ―more concerned with
achieving political than policing objectives‖ (Burger, 2011, p. 15). Additional challenges
included low pay, low motivation, and low morale of police as a result of ―serious
management issues and corruption‖ (Burger, 2011, p. 16). As evidence that the SAPS do
not have a holistic view of including the community in the fight against crime, very little
attention is given to concepts such as community policing, partnership policing, and
sector policing as contained in the Strategic Plan of the South African Police Service
2010-2014 (Burger, 2011).
In the Report of the Portfolio Committee on Police on Budget Vote 25: Police
(2013-2014), it is reported that a paradigm shift within the SAPS regarding the
recruitment process, working conditions of police officers, issues of salary, training and
development, as well as reviving the community policing approach is required to address
these pressing challenges (SAG, 2013). The report also mentions the many police officers
that are ―suffering serious post-traumatic stress disorder as well as related psychological
problems resulting in suicides‖ (SAG, 2013, p. 3). According to the Institute of Security
Studies‘ (ISS) response to the Budget hearings, there is ―evidence that the SAPS
disciplinary system allows criminally violent officers to remain within the SAPS‖ (SAG,
2013, p. 5).

170

Further challenges facing the SAPS that the ISS identified included ―improving
training, appointments, promotions, and rewards‖ (SAG, 2013, p. 6). During the Police
Portfolio submissions, the Department of Police stated that a total of 834 SAPS firearms
were lost in 2012-2013 and that a total of 140 members were charged in 2012-2013
regarding the loss of their firearms. A total of 15 cases were not processed, 9 were
withdrawn, while 162 received varying degrees of punishment from written warnings to
dismissal. It was revealed in January 2013, that it took at least ―five months for the SAPS
to be provided with essentials such as riot shields and pepper spray‖ (Kohler-Barnard,
2012g). The SAPS also has to contend with a growing private security industry, as South
Africans increasingly ―rely on the private security industry to protect them and their
property because the Police Ministry is failing to protect citizens‖ (Kohler-Barnard,
2012e).
According to Kohler-Barnard (2013c), the sanction against police officers for
―assault, common assault and assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm‖ ranges
from a ―verbal warning to dismissal or a fine‖ and this allows for a ―culture of impunity
to develop.‖ A policeman charged with serious assault had a ―0.25% chance of being
convicted,‖ pointing to a breakdown in the security system (Cronje, personal
communication, June 10, 2013). The SAPS appear to have a parallel criminal justice
system, which sees ―criminal acts by police members dealt with ‗in-house‘ instead of in
the courts‖ - the concern is that such police officers are left on duty, fully armed (KohlerBarnard, 2013c).
During negotiations with a large trade union, the leader of that union admitted that
the ―police are a big problem‖ (Anonymous ―2,‖ personal communication, May 17,
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2013). Anonymous ―3‖ (personal communication, May 6, 2013) asserted that the
challenges that the SAPS face largely concerns a lack of competence – ―learning
command and control and discipline in policing takes time.‖ In addition to this, a former
senior security official and presently managing director of a private security company
stated that the SAPS face investigative incompetence and are burdened under a workload
with huge backlogs to overcome (Anonymous ―3,‖ personal communication, May 6,
2013). To add to these challenges, the new SAPS Commissioner lacks policing
experience and even some of the ―provincial commissioners have been political
appointees‖ that have not come through the ranks and ―lack the wherewithal to run huge
policing departments‖ (Anonymous ―3,‖ personal communication, May 6, 2013).
Heinecken (personal communication, April 11, 2013), opined that one of the problems
the SAPS have is the lack of suitably qualified police to be able to do the job – many are
―functionally illiterate.‖ Coupled to this, in the interests of transformation, the SAPS have
been overly focused on getting the institution of the state representative of society
without any due consideration for the actual capacity (Heinecken, personal
communication, April 11, 2013). Although the ―SAPS have the capability, they lack the
capacity‖ to do the job, and this is an important distinction (Heinecken, personal
communication, April 11, 2013). This contributes to a ―deficit because you just do not
have the skills left within the organization and the institutional memory, and together
with this there has been an erosion of the value system within the police as well‖
(Heinecken, personal communication, April 11, 2013). Dr. Anthony Leysens (personal
communication, April 12, 2013), Chair of the Political Science Department at the
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University of Stellenbosch, shared this sentiment when he stated that ―we‘ve seen that the
police services have not attracted capable people - they‘ve not been the right people.‖
During secondary data analysis, I found that despite many indicators pointing to
enhanced democracy in SA (Table 3.2), with carjacking, murder, and attempted murder
showing a downward trend, these three crimes together with residential burglary have
shown an increase between 2012-13, notwithstanding the increase in the police budget
and human resources. In the lead-up to the 2010 Soccer World Cup and increased police
and security measures, SA showed a decrease in violent crime that maintained through
2011, but in 2012, there is an increase in violent crime over the preceding year (Crime
Stats SA, 2013; see also Chapter 3).
The results of the secondary data analysis show that SA is becoming increasingly
dependent on PSCs to provide basic security services to the point where one might
question the state‘s ability to care for its citizens without outsourcing. Heinecken
(personal communication, April 11, 2013) states emphatically that it is no longer a case
of the state outsourcing certain security functions, but a case of the state insourcing the
private security industry because of ―capacity deficits‖ in the security system, although
the SAG is yet to formally acknowledge these deficits. Cronje (personal communication,
June 10, 2013) is a proponent of the state outsourcing more of its security functions to the
PSCs. Suggestions were made that the huge police budget be used for outsourcing more
policing functions to the PSCs, who are ―generally more efficient than the SAPS,‖ so that
the citizens who pay taxes and pay for PSC services can get tax relief by paying only for
PSC services through the state‘s outsourcing (Cronje, personal communication, June 10,
2013; Hermann, personal communication, June 5, 2013).
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As of November 2012, South African residents paid a sum of R62.4 billion (USD
6.24 billion) a year towards the Department of Police in the form of taxes, in addition to
the R6 billion (USD 600 million) to the private security industry for protection of life and
property (Kohler-Barnard, 2012e). This huge amount of expense borne by the South
African populace is a further reflection of the extent of mistrust in the SAPS capabilities
and capacities to protect and serve the citizens (Hermann, personal communication, June
5, 2013; Kohler-Barnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013). A further contributory
factor to the decline in the trust of the police was in 2008 when the then-Deputy Minister
of Police, Susan Shabangu, told police service members that they must ―kill the bastards‖
[referring to criminals] and that they ―must not worry about the regulations. I want no
warning shots. You have one shot and it must be a kill shot;‖ a year later, Andries Tatane
was murdered at the hands of the SAPS, followed by the Marikina massacre (KohlerBarnard, 2013c).88 Having incompetent SAPS officers erodes the public‘s trust in the
police, especially when it was reported on November 22, 2012 that less than 3,000 police
officers were declared competent in the use of firearms since January of 2012, which
effectively meant that there were ―approximately 24,000 police officers on the streets
who have not been declared competent to use firearms‖ (Kohler-Barnard, 2012f).
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During the second half of 2012, Lonmin mine workers in the Marikina area went on a wildcat strike for
better working conditions and better pay, which led to a series of violent incidences between the striking
workers, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Lonmin security, and the SAPS. It ended up with the
SAPS shooting and killing 34 mineworkers, most of whom were shot in their backs far from the police line,
while an additional 70 mine workers were injured. This was referred to as the ―Marikina massacre,‖ the
single most deadly use of force by the SAPS since the infamous 1960 Sharpeville massacre during
apartheid (IOL, 2012a).
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Outsourcing Security
Outsourcing may be defined as forwarding functions to outside contractors that
were previously performed in-house (Gupta & Gupta, 1992). Outsourcing is widely
accepted as a way to access external expertise and technology, reduce cost, return to core
business, and improve service (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995; McIntosh et al., 1997).
The type and number of PSCs are determined by the market, in other words, the
demand on the provision of security functions (PSIRA, 2012). While the number of
active PSCs almost doubled between 2001 and 2011 (Tables 3.3 & 3.4), and is further
growing, we have also witnessed an increase in violent crimes. Moreover, South African
citizens and businesses spend around R6 billion (USD 0.6 billion) annually on the private
security industry because they feel that the SAG does not do enough to keep them and
their property safe in a climate of very high crime rates, according to Diane KohlerBarnard (2012h). Kohler-Barnard (2012h) stated that ―more and more government
departments, state entities and even state security agencies and the police themselves use
private security firms.‖ The growth of the private security industry has taken place
because the ―state has failed to provide sufficient public security‖ (Mdwaba, personal
communication, May 27, 2013). Dr. Frans Cronje (personal communication, June 10,
2013), Chief Executive Officer of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR),
stated that the private security industry is ―filling a vacuum left by a weakening system.‖
Jenni Irish-Quobosheane (personal communication, April 25, 2013), Secretary of Police,
ascribes part of the growth in reaction to the ―high levels of crime and people feeling that
they need to have armed response companies to deal with that fact.‖ Both the secondary

175

and interview data are indicative that human security decreases as the effectiveness of the
security system decreases thereby manifesting latent state fragility.
Barlow (personal communication, April 25, 2013) states that ―private security
companies test the integrity of the police and intelligence cyber systems,‖ and this type of
outsourcing of sensitive national security functions is tantamount to the SAG having a
security system deficit. Barlow expressed his concern with the ―false peace that was
created after 1994 that puts such a huge gap in the security system that private security
has had to step in to fill it‖ and warned that ―if we stop private security I think our law
and order will collapse completely‖ (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013;
see also Barnard, personal communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013). Challenges that
the transition from apartheid to democracy brought to the security system from the
affirmative action policy, sub-par leadership, and ―other weaknesses in the SAPS,‖ have
caused the government to outsource some of its security operations to PSCs (Lekota,
personal communication, May 23, 2013; Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8,
2013). SA will never have enough police or soldiers to protect all the power stations and
it will have to rely on private security firms to assist with that effort (Meyer, personal
communication, April 24, 2013). According to Barlow, this is partly due to ―flawed
advice at government level and an ineffective National Security Strategy‖ (personal
communication, April 25, 2013). PSCs contracted by mining houses have grown into a
huge business in SA (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013; Strydom,
personal communication, April 26, 2013).
The latest crime statistics show an increase in violent crime rates and are a
reflection on police inefficiency and incapacity, according to opposition parties, media,
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and the public (Kohler-Barnard, 2013d). Moreover, it would appear that notwithstanding
one of the higher budgets in the overall national budget and an increase of police officers
to almost 200,000, overall crime rose from ―2,085,757 to 2,126,537, an actual increase of
40,780 reported crimes since last year‖ (Kohler-Barnard, 2013e). Additionally, only one
in ten victims of rape was reported to the SAPS, which meant that 700,000 women,
children, and men were raped in 2011 (SAIRR, 2012). In total, 1.65 million crimes went
unreported to the police in 2011 (SAIRR, 2012). My interviews and secondary statistical
analysis indicate that simply increasing the number of PSCs will not lead to a more stable
state.

DISCUSSION
Civilian control and supervision of the security system is paramount to
establishing and maintaining an accountable, transparent, and effective security system.
Good governance of the security system actors and institutions that are responsible for
formulating, executing, managing, and monitoring security policy is essential for a wellfunctioning security system (OECD-DAC, 2007). Security is the fundamental need of
every state and only a few have the ability to meet fully their own security needs (Grant,
2013). Natural limitations in human and material resources and diminishing returns in the
provision of security impact most states‘ security capabilities (Grant, 2013). My results
show that an increase in the number of PSCs per se does not lead to a more stable
security system environment in SA. This underscores the argument made in the literature
that government should not outsource a core competency from a position of weakness
when having a GGD (Krishnan, 2011).
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My results show that security system effectiveness decreases as corruption and
abuse of power increase in SA. The SAPS is rife with premeditated criminal behavior by
police officers who are not properly trained, and are underpaid, demoralized, poorly
educated, and de-motivated. This is a police service served by police officers that are
complicit in some of the most heinous crimes such as rape, murder, assault to do grievous
bodily harm, and brutality. In addition to these ills, the SAPS lacks proper control and
command, leadership, expertise, and is party to wrongful arrests, corruption, fraud, and
negligent conduct. The most recent figures show that the SAPS has paid out
approximately R300 million (USD 30 million) in civil claims and its latest legal bill runs
at R135 million (USD 13.5 million). These developments are being touted as perhaps one
of the reasons for the growth in the private security industry.
Public trust in the SAPS has eroded because of police behavior, especially the
corruption committed at the most senior levels. Two of the most recent police
commissioners were fired for corruption. Having approximately 1,000 officers charged
with murder, rape, and other serious offences does not help to foster respect for or trust in
the SAPS. All of the aforementioned ills in the SAPS exist while crime in SA has
increased in absolute numbers over the past 17 years.
It would appear that the SAPS have a secondary interest in community policing
while their primary focus is on fighting crime. In its efforts to fight crime, the SAPS
reintroduced military ranks to instill a sense of discipline and respect within the service.
This militarization, which has morphed the SAPS from a service to a force has shown no
increase in the conviction rate or instilled greater public respect for the SAPS. Cadre
deployment still dogs the SAPS and erodes the effectiveness of the SAPS. Similar to the
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private security industry, the SAPS has a parallel system of justice by handling criminal
cases internally of officers guilty of crime and misconduct. During the Soccer World
Cup, the SAPS recruited extra resources to increase its manpower without vetting the
new recruits. These officers are still in the employ of the SAPS and no doubt contribute
to the ailments that besiege it.
Based on my interviews, the SAG does not sufficiently address the serious
challenges that face the SAPS, and it distracts the public‘s attention by pointing to the
number of police officers that are killed in the line of duty. A number of high ranking
former government officials, parliamentarians, and academics criticize the SAG for a
lack of political will to implement the recommendations of the Policy Advisory Council,
which the SAG appointed. A number of respondents felt that the SAPS is more interested
in achieving political rather than policing objectives and does not have a holistic view of
fighting crime, as shown by its neglect for collaborating with community policing and
making it a priority as well. The SAPS has instilled a culture of impunity where officers
who commit serious crimes are either given a verbal warning, dismissed, or given a fine
to pay. With its persistent focus on establishing demographic representation with little
consideration for strengthening capacity, the SAPS will continue to fight a losing battle
against crime in SA and increasing the negative public perception of its capabilities and
capacities as a police service.
As the SAG outsources some of its security functions, and according to some of
the interviewees, the government does not outsource from a position of strength but from
a position of weakness because of endemic corruption, crime, and sub-par leadership. By
not being able to provide some of those security functions, it is compelled to insource
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private security for those services. My results show a relationship between SA‘s fragility
stabilizing as the private security industry grows to meet the demand for its services.
Therefore, outsourcing of basic security system functions to PSCs is indispensable to
maintain an efficient security system in SA.
The SAG is worried that PSCs perform functions which used to be the sole
preserve of the SAPS and claim that the private security industry has a negative influence
on the functioning of the criminal justice system. However, outsourcing to the private
security industry with proper oversight mechanisms can repair the credibility, legitimacy,
and efficiency of the SAG and therefore it can in fact enhance state stability.
The literature is clear that outsourcing assumes effective management and
oversight mechanisms. However, in private companies‘ quest to maximize profits,
overpricing and cheating become a concern as reports show how private companies were
charged with ―fraud, overbilling, wasteful spending, and inadequate planning and
oversight‖ (Franke, 2010, p. 14). As there is insufficient management and oversight of
private security companies‘ activities, in addition to the incentives of private security
companies not necessarily aligning with their clients‘ interests, outsourcing is not always
viewed in a positive light (Franke, 2010, p. 14; Singer 2005). Interviewees who oppose
any form of outsourcing state that for the very reason that PSCs work for profit, this
would make them susceptible to being bribed by the highest bidder and state security
cannot be compromised this way. These interviewees did not make any mention of the
level of corruption and crime committed by police officers, and at times very senior
police officers, as compromising the security they are supposed to provide to the public.
Based on the literature and the concerns expressed by some of the interviewees, it would
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seem that government ought not to outsource those security functions, which if the
private security industry were to renege or prematurely end, state security will be
seriously compromised.
As for loss of specialist expertise, there is an acknowledgement that the SAPS
lack the required capacity in the electronics field and therefore this has been outsourced
to the private security industry. As far as intelligence gathering is concerned, some
interviewees have suggested that this core security function should not be outsourced
simply because of the covert nature of some of the work, which should remain the
exclusive domain of the state. However, under the present situation in SA where crime
and corruption, lack of expertise, and sub-par leadership dominate the security system,
this function ought to be outsourced, provided it is done in collaboration with and
oversight by the SAG. Under these conditions, the final party responsible for reporting to
the SAG should remain the state and not the private security industry.
The opinions expressed by my interviewees range from opposition to outsourcing
to PSCs, to outsourcing even the core functions, such as intelligence, under the present
conditions of pervasive corruption, lack of effectiveness, efficiency and capacity, sub-par
leadership, and lack of trust in the security system. Furthermore, there is
acknowledgement from some interviewees that there has been an increase in PSC activity
world-wide, and perhaps it is time to change the conventional thinking about what should
or should not be outsourced to PSCs. It is most revealing that a country like the United
States with a modern intelligence capacity outsources 70% of its intelligence efforts to
the private security industry (Bloomfield, 2013). Perhaps the SAG should change its
conventional thinking about the state‘s monopoly on the legitimate use of force so that it
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could conceptualize another model of delivering security to its population more
effectively, through better collaboration with the private security industry. An appeal is
made by some that a balance be maintained between the security services that the
government delivers and the services delivered by the private security industry.
Throughout my interviews, it was apparent that the SAG does not outsource some
of its security functions from a position of strength, but rather from a position of
weakness. It is apparent that the SAPS no longer outsources some of its security, but in
fact insources private security services to fill the gaps in the areas where it has a deficit.
This deficit was manifest during the recent farm labor strikes in the Western Cape when
the SAPS were incapable of protecting farms and allowed damages to the tune of tens of
millions of Rands (millions of USD) to be done to the farms. The loss and damages could
have been substantially higher had the farmers not contracted PSCs to protect life and
property.
The consistently high threats to personal and community security, the ineffective
implementation of ethnicity based preferential treatment, widespread corruption, and
abuse of power are indicators of the presence of latent state fragility. In Chapter 7, I
analyze the study‘s findings as they pertain to good governance in SA and how that also
relates to and compounds latent state fragility in SA.
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CHAPTER 7

GOOD GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

When we look at law enforcement, intelligence, and the armed forces,
their strategy combined results in a national security strategy. But the
national security strategy cannot be developed unless there is a grand
strategy for the state, which there isn‘t….we have an intelligence service
developing an intelligence strategy, a law enforcement agency developing
a law enforcement strategy, and under law enforcement, I include the
judiciary and the prison services, and the armed forces have their strategy.
But not one of these strategies is aligned with the other (Barlow, personal
communication, April 25, 2013).

The new democratic SA inherited a system of government that was skewed
towards serving the white minority while neglecting the majority black population. Along
with this inheritance came challenges of how to transform the system of government to
serve all the people of SA across the racial divide, which meant serving all 42 million
citizens at the time and not mainly the 5 million whites. In the process of transforming
the system of government, SA‘s allies offered advice and training, especially with regard
to SA‘s security system. It is to this point that Barlow expressed his dismay at the way
the SAG allowed the loss of military skills when the British and Americans were allowed
to dictate how to restructure the South African National Defense Force (SANDF)
(Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013). The British Military Advisory Teams
(BMAT) recommended that the new SAG do away with the military combat units as they
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allegedly posed the greatest threat to stability in SA (Barlow, personal communication,
April 25, 2013). Units such as 32 battalion and 61 mechanized infantry battalion were
shut down, the Paratroopers merged with Special Forces initially, ―but that developed
into a total mess, so they‘ve now split them up again and some infantry units that had
experience at warfare were closed and that experience was lost to the country‖ (Barlow,
personal communication, April 25, 2013). In losing that experience, ―organized crime
gained a huge amount of experience‖ because suddenly there were soldiers on the market
that had skills and who ―weren‘t afraid to shoot people‖ (Barlow, personal
communication, April 25, 2013). SA has consistently improved from a moderately fragile
state in 1995 to low fragility in 2011 (Center for Systemic Peace, 2012). According to all
these statistics, it seems that SA is becoming more stable. This chapter examines good
governance in SA with a focus on socio-economic challenges and successes, corruption
within the SAG, the new social divide, crime syndicates, and political destabilization.

Socio-Economic Challenges and Successes
On the question if the ruling African National Congress (ANC) delivered on its
promises to improve the well-being of all South Africans, there seems to be growing
impatience from the ANC electorate, most of whom still live in poor conditions. Right
after democracy set in, the ANC government promised to improve the lot of many
ordinary South Africans and made concerted efforts in that regard. For every shack that
was erected since 1994, 12 formal houses were built (Cronje, personal communication,
June 10, 2013). The ANC government connected as many households to the electrical
grid as it inherited in 1994, approximately seven million homes. Social welfare now
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reaches 16 million people and has become the biggest source of income for one third of
all households. These accomplishments created expectations from the ANC support base
of continued delivery on ANC promises of further improvements on living conditions.
However, during this time there has been a zero net growth in jobs (SAIRR, 2012). Since
the government brought about these improvements for many South Africans, the living
conditions for the majority have not changed since the days of apartheid and many are
becoming impatient with the ANC government 20 years into democracy. During the
general elections held on May 7, 2014, the ANC received the lowest support from the
electorate since it came to power in 1994 (see Table 7.1). Of the 31.4 million eligible
voters only 59.34% voted and the ANC received support from 36.39 % of the eligible
voting population (IOL, 2014d).

Table 7.1
General Election Results of May 7, 2014

Source: IOL (2014d)
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Moreover, the electorate‘s impatience with the ANC government has now manifested in
daily service delivery strikes where residents protest the lack of (or sub-par) local
government services. The poor population sees the enrichment of a small elite group of
their leaders while the government is failing to make good on their promise to improve
their living conditions. Many believe that these protests in conjunction with the high
levels of crime, corruption, sub-par leadership, and abuse of power are ominous signs of
the waning legitimacy of the ANC government.
Notwithstanding the SAG‘s successes at improving the relative standard of living
for the majority of South Africans concerning the provision of housing and HIV/AIDS
treatment programs when compared to the apartheid-era, unequal access to security,
justice, and jobs may foster latent state fragility, which in turn exacerbates the deficiency
in the security system. Daily service delivery protests by disgruntled, unemployed and
under-employed township residents throughout the country is a disconcerting
development as these protests are becoming more disruptive and violent in nature (Fivaz,
personal communication, June 3, 2013). These protests pit the residents against the SAPS
as they attempt to bring them under control within the parameters of the law and further
erode the public trust in the SAPS (Fivaz, personal communication, June 3, 2013; Van
Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013). The World Bank formerly was reluctant to
address issues of conflict and security, but by its 2011 report it focused on the interlinkages between conflict, crime, security, and development (Schnabel, 2012). The World
Bank now recognizes that ―improved security and justice establish a context of credible
exchange that can encourage markets, allow human development to proceed, and provide
space for innovation‖ (World Bank, 2011, p. 5). Security system stability plays a vital
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role in decreasing state fragility. Conversely, security system deficits can increase state
fragility, and in fact, could serve as a predictor of state fragility. Testing hypothesis H3,
The effectiveness of the security system is directly correlated with political effectiveness
and good governance,89 revealed the following results.
With regards to good governance, expressions of mistrust in the SAG were made
during my interview with Ndlovu (personal communication, May 21, 2013). He stated
that ―if a commercial airplane can land at a national key airport [referring to Guptagate]
and the Minister of Defense says he ‗did not know,‘90 and if another Minister‘s wife is
arrested because of illegal drug-dealing and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and the
Minister says ‗I didn‘t know‘ - then you have a problem‖ (Ndlovu, personal
communication, May 21, 2013). These sentiments of mistrust in the SAG were shared by
Hermann (personal communication, June 5, 2013). He stated that the morale of South
Africans is dropping due to the high levels of violent crime, and his concern is that crime
has become so systemic that the media simply do not report on it as prominently as in the
past (Hermann, personal communication, June 5, 2013). Hermann (personal
communication, June 5, 2013) asserted that one of the most important functions of
government is to create a safe environment for its people and because that is not the case
in SA, ―government is losing its credibility.‖ Cronje (personal communication, June 10,
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See IOL (2013) for a report on Guptagate by Stefan Gilbert, a consultant for the Governance, Crime and
Justice Division, Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria.
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2013) expressed the same sentiments when he stated that ―no one poor, rich, old, or
young has confidence in the state - I think there's fear of the state.‖ He explained that a
number of his female colleagues shared how scared they were of the police at night; ―of
being raped, which is a problem that‘s raised its head repeatedly and never really been
dealt with effectively‖ (Cronje, personal communication, June 10, 2013).
Cronje (personal communication, June 10, 2013) identified cases of police
officers perpetrating very serious, violent, and pre-mediated criminal behavior such as
armed robberies, hijackings, bank robberies, murders, and rapes over a period of 12
months and listed 100 incidents.91 In compiling the list, the SAIRR consulted journalists,
media reports, and the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) of the police (Cronje,
personal communication, June 10, 2013). There were 2-3 incidents of police blowing up
ATMs and taking the money (Cronje, personal communication, June 10, 2013). There
was an incident of the flying squad robbing a street vendor,92 fatally shooting him, and
being pursued by a PSC through the streets of Germiston (Cronje, personal
communication, June 10, 2013).93 During my interview with an influential business
owner in the Western Cape (Anonymous ―2,‖ personal communication, May 17, 2013),
against the backdrop of the high unemployment rate, he stated that he understood that
people must eat and they would resort to petty crime to have food for their family. In
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response to the high levels of crime, people turned to the private security industry for
help and ―if you go to my house now and many houses in my area, the amount of money
that is being spent to secure a house with burglar bars, alarms, and armed response
companies - if that amount of money could be invested in job creation this would be a
super country‖ (Anonymous ―2,‖ personal communication, May 17, 2013).
With regards to affirmative action and BEE policies, there is still definitely a
strong racial divide prevalent in SA, according to Van Zyl (personal communication,
April 8, 2013). SA has been a democracy for almost 20 years and there are many young
black people who are attending top schools who have ―never been disadvantaged, whose
parents are middle-class or wealthy‖ (Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013).
They should not be getting jobs or acquiring positions simply because they are black,
according to Van Zyl (personal communication, April 8, 2013). Hermann (personal
communication, June 5, 2013) is concerned about the rising racial tensions because of
―government intervention in the economy‖ that fosters the rich becoming even richer
while it does not address the problems of the very poor in SA. He is involved in a court
case in the Western Cape on behalf of four Colored South Africans for falling victim to
affirmative action (Hermann, personal communication, June 5, 2013; see also Chapter 5
for more detail). Hermann (personal communication, June 5, 2013) stated that the ―racial
tensions between colored and black is more pronounced than between black and white.‖
Under apartheid, the coloreds were not white enough to feel at home with the whites and
now in post-apartheid SA, the coloreds feel that they are not black enough to feel at home
with blacks (The Economist, 2012). This is further evidence that the application of
ethnicity based preferential treatment under affirmative action and BEE is widely
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perceived to be flawed, especially since the aim of these policies is to benefit all the
previously disadvantaged population groups. One of the most senior colored politicians,
Trevor Manuel, who will be retiring in 2014 after serving in cabinet for 20 years, recently
stated that ―‗worst-order racisim‘ has ‗infiltrated the highest echelons of government‘‖
(The Economist, 2012b, p. 1).
Today, evidence of the flawed application of outdated affirmative action and BEE
policies were among the concerns expressed by some interviewees (Barnard, personal
communication, April 30 & May 10, 2013; Burger, personal communication, May 28,
2013; Cronje, personal communication, June 10, 2013; Pik Botha, personal
communication, June 6, 2013; Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013). In
addition, The Economist (2010) reports that it is widely agreed that ―BEE and
affirmative-action laws brought in after apartheid as the star policies of the ruling African
National Congress (ANC) have failed‖ (p. 1). According to the report, even President
Jacob Zuma seems to agree. John Kane-Berman of the SAIRR argues that BEE has
actually harmed blacks, in the way it has so far been implemented, by ―discouraging selfreliance and an entrepreneurial spirit. Instead it has fostered a debilitating sense of
entitlement‖ (The Economist, 2010). The SAIRR (2012) asserts that the ―evident failure
of affirmative action and BEE to assist more than a small elite is sparking more criticism
and may in time help bring about constructive reform‖ (p. 819). The problem is that
instead of redistributing wealth and positions to the black majority, they have resulted
mainly in a few benefiting a lot, according to Zuma, while leaving the leadership of most
big companies in white hands (The Economist, 2010). Consequently, the majority black
South Africans, the intended beneficiaries, have hardly gained. Mbeki asserts that BEE
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has functioned as an attempt to ―co-opt and bribe the controllers of political power, with
the elite using taxation and corruption to enrich itself‖ (African Arguments, 2012, p. 3).
In Mbeki‘s words, ―BEE is legalized corruption‖ (African Arguments, 2012, p. 3).
Constructive reform could take place when the SAG realizes that it should make the
poorer population less dependent on social programs and launch skills training programs,
invest in quality education, and help create an investor climate conducive to foreign
direct investment and economic growth to help create employment opportunities for the
many unemployed and under-employed.
Media reports and interviews conducted for this project are indicative of the
overall assessment that good governance decreases through affirmative action and BEE
policies. As economic security is threatened through a good governance deficit, it points
to the presence of latent state fragility.

Corruption within the SAG
Rotberg (2004) notes a dozen-odd characteristics of failing states, among them
inability to control peripheral regions, increased criminal violence and lawlessness,
endemic corruption, dramatically declining economic growth, and loss of political
legitimacy. Moreover, increasing criminality and widespread corruption is prevalent in all
aspects of society, including political and economic institutions where a burgeoning

191

informal economy is characterized by black markets, extortion, and widespread criminal
activity (Dorff, 1999). Testing hypothesis H3,94 revealed the following results.
In addition to the findings of corruption in Chapters 5 and 6, during my interview
with a senior government advisor (Anonymous ―1,‖ personal communication, May 3,
2013), I was informed that there is a ―lot of unconventional business in this country
because tax regimes and tariffs have created an underground economy of enormous
proportions and there is total pressure by law enforcement to shelter and protect [those
complicit in these activities].‖ The advisor asserted that during the hosting of the Soccer
World Cup in 2010, the SAG ―made a deal with organized crime – organized crime could
send their prostitutes out, they could smuggle cigarettes, they could do foreign exchange
transactions as long as they kept the petty guys out of the system‖ (Anonymous ―1,‖
personal communication, May 3, 2013). In another example of prevalent corruption,
Mark Wiley, Democratic Alliance Member of the Provincial Legislature (MPL),
Chairman of Community Safety, and Cultural Affairs and Sport Committee of the
Western Cape Parliament, stated that in Hout Bay there were ―criminals involved in the
management and security of the harbor‖ (personal communication, April 29, 2013).95 He
asserted that he knew this because the company concerned was an ―unregistered security
company contracted out to the national government‖ (Wiley, personal communication,
April 29, 2013). Wiley expressed concern about the mismanagement of the harbors where
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foreign ships stop overnight to access land and sail out again without going through the
proper border and customs controls (Wiley, personal communication, April 29, 2013).
Wiley is deeply concerned about the state‘s ―huge security vulnerability along SA‘s
coastline and therein lies a massive breach in national security as far as the small boat
harbors is concerned‖ (personal communication, April 29, 2013). In addition, he was
aware of ongoing maritime poaching and organized criminal activities that take place
after hours in the Hout Bay harbor area and other small boat harbors in the Western Cape
Province (Wiley, personal communication, April 29, 2013). According to Wiley,
corroborating what Greyling had asserted, ―maritime poaching is directly linked to both
organized drug smuggling as well as prostitution, and these are well documented illicit
industries where the direct linkages are observed‖ (personal communication, April 29,
2013). The illicit abalone trade is now inextricably linked to drug-trafficking and the
prostitution trade, as a highly sought after form of payment (Greyling, personal
communication, April 15, 2013).
Van der Spuy (personal communication, May 13, 2013) stated that ―political
alliances are quite clear‖ and if you look at the ―corruption under both [Police
Commissioners] Selebi and Cele‖ and what has been happening to the ―intelligence
component of the police has people really concerned that there is political interference.‖
The PSIRA, who reports to the Minister of Police, is rife with corruption and ineptitude
when they have uncollected debts of R82.5m (USD 8.25 million), which is more than
they had for the previous year (Kohler-Barnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013).
As an organization, ―they keep on hiring consultants to do their jobs for them at huge cost
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- as a management structure, it‘s a total failure‖ (Kohler-Barnard, personal
communication, May 8, 2013).
John Hitchcock, Executive Director of a private security company, expressed
concern about the corrupt tender system in the SAG when it came to the outsourcing of
security functions to the private sector (personal communication, April 23, 2013). He
questioned the pricing of the services and tenders that go to ―companies owned by
government officials‖ (Hitchcock, personal communication, April 23, 2013). Van Zyl
(personal communication, April 8, 2013) stated that he was concerned about the tenders
―to what extent is the government looking after its own people? I would imagine that
there are cases of nepotism, there are cases of looking after cadres, and giving them jobs‖
(Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013). These tenders are given to companies
that ―have some kind of relationship with the government‖ (Van Zyl, personal
communication, April 8, 2013). Willie Hofmeyer, head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit
within the National Prosecuting Authority in October 2011, stated that between R25
billion (USD 2.5 billion) and R30 billion (USD 3 billion) of the SAG‘s procurement
budget is lost every year due to ―corruption, negligence, and incompetence by public
officials‖ (SAIRR, 2012, p. 848). Groenewald (personal communication, April 17, 2013),
Member of Parliament for the FF+ and Director of the South African Counter
Intelligence Agency - a private security company, expressed the same sentiments about
the lack of good governance with ―police case dockets disappearing and prosecutors who
are bribed.‖ The number of lost and stolen case dockets increased from 343 in 2003/4 to
668 in 2008/9 (SAIRR, 2012, p. 751). ―Only 10% of all criminal cases in SA have a
complete cycle through our courts‖ (Groenewald, personal communication, April 17,
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2013). The total number of cases reported to the SAPS in 2010/11 numbered 1,986
million of which there were 293,673 convictions (SAIRR, 2012, p. 754). There were
1,079 escapees in 2011/12 (SAIRR, 2012, p. 751).
Retired assistant police commissioner Botha (personal communication, April 17,
2013), stated that the local police in the city of Bellville in the Western Cape Province
informed him that the major drug and gun smuggling that happened there is becoming
―unpoliceable‖ and it is ―difficult for them to get in there unless they recruit a Somalian
and plant that person there to be able to get information.‖96 Some members of the local
police are in the ―pockets of the gang leaders, so the possibility of corruption is always
there‖ (Chris Botha, personal communication, April 17, 2013).
As far as the judicial system in SA is concerned, there's not a culture of
prosecuting police officers successfully and ―prosecutors and magistrates turn a blind eye
to police abuses and torture because they‘ve become accustomed to it‖ (Cronje, personal
communication, June 10, 2013). Fivaz (personal communication, June 3, 2013)
highlighted another concern about the number of corrupt police officers who are
processed by an ―ineffective court system‖ and in the ―eyes of many our safety and
security in SA is not up to standard.‖ After Cele was dismissed as National Police
Commissioner in 2011 by President Zuma, the Public Protector, Advocate Thuli
Madonsela, found that the acting Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi faced a
―prima facie case of improper conduct and abuse of power, which warrants an
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investigation,‖ as he was allegedly part of a group within the police that killed an
innocent man and then obstructed justice by failing to cooperate in the murder
investigation (Kohler-Barnard, 2012c).97 Barnard (personal communication, April 30 &
May 10, 2013) and others were in agreement that corruption at the highest levels of
government is unacceptable and sets a bad example for the rest of the country‘s
citizens.98 Both secondary data and information gathered through interviews are
indicative of the overall assessment that security system effectiveness decreases as the
level of corruption increases. Consequently, personal and community security are
threatened indicative of the presence of latent state fragility.

Crime Syndicates
The breakdown of good governance, law, and order follows when a state, as a
decision-making, executing, and enforcing institution can no longer take and implement
decisions (Zartman, 1995). Allegations of criminal conduct were made against the Head
of Crime Intelligence, Major General Richard Mdluli and other senior officers in April
2011 during the investigations into the activities of Czech fugitive and alleged organized
crime boss, Radovan Krejcir by the SAPS Directorate for Priority Crime (Burger,
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2011).99 These allegations pertained to the illegal tapping of the telephones of the
investigators and sharing that information with Krejcer, thereby compromising the case
against him (Burger, 2011). Shortly after this allegation, Mdluli was charged with a
murder that took place 10 years earlier (Burger, 2011). Research conducted by the
SAIRR shows the extent of organized crime within the ranks of the SAPS (see Ndebele,
Lebone, & Cronje, 2011).
Criminal syndicates have become more sophisticated in SA (Koornhof, personal
communication, April 17, 2013). Some criminals are always one step ahead, as in the
case where they buy a house inside a gated community and live there so that they can
perpetrate a robbery or murder and then decide not to leave the community until the ―dust
has settled‖ (Koornhof, personal communication, April 17, 2013). At that point they drive
out of the gated community with the stolen goods and they have ―successfully pulled off
an inside job without being caught‖ (Koornhof, personal communication, April 17,
2013).
The changeover from an autocracy to a democracy in 1994 left a security vacuum,
which the criminal elements utilized to their benefit (Meyer, personal communication,
April 24, 2013). Criminals found it easier to move around and to perpetrate crime and
that resulted in an on-going high level of crime, and to some extent even an increase in
crime, which is ―still very much part of the South African environment today‖ (Meyer,
personal communication, April 24, 2013). Van Wyk (personal communication, April 21,
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2013) supports this contention that the new government in 1994 lacked crime fighting
capabilities and capacities, as the previous police structure was focused on containing the
ANC liberation movement and not focused on combating crime. It was at that time that
the ―Russian mafia and the Eastern bloc mafia infiltrated SA‖ without hardly any
resistance from the SAPS (Van Wyk, personal communication, April 21, 2013). To give
further perspective on organized crime in SA, Kohler-Barnard (personal communication,
May 8, 2013) explained that there is a huge disconnect between the ability of both the
SAPS and private security to effectively counteract the threat of international syndicates.
Syndicates have sophisticated weaponry and modern equipment, which the SAPS do not
have and which the private security operators are not supposed to have – they
(international crime syndicates) ―outgun them, out-drive them, they have boats, they have
helicopters, and they have got everything that neither the private security, nor SAPS
have‖ (Kohler-Barnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013). Furthermore,
international crime syndicates do not recognize borders and hide behind protocols
governing international relations, which restrict cross-border pursuits (Kohler-Barnard,
personal communication, May 8, 2013). According to the SAPS, the most serious
categories of organized crime include motor-vehicle theft, drug-related offenses, fraud,
and car hijacking (Owen, 2014). In 2011/12 there were 176,307 drug-related crimes (rose
by 284% since 1994/5); 59,097 vehicles stolen (decrease of 44% since 1994/5); 9,475
car-jackings (decrease of 27% since 1996/97); and 88,050 commercial crimes (rose 40%
since 1994/5) (SAIRR, 2012, pp. 680-710). In addition, since 1994/5, common robberies
rose by 62%, illegal possession of firearms and ammunition by 31%, and commercial
crime by 40% (SAIRR, 2012, p.680). Factors that make SA attractive to organized crime
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include the ease with which criminals can enter the country with false passports,
corruptibility of the police, and the low risk of landing up in court (Owen, 2014).
Breytenbach (personal communication, April 9, 2013) expressed concern at the
number of illegal aliens from other parts of Africa who flock to South African cities and
live in informal townships that come to seek employment opportunities only to discover
that there are few job opportunities and then may turn to crime to meet their basic
needs.100 It was found that the automatic teller machine bombs that are used to blow them
up are ―very sophisticated,‖ and after apprehending the perpetrators they were found to
be ―former members of the Zimbabwean army‖ (Breytenbach, personal communication,
April 9, 2013). Barlow (personal communication, April 25, 2013) also referenced a heist
that took place at a popular shopping mall in Pretoria in 2012 where the robbery was
carried out with military precision – ―these are not common criminals doing this.‖ Barlow
asserted that ―execution hits‖ on business people took place by way of a ―hijacking gone
wrong‖ and ―lots of them have happened in SA‖ (personal communication, April 25,
2013). This type of violence has flared up in KwaZulu Natal against ―politicians that
have been assassinated‖ (Barlow, personal communication, April 25, 2013).
There have been successes in the fight against violent crime, such as the cash-intransit heists and robberies, which came about through the ―excellent partnership between
the SAPS and the banking sector‖ and yielded effective results (Irish-Quobosheane,
personal communication, April 25, 2013). The banking sector has traditionally, even
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during the apartheid years, used in-house PSCs for protection services when large
amounts of money are transported. The cooperation between the PSCs and police has
been well established over many years and their formula for cooperation has been very
successful (Irish-Quobosheane, personal communication, April 25, 2013). IrishQuobosheane (personal communication, April 25, 2013) asserted that some of the violent
crime that does take place in SA is highly organized. In response to being prompted about
the types of crime syndicates that operate in SA, I was informed of Bulgarian car theft
rings that engineered a series of hijackings in the 1990s, Mozambican drug and cigarette
smuggling syndicates, and Nigerian human and drug trafficking syndicates have
established themselves in SA (Anonymous ―1,‖ personal communication, May 3, 2013).
Petty crime is one of the drivers of organized crime because it helps to ―keep
organized crime under the radar‖ (Van Niekerk, personal communication, May 27, 2013).
Transnational organized crime has created a value chain, ―somebody is making money
somewhere‖ (Van Niekerk, personal communication, May 27, 2013; see also ISS,
2013c). Hitchcock (personal communication, April 23, 2013) expressed concern about
the high level of white collar crime, computer fraud, and ―inside jobs.‖ To this point
Ngonyama (personal communication, May 21, 2013) asserted that ―organized crime in
SA is terrible,‖ especially concerning the illegal drug trade. He stated that the Premier of
the Western Cape made an unsuccessful appeal to the SAG to deploy the army to the
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Cape Flats where gang-related violence and drug trafficking are extremely high, to help
combat these crimes in that area (Ngonyama, personal communication, May 21, 2013).101
Organized crime is a money turnover business as most things that are stolen are
insured, and every insurance payout ―reproduces that product back into the market‖
(Strydom, personal communication, April 26, 2013). When a replacement product is
purchased, the government receives tax (value added tax) on every transaction and in this
way, ―organized crime pumps money into the economy‖ (Strydom, personal
communication, April 26, 2013). He speculated that it may be driven by individuals in
government participating in organized crime who benefited from this crime – ―there is
talk on the street about that‖ (Strydom, personal communication, April 26, 2013). In her
recent research study, Lambrechts (personal communication, April 16, 2013) found that
organized criminals cut deals with the police and so they do have a corrupt relationship.
Concerning the relationship between the state and organized crime, some criminal
syndicates form their own security companies as a legal front organization misused for
their own criminal activities – ―as far as I am concerned that poses a big threat to the
stability in SA‖ (Groenewald, personal communication, April 17, 2013). Chris Botha
(personal communication, April 17, 2013) pointed to the corruption case against Schabir
Shaik, friend and former advisor to President Zuma, who was found guilty of corruption
and fraud relating to the now infamous arms deal and sentenced to fifteen years
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imprisonment.102 Zuma, who was Deputy President of SA at the time, was dismissed by
President Mbeki as a result of this corrupt relationship (Chris Botha, personal
communication, April 17, 2013). After serving time in prison for two-and-a-half years, he
was granted parole on ―medical grounds‖, and after succeeding Mbeki as President,
Zuma reprieved Schabir on the grounds of being fatally ill.103
The extent of organized crime is difficult to gauge accurately. The SAPS reports
that 192 organized crime syndicates operate in SA specializing in drug trafficking (96
syndicates), vehicle-related crime (83 syndicates), and commercial crime (60 syndicates)
(Shaw, 1998). Of the 192 syndicates, 32 operate internationally, while 150 operate in
sub-Saharan Africa (Shaw, 1998). With an apparent sub-par police service that is
politically compromised through the flawed application of ethnicity based preferential
treatment, and the inability to ensure the human security of all its citizens equally
throughout the country, good governance is at risk. In fact, good governance can only be
established if SA has an accountable, legitimate, and fully functional security system,
while the provision of security is a pre-requisite of legitimate government. During her
recent doctoral field research, Lambrechts (personal communication, April 16, 2013) had
to access an area in the Cape Flats called Manenburg. To accomplish this, she had a
gatekeeper who (at the time of the research) was a rehabilitated member of one of the
largest gangs and they had to get clearance from other gangs in control of specific areas
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to access sites (Lambrechts, personal communication, April 16, 2013). There Lambrechts
found no private security signage because they ―just don‘t feature in those areas.‖
Lambrechts explained that in the ―past 4-5 months we have seen a massive increase in
vigilante groups in Khayelitsha and in the other informal settlements,‖ and when asked
why they resort to this type of violence, their standard reply was ―lack of police
response‖ (personal communication, April 16, 2013). Both secondary and interview data
indicate that security system effectiveness decreases as the legitimacy of government
decreases. In turn personal and community security is threatened indicating the presence
of latent state fragility.

Political Destabilization
One of the most important aspects of human security is political security, focusing
on the protection of basic human rights (UNDP, 1994). Martin and Owen (2010) argue
that ―people must first be secure from critical and pervasive threats to their vital core,
whatever the cause, before the mechanisms of development can take root‖ (p. 222).
Promoting human security is about a state keeping its side of the social contract because
it is created to provide security, among other things, so that individuals may pursue their
lives in peace (Krause, 2002).
Greyling (personal communication, April 15, 2013), former Special Forces
operative, presently President of the Pan-African Security Association, submits that the
SAG has come up with a strategy, unlike the infamous ―landgrab‖ policy of Zimbabwe,
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to devalue the worth of farms in the Western Cape by inciting farm labor violence under
the ―facade of the fight for higher wages.‖104 By eroding the farm‘s worth by inciting
labor unrest, the farm‘s produce output drops, which affects the profits negatively; the
SAG can then at the opportune time make an offer to purchase the farm, under the land
expropriation policy of the SAG, at a reduced value (Greyling, personal communication,
April 15, 2013). The value of the farm would also drop because of the heightened
security risk the farm is exposed to, caused by the farm labor unrest (Greyling, personal
communication, April 15, 2013). In addition, the African National Congress Youth
League (ANCYL) has threatened to make Cape Town and the Western Cape
―ungovernable,‖ if their demands concerning a youth wage subsidy and the closure of
some schools were not met, and the ANC has yet to repudiate the ANCYL for saying that
(Independent On Line, 2012b). Making the Western Cape ungovernable would take the
form of daily street protests where the delivery of government services is disrupted and
riots fostered by the agitators would occupy the resources of the police and medical
services 100% of the time, while basic crime fighting elsewhere in the province is just
about non-existent. In essence, it would mean the disruption of daily life to the detriment
of the inhabitants of the province. The Western Cape is the only province in SA that is
not under ANC control and is governed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) – the official
opposition party. There is a school of thought that the ANC wishes to take control of the
province from the DA, and this is the ―crux of the farm labor unrest‖ (Greyling, personal
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communication, April 15, 2013). The board of directors of Du Toit Agri released a public
declaration on November 15, 2012, following widespread damage to their and
surrounding farms as a result of farm laborers incited to protest.105 The agricultural
business suffered millions of Rands of damage (Anonymous ―2,‖ personal
communication, May 17, 2013).106 Anonymous ―2‖ expressed concern about the ―slow
and inefficient reaction by Government to protect our assets and people,‖ and that he felt
this lack of reaction from the SAG confirmed his ―strong suspicion that this is an illintended campaign by unions and political parties.‖
In a press release by the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille in the wake of
the farm labor strikes,107 she asserted that Noseyman Pieterse - a farmer, president of an
association of BEE farmers in the wine and spirit industry, and trade union leader who
organizes workers in the farming industry - emerged as a ―key figure behind the strikes,‖
and is mobilizing for the next round of the ―rural struggle‖ he claims to lead (2013). Zille
claims that the ANC‘s interest in fuelling the farm labor unrest is as a ―golden
opportunity to drive a wedge between two strong sectors of DA support -- farmers and
farm workers -- while seeking to position the DA on the side of ‗heartless farmers‘ and
the ANC as the ‗champion of exploited workers‘‖ (2013). Premier Zille visited the area
during the unrest and spoke to the farmers who implored her to get more SAPS officers
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See Zille (2013) for the full press release by Premier Helen Zille.

205

dispatched to contain the violence and limit the damage to their farms (Anonymous ―2,‖
personal communication, May 17, 2013). An influential business owner of the Western
Cape (referred to hereafter as Anonymous ―2‖) appealed to the Western Cape Police
Commissioner Lamoer to intervene and to help the farmers, but since he is under the
control of the ANC national government, he could only act within the parameters that
were dictated by his headquarters.108 Anonymous ―2‖ (personal communication, May 17,
2013) acknowledged the suspicion that there was ―enough proof that the labor unrest on
the farms was motivated by a political agenda.‖ The misleading ANC narrative was that
the white farmers were exploiting [colored] farm laborers, when in fact they were
receiving a wage higher than the national average (IOL, 2013c). This was a narrative that
suited the ANC so that it could attempt to weaken the DA government in the Western
Cape (IOL, 2013c). The ANC wishes to govern all nine provinces in SA and these
sentiments are front and center as the country prepared for the general elections held in
May 2014. Making a provincial government less stable to further the political aims and
objectives of the national government detracts from good governance.
Van Zyl (personal communication, April 8, 2013) also asserted that in response to
the poor policing in the Western Cape Province, Premier Zille was about to sign into law
legislation to help address the crime situation in the Western Cape, which the ―national
authorities are not responding to effectively.‖ He is of the opinion the national
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At the time of conducting my interviews, Lamoer declined to participate. Later on media outlets
revealed that Lamoer is under investigation for allegedly having a corrupt relationship with a local
businessman. The national police commissioner is under investigation for tipping Lamoer off about being
under investigation by the crime intelligence division (IOL, 2013a; IOL, 2013b; IOL, 2013c; IOL, 2013d).
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government will challenge the legislation in the constitutional court on the basis that it is
alleged interference with national policing (Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8,
2013). Van Zyl (personal communication, April 8, 2013) deplores this negative approach,
since the ―national government should be seen to support all the provinces.‖ However,
the Western Cape is the only province which is a DA-controlled province, and the ―ANC
would dearly like to displace the DA in the Western Cape, but has not been able to do so.
It is a question of politics, pure politics‖ (Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8,
2013).
In discussing the farm labor protests in the Western Cape at the end of 2012 to
pressure the farmers into raising their wages, Burger (personal communication, May 28,
2013) stated that there is more than enough evidence to show that ―this has just become
an excuse to mobilize groups‖ to destabilize the Western Cape. Protesting groups of
people were bussed into the area to participate in the violent protests (Burger, personal
communication, May 28, 2013). Burger (personal communication, May 28, 2013)
credited the SAPS for having done their best with a few officers under the circumstances,
and blames most of the damage caused to the farms on the ―rent-a-mob‖ groups that were
transported in and were ―not in the employ of any of the farmers.‖ Information gathered
through interviews and the media is indicative of the overall assessment that security
system effectiveness decreases as political stability decreases. As personal, community,
and economic security are threatened, latent state fragility rises.
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New Social Divide
The main threats to economic security are persistent poverty and unemployment
with the most insecure jobs being in the informal sector, which is prevalent in the
majority of developing countries, where there is no social insurance or safety net for
people working in the informal sector (Canagarajah & Sethuraman, 2001).
Unemployment and under-employment are indicative threats to economic security and
both can be somewhat addressed by an existing social safety program as provided by
either the state or the private sector or a combination of the two (Werthes et al., 2011). A
critical aspect of economic security is citizens having equal access to economic
opportunity regardless of their ―social background, religion, ethnicity, and gender‖
(Werthes et al., 2011, p. 19). It is not the existence of inequalities that triggers violence,
but a collective feeling of unfairness based on the perception of an unfair distribution of
benefits among the various groups (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Good governance includes
effective socio-economic systems, which would pre-suppose government policies and
programs that would grow the economy and reduce unemployment and poverty rates.
Citizens having unequal access to the economy because of a lack of effective economic
policies, is an indicator of a good governance deficit, and of latent state fragility because
of the threat to economic security.
There is an upcoming black entrepreneurial middle class, and even in the top
upper class the number of ―black millionaires in South Africa has risen by 81 percent
over the past seven years‖ (Taylor, 2013). According to Jones (2013), ―about 16 percent
of South Africa‘s 48,700 millionaires are black, Indian, colored or Chinese‖ (p.1).
However, the majority of South Africans living in townships do not have running water
208

or functioning toilets (Hitchcock, personal communication, April 23, 2013). According to
the SAIRR (2012), 68% of black households have functioning/hygienic sanitation
facilities while 32% have substandard facilities. Moreover, 3.73 million black households
are without water in the dwelling or on site (SAIRR, 2012). The haves and have nots in
SA are ―poles apart and the distance between these are becoming greater‖ (Kuhn,
personal communication, May 15, 2013).
The SAG‘s policies of ethnicity based preferential treatment are only enriching a
very few people in SA (Kuhn, personal communication, May 15, 2013).109 Meyer
(personal communication, April 24, 2013) is of the opinion that the new social divide is
along class differentiation, which cuts across racial divides, and which is purely
economic.110 The class divide has become far stronger in SA and by way of example
Anonymous ―6‖ (personal communication, April 24, 2013) used the case of the
production of a home in Cape Town.111 In the Langa and Khayelitsha townships one
could build a shack to live in for less than R10,000 (USD 1,000),112 whereas in wealthy
Camps Bay, one would pay between R55-R100 million (USD 5.5-10 million) for an
exclusive home (Anonymous ―6,‖ personal communication, April 24, 2013).113
Anonymous ―3‖ (personal communication, May 6, 2013) concurred when he stated that
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the ―divide between wealthy neighborhoods and poor neighborhoods will increase‖ and
the nation will not become safer, it is only the ―richer that will become more secure‖ in
their environment.
There is a divide between the haves and have nots, but ―that‘s about the failure of
governance‖ (Shaik, personal communication, June 4, 2013). South Africans confident in
a happy future for all population groups dropped from 74% in 2000 to 65% in 2011
(SAIRR, p. 813). The wealthy black and white people are able to live behind electrified
walls and huge mansions with flood lights and beams and security equipment while
creating a chasm between them and the have nots, and so the primary division in SA is
economic/class-based since 1994 (Leysens, personal communication, April 12, 2013).
Breytenbach (personal communication, April 9, 2013) concurred with this point of view –
―its class and affluence.‖ It is all based on income and the higher income levels have an
increasing number of blacks while the lower levels of poverty have started to get a
―sprinklings of whites‖ (Anonymous ―1,‖ personal communication, May 3, 2013).
The Gini coefficient has shown that there is a ―widening gap between the haves
and the have nots‖ (Wiley, personal communication, April 29, 2013). SA is one of the
most unequal countries in the world with a Gini co-efficient of 0.7 in 2008 (World Bank,
2012). The Gini co-efficient by race in 2011 was 0.56 for blacks, 0.51 for coloreds, 0.44
for Indians, and 0.43 for whites (SAIRR, 2012, p. 305).114 As the South African society
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The Gini co-efficient is used to measure equality within countries or between groups of people. It
assigns a measure to distribution of total personal income between zero, which is perfect equality (everyone
has the same income) and one, which is perfect inequality (one person has all the income) (SAIRR, 2012,
p. 305).
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strives to become a united society, the divide that is emerging is between the haves and
have nots (Lekota, personal communication, May 23, 2013). Radebe (personal
communication, May 31, 2013) agreed that the class divide cuts across the color
spectrum. Barlow (personal communication, April 25, 2013) is also in agreement when
he stated that ―we are seeing a very large divide between the haves and have nots.‖
Ndlovu (personal communication, May 21, 2013) sees the class divide as problematic for
SA as the have nots far outnumber the haves. Class is the new divide in SA (Cronje,
personal communication, June 10, 2013). On the other hand, there is no divide in SA and
one has to ―understand and acknowledge the principle of capitalism,‖ that there will
always be a gap between the poor and the rich, and ―life in general is getting better‖
(Anonymous ―4‖ and Anonymous ―5,‖ personal communication, April 24, 2013). Fivaz
(personal communication, June 3, 2013) asserted that after 1994, SA had developed a
large black elite while also having a fairly large white elite – ―there are more young
people between the ages of 20-30 who have become millionaires in the last ten years than
ever in the history of this country.‖ Van Wyk (personal communication, April 21, 2013),
Lambrechts, (personal communication, April 16, 2013), and Joubert (personal
communication, May 20, 2013) all agreed that SA has a new class divide across the racial
divide along economic lines. There are quite a number of whites who have become very
poor, ―living in squatter camps,‖ and the new divide is between the haves and the havenots (Groenewald, personal communication, April 17, 2013). SA is the leading country in
the world in terms of the gap that exists between the haves and the have-nots and Burger
(personal communication, May 28, 2013, World Bank, 2012) submits that this is
―probably the biggest cause of most of our problems.‖
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Both secondary and interview data are indicative of the overall assessment that
economic security decreases with unequal access to socio-economic opportunities
through government policies. In this sense, unequal access to economic opportunities and
ethnicity based preferential treatment threaten human security, thereby contributing
further to latent state fragility. The observed heightened social divide between the haves
and have nots further erodes the effectiveness of the security system and as a result
undermines good governance.

DISCUSSION
Effective legitimate governance, namely ―governance in which the governed
believe fundamentally in the legitimacy of the system and people who govern them,‖ is
essential if the state is to ward off becoming a fragile state (Dorff, 2005, p. 24). Endemic
crime, corruption perpetrated especially by the police, and an increase in poor service
delivery to the population, do not foster a climate of legitimacy of the state. Jackson
(2012) argues that ―security is an integral element of governance more generally, and the
provision of security is a key element of legitimacy‖ (p. 264). It is difficult to justify that
the SAG provides effective and sufficient security to the population when so many of the
SAPS senior leadership, and especially the crime intelligence division, suffer from the
many ailments as mentioned earlier in this study. The United States Government
Accountability Office defines failed or failing states as ―nations where governments
effectively do not control their territory, citizens largely do not perceive the governments
as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic public services or domestic security‖
(USGAO, 2007, p. 5). Interviewees have shared their concern for areas in the Western
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Cape that are no longer under effective control of the police as officers have to seek the
permission of organized gangs to gain access to gang-controlled areas in their attempt to
police the areas and gain crime intelligence.
These gang-controlled townships are where there has been a rise in so-called
―kangaroo courts,‖ where vigilantes take the law into their own hands.115 If government
no longer has free access to all its territory, it has lost effective control, and if citizens no
longer have access to basic services and security, they may no longer see their
government as legitimate. Interviews and secondary data highlight the problems of high
levels of crime, corruption, high unemployment, and a rising social divide between the
haves and have-nots. Moreover, the SAPS should regain control over all of SA‘s
sovereign territory, especially where organized crime syndicates operate.
Based on the findings in this study, the SAPS does not have full and unchallenged
access to all of the land without using force, coercion, or negotiations with gangs to gain
access. SA seems to be weakening in the areas of personal and community security,
political security, and economic security, which the SFI does not capture or process in
order to accurately determine the actual level of state fragility. Security effectiveness,
political effectiveness and political legitimacy receive a stable grading when clearly there
are concerns about the threats to human security in the areas of personal, community,
economic, and political security. Political effectiveness, political legitimacy, and security
effectiveness are some of the traditional indicators used by the SFI that point to SA
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These are ―courts‖ set up by the township residents to try criminals for committing crimes in their
neighborhoods, which are not reported to the police because of the public‘s lack of trust in them. These
residents act as the police, prosecutor, judge, and executioner.
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having low fragility. However, some of the components of human security that this study
uses are not taken into consideration by the SFI when making that determination. The
dilemma is that the SFI depicts SA generally as stable, when in fact SA shows
considerable signs of latent fragility. The indicators of latent state fragility such as high
violent crime, growing social disparities, endemic corruption, consistently high
unemployment and poverty rates, and poor service delivery, especially with regards to the
provision of security provide evidence of good governance deficit.
Many of the interviewees state that the SAG will not be successful in its fight
against crime because of the lack of understanding that the fight should consist of a
combination of effective legislation, commitment of government to create a strong
capacity to deal with crime, effective criminal justice system, and the existence of a
value-of-norms system. A holistic approach to security is required. Data obtained during
the interviews show that the aforementioned factors will go a long way to combating
crime successfully. Weaknesses in any of these areas will result in a failed crime-fighting
strategy.
The NDP identifies that blame-shifting within government is a concern. The
SAPS often blame the courts for poor prosecution, while the courts blame the SAPS for
poor police work in helping to prepare case dockets for prosecution, resulting in the
acquittal of the majority violent criminals. Concern was expressed about small boat
harbors, which have become national security risks because of the lack of customs and
border control, where foreign boats enter and access land without going through any
security checks. A further concern is that PSCs, some with criminal elements, deployed at

214

some of these harbors are co-owned by government officials who participated in a flawed
tender system to be able to obtain the contract.
A number of my interviewees suggested that SA do away with the cadre
deployment policy where party loyalists are treated preferentially through appointments
and/or pensions for their erstwhile fight in the liberation struggle (Fivaz, personal
communication, June 3, 2013; Heinecken, personal communication, April 11, 2013;
Kohler-Barnard, personal communication, May 8, 2013; Mdwaba, personal
communication, May 27, 2013). However, cadre deployment policy may not substitute
for qualifications and skills and in fact contributes to the erosion of public trust in the
government. Therefore, one of the primary tasks for the government must be the reestablishment of that trust not just among its support base, but all South Africans.
Promoting trust is a necessary precondition to foster the legitimacy of the government
and enhance good governance.
Placing all the blame for the high levels of crime on the SAPS is not only unfair,
but also disingenuous. The former apartheid government has to take apportioned
responsibility for its role in creating an environment of structural violence and for using
the public‘s police force to coerce and subdue the majority of the population. The
apartheid based SAP focused on punitive policing rather than service policing.116 With
the dawn of the new democratic dispensation in 1994, the newly formed SAPS did not
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It is however true on the other hand to understand that the SAP provided an indispensible and crucial
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communication, June 3, 2013; Shaik, personal communication, June 4, 2013).
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inherit much crime fighting capabilities and capacities from the old SAP and therefore
started from a disadvantaged position in its crime fighting efforts. Based on these
findings, I propose that the SAPS focus their efforts on developing and providing
specialized and repeated training to its police service so officers can combat crime and
corruption more effectively. Moreover, it would behoove the SAG to cultivate a ―culture
of respect‖ within the SAPS as well as between the SAPS and the public. The SAPS
ought to serve and protect all the people in the country, unlike the apartheid days when
the largest portion of the population feared the police without respecting them.
Leadership training that encompasses ethical leadership should be implemented for all
senior officers so that the rank-and-file may follow good standards of behavior.
The change from an autocratic government to democracy made it easier for
criminals to move around and conduct their illicit activities. Increasing SAPS headcount
and increasing the Department of Police‘s annual budget clearly does not sufficiently
address the pervasive high crime dilemma in SA, with some categories of violent crime
increasing. In a highly bureaucratized institution such as the police where there is a
disrupted chain-of-command due to the cadre deployment policy, ANC party loyalists do
not speak out against other loyalists in the police service and therefore corruption in the
service is not readily reported. The range of issues including sub-par leadership, lack of
command-and-control, endemic corruption at all levels, socio-economic challenges, the
new social divide, crime syndicates, and political destabilization have eroded SA‘s
system of governance. High levels of unemployment, mismanagement and misallocation
of funds, lavish spending, lack of relevant expertise and experience in the SAG, police
abuse of power, flawed application of affirmative action and BEE policies, and a lack of
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sufficient intelligence capabilities, all point towards a GGD in SA. More specifically, the
aforementioned indicators confirm the existence of latent state fragility.
It is apparent that the middle-to-upper-class no longer relies on the state for the
provision of security and has turned to PSCs to provide that service. Consequently, the
state has become the primary provider of security for the poor, which seems to only take
place sporadically, which explains the rise in so-called ―kangaroo courts‖ in the
townships and vigilantes who take the law into their own hands. There is also concern
that the national government‘s lack of support of the efforts made to address the recent
farm labor strikes in the Western Cape is indicative of an alleged strategy to destabilize
the province politically, and to unseat the Democratic Alliance that governs the only
province not governed by the ANC.
The large number of service delivery protests exposes a weakness in the state not
due to the failure of the state, but in many respects counter-intuitively due to its success.
The SAG succeeded at improving the relative standard of living for the majority of South
Africans when compared to the apartheid-era (SAIRR, 2012), yet it has shown great
difficulty in meeting the heightened expectations of the ANC support base. Policies of
ethnicity based preferential treatment cannot work without simultaneous education and
skills based training, so qualified candidates can be found among all population groups.
While demands from the ANC support base are growing daily, the tax capacity of the
black population is currently very limited. Therefore, even the unsatisfactory current
level of service deliveries provided by the national, provincial, and local governments
cannot be sustained even in the medium run.
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The SAG is in danger of losing even more of its legitimacy if the majority of the
population does not see marked improvements in access to economic opportunities, their
basic standard of living, and enhancements in the provision of personal, community, and
economic security. In order to strengthen public trust and good governance, it becomes
imperative that the SAG makes every effort to address the broad based political concerns
inclusively and comprehensively. For as long as perceptions prevail that the government
at any level treats one or more population groups preferentially, government policies are
not truly representative of the democratic constituency and public trust cannot be restored
successfully.
In addition to prevalent, legitimacy, and good governance problems, SA suffers
from a crisis in latent fragility. The categorization of the country by the SFI as fairly
stable ignores much of the direct and structural violence observed in the present study.
Based on the parameters of the fragile states strategy of the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID, 2005), SA could be categorized as a fragile state
that is unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic
services to significant portions of its population. Should the SAG not be able to meet
these challenges effectively, legitimacy and public trust may further erode and SA may
slip into a crisis state, where ―central government does not exert effective control over its
own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to
significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or
nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk‖ (USAID, 2005).
Synthesizing the results from chapters 5, 6, and 7, the next chapter specifically
expands the state fragility discourse by discussing the importance of the concept of latent
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state fragility and offering policy recommendations to address the threats to personal,
community, political, and economic security and to reverse the disintegrating legitimacy
of the government, and SA‘s potential slide into a fragile and even failed state.
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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Nelson Mandela described the peace process in SA as the miracle of the rainbow
nation (Mandela, 1994). My study clearly indicates that for all the positive expectations
about the new democratic SA, there are serious challenges facing the country, especially
in the security system, and more specifically in the SAPS.
The results of my interviews with experts in the security system point to the many
challenges brought about by identity-based social policies, deep levels of corruption
within the SAG, and particularly the criminal justice system, the sub-optimal level of
service delivery by the SAPS and sub-par leadership, and the outsourcing of security
system functions. There seems to be agreement among most of my interviewees that the
SAG does not outsource some of its security system functions, but in fact insources these
because it lacks the capacity and capability to offer such services. Insourcing as opposed
to outsourcing takes place when the government lacks the capacity and capability of
providing security services that it is expected to provide its population, and has no option
but to contract the services of PSCs to provide such services. This lack of capacity and
capability is reflective of a good governance deficit.
This, in part, would explain the increase in growth of the private security industry.
Moreover, public trust in the SAPS seems to be waning, as those who can financially
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afford it pay for private security services, while those who cannot afford it are dependent
upon the sub-par service delivery of the SAPS. Further findings show that the social
divide between the haves and the have nots seem to be growing, while unemployment
remains too high in a society that desperately needs job creation to help address the very
high crime rates. The aforementioned non-traditional fragility indicators point to this
deficit and therefore this dissertation argues that the country is latently fragile, which
ought to prompt intervention through governance measures and programs that would
protect the state from becoming manifestly fragile, and eventually failed.
This study argues that the SFI measures of state fragility are not comprehensive
enough. The SFI indicators are limited to indicators of general security and vulnerability
to political violence, regime durability, and total number of coup events, and current
leader‘s years in office. This study is not concerned with these particular measures and
their appropriateness. This study is concerned with the fact that they are ignoring specific
aspects of human security and structural violence such as risks to personal, community,
political, and economic security. By looking at security more holistically, this study
comes to very different conclusions than the SFI.
The essence of the scholarly contribution of this study resides in the discourse of
what constitutes a failed, failing, or fragile state. While the debate continues unabated,
this study strongly suggests that the SAG take a holistic view of security in its efforts to
make the country more stable, which includes personal and community security, political
security, and economic security. Consequently, looking at the overall state fragility
rankings as determined by the SFI, we have a new form of fragility, which the SFI does
not capture and which this study calls latent state fragility, as existing measures of state
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fragility do not measure the potential or root causes of fragility. The idea of latent
fragility is an important concept and it is the novel scholarly contribution of this study.
This study makes inroads to the methodological aspects of the SFI and points to some of
its shortcomings. It shows that it is important to not rely exclusively on aggregate statelevel data, but to supplement secondary data analysis with qualitative data to more
accurately determine the fragility of a state, especially by taking elements of human
security into consideration. Clearly, although the SFI categorizes SA as having low
fragility, this does not give an accurate reflection of the true state of affairs. SA appears
to be more fragile than commonly used measures lead us to believe.
The key finding of this study, namely that SA presents a case of latent fragility is
significant because of SA‘s strategic role as a key political, economic, and military force
in Africa and its role as a vital contributor for stability in Africa. As for future research, it
is suggested that the concept of latent state fragility be re-examined in another
country/security context to test its validity.
I measure the waning legitimacy of the SAG, the erosion of public trust, and the
overall well-being of all South Africans in terms of my hypotheses. This chapter develops
some policy recommendations based on the data analysis with respect to improving
human security, enhancing the effectiveness of the private security industry, reducing the
security system deficit, and improving overall good governance.

FINDINGS
It was common knowledge that the real challenge of the new democratic SA
would be its transformation from autocracy to democracy. This study finds that 20 years
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after the country became a democracy, crime rates remain unusually high
notwithstanding a large police service with one of the largest government budgets per
capita, and the world‘s largest private security industry.
This research study reveals the following findings:
1. Concerns have been expressed about sub-optimal police leadership and
management, and the apparent lack of capacity and capability of the SAPS to
significantly reduce the high levels of crime. Further concerns suggest that SA do
away with the cadre deployment policy where party loyalists are treated
preferentially through appointments for their erstwhile fight in the liberation
struggle. Moreover, these concerns feed the growing lack of public trust in the
SAG.
2. The need for BEE and affirmative action policies to redress the wrongs of
apartheid is acknowledged and accepted. However, many interviewees raise
concerns about the effectiveness and application of BEE and affirmative action
policies of the SAG suggesting that it is sacrificing service delivery. Moreover,
this study finds that ethnicity-based preferential treatment policies undermine
economic and political security, and foster structural violence in post-apartheid
SA.
3. The loss of specialist expertise in the police service, such as forensics and
intelligence-gathering has obligated the SAPS to insource PSCs to fill those
security system deficits.
4. The use of PSCs to fulfill basic security functions, such as guarding duties and the
conveyance of prisoners, are justifiable and encouraged. However, with the
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present security system deficits, indications are that the SAPS ought to encourage
much stronger collaboration with the private security industry. The PSIRA‘s
management of the private security industry needs to be reviewed and changes
implemented based on the findings of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for
Police during recent testimony heard from the PSIRA‘s top management.
Exorbitant salaries, improper vetting of private security officers, lack of sufficient
funding to carry out inspection duties, lack of sufficient inspectors to cover all of
SA need to be addressed, and active participation of the national intelligence
agency are highly recommended measures to be taken. This is essential so that
mutual trust between the industry and the SAG can be fostered and strengthened.
Moreover, outsourcing of basic security system functions to PSCs is
indispensable to maintain an efficient security system in SA. Outsourcing to the
private security industry with proper oversight mechanisms can repair the
credibility, legitimacy, and efficiency of the SAG and therefore it can in fact
enhance state stability.
5. Concern has been expressed about increasing governmental ineffectiveness in
maintaining security because of the prevalence of corruption among officials at
all levels of government, especially in the SAPS. Consequently, the erosion of
good governance is being observed.
6. A holistic approach, including community policing, partnership policing, and
sector policing in the SAG‘s efforts to reduce the high levels of crime is
advocated as a solution to this serious governmental problem. Clearly, the SAPS
cannot solve this problem alone.
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7. Although some of the interviewees referenced the rise in ethnic tensions, there is
not sufficient evidence that this has indeed become a manifest problem in SA.
President Zuma has appointed mainly Zulus to important security system
positions; however, this alone does not contribute to rising ethnic tensions.
Perhaps it is only a perception at this point in time, but nonetheless noteworthy to
monitor.
8. This study indicates that the existence of a large private security industry may
contribute to the legitimacy of the SAG by helping to stave off a sharper rise in
the levels of crime.
9. Using this study‘s theoretical and conceptual framework has shown that:
a. Before desperately needed economic growth and job creation can become
possible, the population must first be safeguarded against direct and structural
violence.
b. One of the main sources of threat to South Africans‘ security comes from the
state in the form of endemic corruption and sub-par leadership, especially in the
security system.
c. SA‘s lack of capacity to pre-empt threats of direct and structural violence to
the life expectancy of its citizens as seen in the high homicide rate, is a
reflection of the weakness of the state. SA‘s homicide rate is three times more
than the global average of 6.9 murders per 100,000 (ISS, 2012).
d. Structural violence in SA, which has caused unequal access to socioeconomic opportunities, could lead to deep-rooted conflict as seen by the
increasing service delivery protests, which are becoming more violent.
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Moreover, it is not the existence of these inequalities, but the collective feeling
of unfairness based on the perception of unfair distribution of socio-economic
opportunities and benefits that also drive these protests.
e. Should SA experience increasing (violent) service delivery strikes, because
the government fails to respond to its citizens‘ basic needs adequately, SA is in
danger of losing its legitimacy and implies an erosion of the security system.
This in turn is indicative of a good governance deficit.
f. The level of corruption, sub-par leadership, unresponsiveness, and ineffective
service rendered by the SAPS is indicative of a security system deficit.
g. Under the present social and security conditions in SA, insourcing, PSCs
may help the SAG regain credibility, legitimacy, efficiency, and enhance
stability (see Recommendations 6-8 below). Ultimately, good governance is
a pre-requisite for outsourcing because there is no outsourced solution to good
government (see Recommendation 6 below).

The Nexus between Policing, Human Security, and Good Governance
Despite many indicators pointing to enhanced democracy and stability in SA, the
security situation in a number of specific areas has deteriorated and the government to
date has not responded effectively to these trends. One of the concerns is the high level of
violent crime, which is on the rise again notwithstanding the increase in the police budget
and its human resources.
SA hosted the Soccer World Cup in 2010 and despite many warnings that SA is a
dangerous place that would threaten the safety of the soccer fans, increased safety
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measures during the event made the 2010 Soccer World Cup a huge success with
accolades coming in from all over the world, including soccer‘s leading world body
FIFA. It must be stated however that PSCs played an indispensable and many times a
leading and crucial role in providing security during the World Cup. In fact, the
management of this worldwide event was in many cases done by the private security
industry without seeking publicity for their role. Unfortunately, after the Soccer World
Cup, violent crime rates are increasing again.
Since the end of the World Cup, the security situation has deteriorated further
over the past three years and the government does not seem to be responding effectively.
In its efforts to combat the high levels of crime, the SAG has focused primarily on crime
fighting efforts by the SAPS instead of using a more holistic approach by factoring in
personal, community, political, and economic security, and management and governance,
as well as the outsourcing of security functions to the private security industry. Even
though crime levels may increase or decrease over time, the disconcerting fact is that they
remain at levels which make SA one of the most violent countries in the world. Despite
the fact that the SAPS has increased its headcount to around 200,000 and that the
Department of Police Service has one of the larger national budgets, the SAG has not yet
been able to reduce the overall levels of crime successfully. This begs the question, are
there factors other than increasing the police headcount and budget that need to be taken
into consideration in the country‘s efforts to reduce crime?
Results of this study show that community security decreases as trust in the police
deteriorates and that ethnic tensions may negatively affect community security.
Community security as a component of human security focuses on protecting people
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from their loss of traditional practices and group memberships. A number of interviewees
point to a concern they have with the appointment of predominantly Zulu South Africans
to senior positions in government, especially within the security system. In fact, former
president Thabo Mbeki has recently expressed himself very clearly against the resurgence
of ethnic tension in the SA governmental process. Mbeki said: "When a minister comes
from a certain region, so will the officials in that department" (Mail & Guardian, 2014).
He called it a "homeboy" occurrence and went on to state that part of the ANC‘s task was
to ―bury the demon of tribalism. But in South Africa, 102 years later, tribalism is raising
its head again" (Mail & Guardian, 2014). Mbeki stated that this is one of the challenges
that needed to be addressed. As a result, some interviewees feel that the SAG policies of
affirmative action and BEE do not foster and respect the dignity of all South African
population groups and therefore should be abolished.
This study‘s results show many cases of police corruption and complicity in some
of the most heinous crimes committed in SA. Interviewees have expressed deep concern
for the lack of public trust in the SAPS because of the misconduct, poor training,
corruption, sub-par leadership, and the concomitant high levels of crime. Interviewees
point to the SAPS leadership where misconduct and criminal behavior set a bad example
for the rank and file to follow. This study has recognized the prevalence of the abuse of
power, high levels of corruption, and sub-par leadership within the security system,
especially the SAPS. These factors negatively affect security system effectiveness.
What has become known as the ―massacre of Marikana‖ and the inability of the
police commissioner to explain the SAPS brutal behavior is a most telling recent example
of sub-par leadership. Heinous crimes such as rape committed by police officers in
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uniform cannot contribute to restoring public trust in the SAPS. Moreover, ethnic
preference for senior government positions in the security system do not allay concerns
for perceived or real ethnic tension, exacerbated by the overall negative impact of the
flawed application of affirmative action and BEE policies.
Results of this study and the unique SA history show that any preference for one
ethnic group over others, while equal access to security is not available to all of the
population, may considerably weaken political legitimacy and as a consequence,
governability and stability. No South African would like to return to the era of apartheid.
BEE and affirmative action policies may further contribute to ethnic tensions, especially
when, as some of the interviewees pointed out, positions in government are kept vacant
because a suitably qualified black candidate cannot be found, although there may be
qualified candidates from other population groups. Of course, even the perception of
racial preference may contribute to a rise in ethnic tensions. The challenge with this is the
sacrifice of service delivery
A corrupt criminal justice system is a source of threat to people‘s security and an
indicator that a state is not keeping its side of the social contract promoting human
security. The promotion of human security is about the state‘s capacity to negate threats
to the welfare and quality of life of its citizens so that they can pursue their lives in peace.
Results of this study affirm that with growing corruption, political security decreases.
Current SAG efforts to protect human rights across all population groups and to ensure
their security seem to return sub-optimal results. Security system effectiveness decreases
as the level of corruption increases. Having the two most recent former police
commissioners found guilty of corruption and maladministration, and a police service
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with an unusually high number of officers complicit in corrupt activities, has negatively
influenced the morale and effectiveness of the police service in general. It is alarming
that effective judicial action against crime in the police service is not handled
expeditiously and effectively, rather than having them dealt with by way of internal
departmental investigations.
Further results of this study show that direct or inadvertent application of BEE
and affirmative action policies, cause sections of the population to have unequal access to
socio-economic opportunities and therefore economic security decreases. Given SA‘s
history of apartheid, government will have to be especially sensitive to any perceptions of
racial discrimination. Based on widespread consent among respondents in this study, it
seems that the current SAG ought to be especially mindful to alleviate any impression of
preferential treatment. Results of this study show that perceived policies of favoring one
ethnic group over others for senior government positions, in especially the security
system, decreases economic security as the citizens have unequal access to power sharing
through government policies, including BEE and affirmative action. Unequal access to
power sharing is measured in terms of government policies with a focus on racial
demographics. These policies have led to people being appointed into ―positions they are
not qualified and properly trained for‖ (Van Zyl, personal communication, April 8, 2013).

The Private Security Industry
Outsourcing of basic security system functions to PSCs is indispensable to
maintaining an efficient security system in SA. This study shows that under the current
circumstances in SA as addressed in the previous chapters, outsourcing plays a vital role
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in maintaining some level of stability in SA. In fact, the SAG insources some of the core
security system functions. This is certainly a tacit acknowledgement that the SAG is in
need of the services provided by the private security industry. Until such time that the
SAG can provide effective security to all its population, it will have to harness the
services that PSCs have to offer.
This study suggests that there is a probable relationship between state fragility and
the increase in size of the private security industry. The apparent lack of success by the
SAPS to contain crime and the low public trust in the police has contributed to the growth
of the private security industry to become the largest in the world. The results in this
study indicate that simply increasing the number of PSCs is no guarantee for a more
stable state. Although the SAG has outsourced some security functions to the private
security industry, the results show that in some cases the SAG has had to insource as
opposed to outsource these services simply because a gap in the security system has
developed which needs to be filled. It is therefore alarming that those very basic security
services which any government bureaucracy should be able to provide, has to be
insourced, such as intelligence, forensics, event security, and protection of all the citizens
against crime effectively. The services that the private security industry does provide are
needed because the SAG does not have that expertise or capacity available. It therefore
has to insource these services out of necessity as opposed to outsourcing these services
for economic considerations. For instance, interview data show that the intelligence
service does not provide all voice communications-monitoring functions and has
outsourced that to the private sector; therefore, the reasons for outsourcing are not purely
economic. Although the security system deficit is temporarily filled, it remains latent as it
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becomes manifest the moment the private security industry decides to no longer offer
their services for whatever reason(s). Government has a responsibility to protect its
citizens and provide sufficient security to them, and when they no longer can offer these
services, a GGD becomes manifest.

Good Governance
Further results of this study show that security system effectiveness suffers from
corruption and the abuse of power, and decreases as political effectiveness decreases.
Interviewees confirm media reports that corruption is endemic in SA. As long as leaders
function sub-optimally, the call for clean and effective government will be hollow.
Results show that the effectiveness of SA‘s security system suffers from a lack of
political effectiveness as demonstrated by the widespread corruption and abuse of power
in the security system and a noticeable lack of leadership, both politically and
bureaucratically, that present a severe strain on security system effectiveness. According
to some of my interviewees, fear because of police brutality, and mistrust because of
police officers‘ participation in crime, fraud and corruption, is on the increase. Concern
was expressed about the SAPS institutional ailments such as insufficient training, low
morale, loss of specialist expertise, corruption, and abuse of power.
Lack of trust by the SAG in the perceived motives of the private security industry,
the employment of former apartheid-era police and military personnel in the industry,
foreign ownership of some PSCs, poor collaboration between the SAPS and the private
security industry, and the lack of proper oversight of the industry by an alleged
underfunded, understaffed, and mismanaged PSIRA are contributory factors and
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evidence of not having a holistic view to substantially reducing the levels of crime in the
country. As evidence that the SAPS does not have a holistic view of including the
community in its fight against crime, very little mention is made in the literature or
interviews of concepts such as ―community policing,‖ ―partnership policing,‖ or ―sector
policing‖ as contained in the Strategic Plan of the South African Police Service 20102014 (Burger, 2011). The SAPS should focus on community outreach programs where
public trust and confidence can be restored and strengthened, whereby community
policing can become more effective. The police should meet with community leaders and
the community-at-large on a regular basis, so that the community can be assured that
their security concerns are receiving priority attention. Police have to be seen patrolling
the community. Visibility is important in establishing public trust and confidence again.
The public is a vital partner in the fight against crime, in the sense that they can be an
invaluable source of information. However, for community policing and partnership
policing to be effective, there has to be political will from the SAG and the SAPS to
implement such an outreach program. Sector policing is an effective crime fighting
strategy as police officers are dedicated to patrol specific sectors thereby increasing their
visibility in the community and underscoring their community outreach efforts.
Affirmative action and BEE policies have shown to challenge socio-economic
opportunities for those population groups other than black South Africans. Results of this
study show that service delivery in the interests of vigorously applying these policies is
not well served. Positions in government and promotions of qualified candidates are not
filled when these candidates do not satisfy the national demographics of the country. In
fact, some of the interviewees have indicated that more and more people from within the
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black community say that these very policies place the people they were constructed to
help at a disadvantage because they are singled out for job creation, which may feed
perceived or real ethnic and racial tension. These policies stereotype the very people they
are designed to help. Under-qualified people are appointed to positions only to have
competent juniors perform their work for them. This process may harm reconciliation in a
country where apartheid caused very deep wounds. Under apartheid, qualified blacks
were rarely considered for government and private sector jobs simply because of the
racist legislation, which favored the minority whites. Such discrimination fueled in
essence the liberation struggle in SA. Likewise today, BEE and affirmative action
policies favor the blacks over qualified coloreds, Indians and whites for government and
private sector jobs. In both scenarios, the application of ethnicity based preferential
treatment policies at the expense of quality service do not foster healthy racial relations.
After apartheid, reconciliation between the various racial groups do not foster in the
interest of nation-building. Results from this study seem to affirm the overall assessment
that good governance decreases through current application of affirmative action and
BEE policies.
Having crime syndicates function with the tacit approval or disregard of the
SAPS and where some officers were found to be complicit in their activities, results show
that security system effectiveness decreases as the legitimacy of the government
decreases. As examples, crime syndicates are found in the pervasive business of car
guards, prostitution, abalone smuggling, and foreign exchange. When these criminal
activities take place with police complicity, these trends, whether perceived or real,
undermine the legitimacy of the government. A further contributory factor to waning
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legitimacy is the public disillusionment and decreasing trust in the SAG. The public
disillusionment manifests in the approximately 3,000 service delivery strikes monthly as
well as the decreasing trust in the effectiveness of the SAPS, which may explain the
rising tensions between the service delivery protestors and the SAPS, and the increasing
growth in the private security industry.
Some interviewees felt that the SAG should show support for all nine provinces
equally in the interests of citizens who may choose to live where they desire. However,
lack of effective and efficient police services in containing the recent (2012) farm labor
strikes in the Western Cape Province affirm the overall assessment that security system
effectiveness decreases as political security decreases.
The apparent failure of affirmative action and BEE to assist more than a small
extremely wealthy black elite is sparking criticism. Consequently, the majority black
South Africans, the intended beneficiaries, have hardly gained a better standard of living
over the past 20 years since the country changed from an autocracy to a democracy.
According to Moeletsi Mbeki,117 BEE has created a small class of unproductive but
wealthy black capitalists. He opines that this policy has undermined the rise of black
entrepreneurship. Failure to protect human security, which includes economic security,
leads to the fading of trust in government, which in turn leads to undermining its
legitimacy that leads to good governance deficit, ending up with latent state fragility and
the destabilization of SA. Both statistics and information gathered through interviews
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A very prominent political and economic commentator, and prolific writer, he is also the deputy
chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs, which is an independent think-tank based
at the University of the Witwatersrand.
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affirm the overall assessment that security system effectiveness is directly correlated with
political effectiveness and good governance.
This study expected to find that the increase in PSCs would have had a
meaningful reduction in the high levels of crime. A preliminary conclusion from the
results of this study is that simply increasing the number of PSCs does not lead to lower
levels of crime. At most, the growth in the number of PSCs may have impeded the further
increase in the levels of crime. However, violent crime is on the increase again. As
argued in this study, the provision of security is a key element of legitimacy. This study
modifies existing knowledge about state fragility by showing that the components of
human security have to be taken into consideration to measure the potential or root causes
of fragility when determining the level of state fragility. The South African case study
offers new insights into a theory of latent state fragility, which holds that within the
context of governmental capacity, traditional indicators of state fragility show a country
to have moderate to low fragility, while the country experiences high violent crime, huge
social disparities, endemic corruption, high unemployment and poverty rates, and poor
service delivery, especially with regards to the provision of security to its population.
These non-traditional indicators have to be taken into consideration when determining the
level of state fragility.
It is recommended that further study be conducted to establish the correlation
between government policies that favor one population group over another, and the
impact that may have on good governance, legitimate governance, and ultimately on state
fragility. It is within this context that the rise in ethnic tensions should also be determined
to establish its impact on state fragility. Furthermore, the role of good quality education
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should be researched to determine the impact this may have on the quality of life of the
population and its role in the reduction of high crime levels, and ultimately its effect on
state fragility. This study‘s model of latent state fragility should be applied in another
country context to test the concept of latent state fragility.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICY, MANAGEMENT, AND GOVERNANCE
Enhanced collaboration between SAG and Private Security Industry
There must be greater collaboration and oversight between the SAG and the
private security industry because SA cannot maintain and sustain security without the
active support of the private security industry.118
1.

The SAG cannot allow the private security industry to liaise directly with the
Minister of Police or even the Presidency. It should, however allow the
private security industry to brief the Minister or the Presidency when
required to do so.

2.

It is clear that effective crime prevention training and skills development
must take place in the SAPS. No effective policing can occur without all
officers having basic educational skills such as a driver‘s license, gun license,
and writing skills.

3.

Senior police officers should be much more developed through leadership
training not only inside SA, but also at institutions of learning in other
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It is estimated that worldwide, the commercial private security market is now valued at $165 billion and
its estimated growth is to continue at an annual rate of 8% for the foreseeable future (Securitas, 2007).
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countries. The SAPS should consider establishing a top leadership and
training academy.
4.

The SAPS should consider using international experts to work alongside
police officers to develop mutual skills, capacity, and understanding in their
field of work.

5.

The vetting of the private security industry should be done by an intelligence
capacity such as the State Security Agency (SSA). The SSA does not have a
profit motive as does the PSIRA and therefore should vet private security
officers and companies in the best interests of national security. The Agency
also has the expertise and capability to do a much more thorough job of
vetting than the PSIRA. Proper vetting ought to allay fears that the private
security industry may be undermining the authority of the SAPS. Moreover,
such vetting should also weed out the ―bad apples‖ in the industry that
transfer from one PSC to the next as they get fired for misconduct.
Furthermore, such vetting ought to allay fears of foreign owned PSCs and
their motives for working in SA. In exceptional circumstances, this vetting
capacity should have unhindered access to the Public Protector to give
support to the South African Constitution‘s checks and balances against
political interference and corruption.

6.

The private security industry and the SAPS collaboration should take place
under the auspices of a national body consisting of SAPS and PSC
representatives. This body should have legal standing and report to the
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Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Police where all parties will be held
accountable (see Finding g. above).
7.

The SAG and the private security industry should form a mutual analytical
platform in which crime intelligence should be analyzed and where a weekly
intelligence report should be prepared.

8.

Fire-arm training and the upkeep of license validity should be outsourced to
the private security industry to support the use of police human resources for
core security functions.

Crime Statistics Reporting
The SAG should encourage up-to-date and accurate reporting of crime statistics
and should remove financial incentives for SAPS station commanders to reduce crime in
their area of jurisdiction. This study shows that incentivizing station commanders to
lower the crime statistics leads to fudging the statistics.
9.

Crime statistics are so important politically and psychologically that before
finalizing them, a third-party neutral body such as a think-tank like the SSI or
the SAIRR should moderate it.

10. Crime statistics alone can never be the only indicator/barometer of the crime
situation in a country. At most, it is an empirical statistical indication of the
prevailing security situation. It needs strategic, political, and socio-economic
analysis to form the basis of sound decision-making on security matters.
11. The SAG should reinstate an independent politically neutral police
inspectorate who will visit all police stations and give an independent
239

assessment on crime and crime statistics to the leadership of the police. In the
case of a long, drawn-out challenge at a specific police station, engaging
international police expertise to serve on this independent body should be
considered.

Relations between the SAG and the Community
This study finds that the most disturbing issue straining the relations between
the SAG and communities is the harsh way in which the SAPS has acted during service
delivery protests. The relations between the community and the SAPS are characterized
as being antagonistic. These conditions are brought about by unemployment,
underemployment, and the lack of education and training, and the protestors hold the
SAG responsible for those conditions, according to most of my interviewees.
12.

Public trust in the SAPS is low. It is proposed that the SAG subject every
police officer to intercultural dynamics training and education, and that
policies be formulated to rebuild public trust and place the relationship
between the public and its security servants on a healthy footing. Such
training for police officers should include efforts to make them familiar with
intercultural dynamics in conflict management. As part of their continuing
education, police officers should be familiar with the current debates and
questions in the field of intercultural communication and conflict resolution.
Strong leadership in the SAPS, its flawed recruitment procedures, the
current lack of specialized and ongoing training, sub-optimal working
conditions, and low salaries require urgent attention and improvement. In
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addition, reviving the community policing approach might help the SAPS
become more effective in its fight against crime and to restore public trust.
13.

The SAPS should remain a service and not become a force as suggested by
President Zuma. By becoming a force, the relationship with the South
African community cannot be restored. It is suggested that the SAG use a
more holistic approach to solving the socio-economic problems, which
cannot be mitigated by morphing the SAPS into becoming a police force. A
holistic approach should be more than enforcing affirmative action and BEE
in the workplace. Focus should be placed upon giving all South Africans
equal access to the economy, stimulating the economy to create more job
opportunities, and governing SA in a manner that would attract foreign
investment. A few interviewees suggested that the SAPS should become a
force to instill a sense of discipline and command-and-control, which the
SAPS are currently lacking. SA appears to have the police resources, but
there is room to improve upon its management and leadership.

14.

The perceived or real corruption, which has become endemic in SA, has to
receive immediate attention. The ANC government has to show resolve and
commitment to root out corruption from within its ranks to set the tone for
the country that corruption cannot be tolerated. This social ill is a major
contributory factor to the public‘s low trust in the SAPS and why foreign
investors are seeking to invest their money elsewhere. According to the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), foreign
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direct investment flows into SA decreased by 24% between 2011 and 2012
(UNCTAD, 2013).
15.

Consideration should be given to a hiring program where affirmative action
and BEE positions are filled by other population groups when suitably
qualified black candidates cannot be identified. Moreover, the demographic
proportionality of each province should be taken into consideration when
applying ethnicity based preferential treatment policies. The proportional
demographics of the province should supersede the national demographics
thereby easing the prevalent racial tensions because of the current flawed
application of these policies.

The Social Divide between the Haves and the Have Nots
This study finds that no sustainable solution to the security situation will be
possible without dramatically decreasing the gap between the haves and the have nots.
This is a governmental responsibility and does not fall within the ambit of the SAPS to
resolve. As long as socio-economic differences exist the SAPS will be challenged to
reduce the high rates of crime.
16.

The ANC government should refrain from making promises to the have
nots, such as increased housing in metropolitan areas and more jobs,
thereby creating expectations which they cannot meet and which ultimately
contributes to latent security system challenges.

17.

It is proposed that the SAG embark on a massive basic artisan skills
training and job creation campaign for the unemployed and under242

employed to minimize the gap in this new social divide. The unemployed
should be given the opportunity to gain a qualification to be equipped for
the job market. The SAG should develop cost-free skills-based training
programs, or at least interest-free loans for them to undergo such training.
Additionally, the SAG should partner with the private sector by relaxing
restrictive policies and regulations that stifle entrepreneurship and
encourage companies to grow their business. The private sector should be
incentivized to take risks and should be offered favorable bank rates to help
grow their businesses to be able to create job opportunities to reduce the
current 25% unemployment rate significantly.
18.

It is proposed that the SAG give top priority to implement a job growth
strategy to help mitigate the service delivery protests, which should help to
restore public confidence in the government and its security system, and
help restore foreign investor confidence.119 The SAG should strongly
consider abolishing its BEE and affirmative action policies to enable all
qualified people to participate in the economy to help it grow in order to
provide much needed job opportunities for the unemployed and underemployed. Moreover, the SAG should consider legislation favorable to

119

As indicated in the previous chapters, for every shack that was erected since 1994, 12 formal houses
were built. The ANC government connected as many households to the electrical grid as it inherited in
1994, approximately 7 million homes. Social welfare reaches 14-15 million people and has become the
biggest source of income for one third of all households. During this time there has been a zero net growth
in jobs.
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business that would reduce company taxes that would incentivize
companies to help create job opportunities for all South Africans.

The Management of the Criminal Justice System
This study finds that the coordination and management of the criminal justice
system (police, justice, and correctional services) in SA must immediately be addressed
at the managerial level. If murder is a benchmark, then SA is 50% safer than it was 15
years ago. However, violent crime is on the rise. With the very high general crime rate in
the country, SA cannot have a conventional criminal justice system to cope with these
high levels. Management should look into creating alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms to relieve the judicial system from its heavy case load and thereby alleviate
the backlog in cases.
19.

It is proposed that a court system where the accused can be charged,
prosecuted, sentenced, and imprisoned (if that is part of the sentence), be
made available throughout the country by having mobile courts of justice
as was the case during the Soccer World Cup that was hosted in SA in 2010
(see also Recommendation 21).

20.

The criminal justice system should develop a permanent task team
responsible for overseeing the day-to-day management of the judicial
process. This task team should be allowed to interact at Ministerial levels
as needed.

21.

The SAG may consider introducing Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
programs to help address the backlog in minor criminal cases to ease the
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burden on the court system thereby enabling them to focus on the more
serious criminal cases (see also Recommendation 19).

Affirmative Action and BEE
The results of this research indicate that ethnicity based preferential treatment
policies should gradually be phased out in SA.
22.

Although ethnicity based preferential treatment policies were necessary to
provide a much needed correction to the discriminatory policies of the
apartheid government, the findings of this study suggest that affirmative
action legislation should be repealed. BEE policies should not be based on
the stringent application of racial quotas alone without considering the
qualifications of those that stand to benefit from BEE. Therefore, training
and education efforts should be made by the SAG to adequately equip
formerly disadvantaged, non-white South Africans as proposed above (see
Recommendation 12).

23.

In order to strengthen public trust and good governance, it becomes
imperative that the SAG make every effort to address the broad based
political concerns inclusively and comprehensively. For as long as
perceptions prevail that the government at any level treats one or more
population groups preferentially, government policies are not truly
representative of the democratic constituency and public trust cannot be
restored successfully.
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CONCLUSION
It is the combination of colonization, apartheid, the liberation struggle, transition
from autocracy to democracy, high levels of direct and structural violence, and the SFI
that ranks SA as a stable state, that makes the country very unique. It is how these
aforementioned factors intersect with one another that make SA a latently fragile state as
measured by the security system and determined by this research study.
As SA‘s security system deficit is largely filled by the large private security
industry, and the fact that personal, community, economic and political security are still
at risk, latent fragility is present. This latency manifests as fragility when the private
security industry decides to withdraw its services for financial or other reasons and the
deficit is exposed. Only a holistic approach to address the unique challenges will help
substantially decrease the high levels of crime, especially violent crime. Moreover, as
long as the unemployment and poverty levels remain high, the country will find it
difficult to reverse its slide into fragility and even failed statehood.
SA‘s paradox is indeed the fact that it is in a state of latent fragility while being
classified as having low fragility by the SFI. The country‘s leaders will have to set the
tone for clean government, sound fiscal discipline, accountability, and respect for the rule
of law. The country needs an effective security system so that economic development can
take place to grow the economy to the level where unemployment will drop to single
digit levels. Under the present circumstances that exist in SA, outsourcing and insourcing
of security system functions should be regarded as a necessity for the immediate future
and an integral part of the security system. Moreover, it will be difficult to honor the
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country‘s constitution if the laws of the land are not respected and applied to everyone,
without exception, and without fear or favor.
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MP (IFP) Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee for Police

Male

Black

MP (COPE) Deputy Party Leader

Male

Black

Hlubi Radebe

Advocate - Government Advisor

Male

Black

Leonard Ramatlakane

MP (COPE)

Male

Black

Moe Shaik

Former Head of Intelligence (ANC)
Senior Security Manager, Waterfront,
Cape Town

Male

Indian

Male

White

Mining Company(PSC)
Thirty-year veteran law enforcement
specialist
MP (ANC) Chairperson of
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee
for Police

Male

White

Male

White

Female

White

Male

White

Male

White

Deon Sloane
Glen Strydom
Frans Van Niekerk
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Anonymous ―1‖: Senior government advisor.
Anonymous ―2‖: Influential business owner in the Western Cape.
Anonymous ―3‖: Former senior security official, presently managing director of a private
security company.
Anonymous ―4‖: Quasi-government body senior representative.
Anonymous ―5‖: Quasi-government body senior representative.
Anonymous ―6‖: University of Cape Town.
Barlow, Eeben: Served in the pre-1994 SA Defense Force in the conventional,
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Barnard, Lukas Daniël: Director-General (DG) and Head of National Intelligence (19801992); DG of the Department of Constitutional Development (1992-1996); DG of
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throughout the African Continent) (2002-2012).
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Botha, Chris: Forty-year veteran in the SAPS having served under the ANC government,
and former head of research and curriculum development for the SAPS,
presently professional associate of the Public Leadership Forum, School of
Public Leadership, University of Stellenbosch.
Botha, R.F. (Pik): Minister of Foreign Affairs (1977-1994); Minister of Mineral and
Energy Affairs (1994-1996).
Breytenbach, Willie: Professor of Political Science at Stellenbosch University.
Burger, Johan: Thirty-six-year veteran with the South African Police Service (SAPS) and
former Assistant Commissioner (Major General), former lecturer at Tshwane
University of Technology, presently Senior Researcher at the Institute of
Security Studies (ISS) in the Governance, Crime and Justice Division.
Cronje, Frans: Chief Executive of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR).
Fivaz, George: First National Police Commissioner of a democratic South Africa,
appointed by President Nelson Mandela.
George, Mluleki: Former ANC underground operative in security structures and military,
former political prisoner from mid seventies until 1982 on Robben Island detained more than 30 times, former ANC Deputy Minister of Defense, former
Chairperson of the portfolio committee of Safety and Security, presently
Member of Parliament for COPE and member of the police portfolio
committee.
Greyling, Chris: Former Special Forces operative, presently President of the Pan-African
Security Association.
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Groenewald, Pieter: Former Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Defense, former
member of the Interim National Defense Force Service Commission, and
presently Member of Parliament for the Freedom Front Plus, and also Director of
the South African Counter Intelligence Agency - a private security company.
Heinecken, Lindy: Formerly a researcher and deputy director of the Centre for Military
Studies (CEMIS) at the South African Military Academy and now Associate
Professor of Sociology at Stellenbosch University.
Hermann, Dirk: Chief executive officer of the Solidarity Movement that includes the
trade union Solidarity, and AfriForum, a civil rights movement and one of the
biggest civil rights organizations in SA.
Hitchcock, John: Executive Director of a Private Security Company.
Joubert, Jan-Jan: Political editor of the Beeld newspaper,120 reporting on Parliament since
2001, in particular the Intelligence (State Security) Portfolio.
Kohler-Barnard, Diane: Shadow Minister of Police, member of the official opposition
Democratic Alliance party, and member of the Portfolio Committee on Police.
Koornhof, Gerhard. ANC Member of Parliament, Parliamentary Committee member on
International Relations and Co-operation and formerly a Parliamentary Member
of the security cluster.
Kühn, Mike: Former long-serving senior National Intelligence officer and presently
director of a competitive intelligence company.

120

Beeld is the largest Afrikaans language daily newspaper in South Africa.
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Lambrechts, Derica: Lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the University of
Stellenbosch.
Lekota, Mosiuoa Gerard Patrick: President and Leader of the Congress of the People –
the third largest political party in SA, former ANC Premier of the Free State
Province, former Minister of Defense under the ANC government for almost ten
years, former chairman of the ANC, and former ANC activist during the
apartheid government having served time in Robben Island prison.
Leysens, Anthony: Chair of the Political Science Department and Associate Professor of
Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch.
Mdwaba, Mathunzi: Prominent South African businessman.
Meyer, Roelf: Deputy Minister of Law and Order (1986 – 1988); Deputy Minister of
Constitutional Development (1988-1991); Minister of Defense (1991); Minister of
Constitutional Affairs, Communication and Provincial Affairs (1992-1996); Chief
Negotiator for the National Party Government for a democratic SA.
Ndlovu, Velaphi Bethuel: Member of Parliament for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and
member of the Portfolio Committee on Police.
Ngonyama, Lulama Smuts: Former ANC underground operative and Umkhonto we
Sizwe121 (Spear of the Nation) military operative, former national spokesperson
and head of communication of the ANC, former head of the office of President
Mbeki, deputy head of policy for the ANC, member of the Portfolio Committee

121

Armed wing of the ANC formed in 1961 under leadership of Nelson Mandela.
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on Economic Development, member of the Portfolio Committee on International
Relations, and presently Member of Parliament, spokesperson, public secretary,
and deputy leader of the Congress of the People (COPE).
Radebe, Hlubi: Former ANC underground operative in the Intelligence Sector;
participant in the negotiations talks; involved in the restructuring of SA‘s
Intelligence Service; presently a businessman.
Ramatlakane, Leonard: Former ANC Minister of Community Safety of the Western Cape
Government (2001 – 2008), presently Member of Parliament for the Congress of
the People (COPE).
Shaik, Moe: Former ANC underground intelligence operative, former Deputy
Intelligence Coordinator and Head of Ministerial Services, former ConsulGeneral to Hamburg, former Ambassador to Algeria, former Head of Policy
Research at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, former
Head of the South African Secret Services until 2011, presently CEO of the
Development Bank International.
Sloane, Deon: former SAPS protection security services manager, presently security
manager at popular tourist venue in the Western Cape.
Strydom, Glen: Former Special Forces operative and currently a security specialist for
Europe, Middle East and Africa working for a mining company as a
regional security manager.
Van der Spuy, Elrena: Associate Professor in the Department of Public Law, member of
the Centre of Criminology, and Deputy Dean of Post-Graduate Studies in the
Faculty of Law at the University of Cape Town.
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Van Niekerk, Frans: Thirty-year veteran law enforcement specialist within the transnational organized crime environment.
Van Zyl, Deon Hurter: Judge of the High Court of SA (1984 – 2007), Inspecting Judge of
Prisons (2008 – 2011), President for Africa of the World Jurist Association
(Washington, D.C.) (1995 - present); member of the Court of Arbitration for
Sport.
Wiley, Mark: Member of the Provincial Legislature; Chairman of Community Safety,
Cultural Affairs and Sport Committee of the Western Cape Parliament.
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APPENDIX C:

Interview Questions

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview regarding my study on the
role of private security as it relates to South Africa. As part of the research procedures at
Kennesaw State University, I have a consent form that needs to be signed.
1. Could you please tell me a little about yourself and your career/experiences in the
security field?
The next few questions will pertain to the overall perceptions regarding the security
situation inside South Africa:
2. Generally speaking, what is a security system deficit/gap as you understand it?
3. Does it occur in SA?
4. How does this pose a threat to stability in SA, if any?
5. Does the problem lie with law enforcement in general?
6. How is the state responding to these challenges?
7. What type of private-public agreements are developing?
8. Is the growth in private security weakening public security?
9. Where does the trust of ordinary citizens lie, with public or private security?
10. Who is relying most on public or private security?
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11. During the Soccer World Cup, SA received accolades from the world soccer
federation (FIFA) and the attendees for providing a safe environment amidst earlier
speculation that the South African Government (SAG) would not be able to keep people
safe. What do you think contributed to this perception?
11(a) Why is it that people speculated beforehand that SA would not be able to contain
crime and violence?
11(b) What did SA do right to ensure a general sense of safety and security?
I will now ask you a few questions about your opinions/perceptions/ideas with the
provision of private security in South Africa:
1. What are your experiences with private security in general?
2. Why do you think the SAG contracts private security companies?
3. Do you deem the growth in PSCs as an indicator of the state becoming more fragile?
4. Are you of the opinion that negative perceptions contribute to the growth in PSCs?
4(a) Why?
5. In your view, what are reasons for the decrease, according to PSRIA, in violent crime
(e.g., murders, attempted murder and aggravated robberies) while petty crime (e.g.,
shoplifting and burglaries) are on the rise?
5(a) Can PS contribute to a decrease in the growing prevalence of petty crime, such as
house beak-ins, car theft, muggings…?
6. What is the number 1 threat to your own personal safety?
7. In your view, are the police or private security companies more effective in providing
protective services?
7 (a) Why?
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7 (b) How?
8. Are there any security services that you think should be outsourced by the SAG to the
private sector?
8(a) Which ones?
8(b) Why?
9. Which security services should not be outsourced to the private sector by the SAG?
9(a) Why not?
10. As you know, private security firms are employed by those who can pay for them.
The vast majority of South Africans, however, cannot afford these services. What do you
think of this reality?
10(a) Is there a new social divide emerging in SA since independence (ethnic, economic,
class)?
11. In which areas do you feel the SAG are meeting the security needs of the South
African society.
11(a) Why?
12. Is there anyone else that you may suggest that I interview regarding my research?
For Interviewees from the Private Security Sector:
4. What in your opinion is the size of the cooperation between the SAG and the PS
sector?
5. What are some benefits for the SAG contracting with private security companies?
6. What are some limitations/shortcomings for the SAG contracting with private security
companies?
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7. Are you aware of any complaints received by the authorities about the prevalence or
behavior of private security companies?
8. If so, what was the nature of these complaints?
For Interviewees from the Judicial Sector:
1. Has there been an increase in the number of criminal cases involving PSCs that are
landing up in court?
2. Has there been an increase in the number of criminal cases involving the South African
Police Services that are landing up in court?
2(a) What are the nature of these cases?
3. What would you say are the main issues related to the private security industry brought
before the court?
4. What are the shortcomings in the laws regulating the PS industry?
5. How could these laws be amended or improved to become more effective in regulating
this industry?
6. How do you view the role of PSCs in SA in the fight against crime?
6(a) Why?
7. What are some benefits for the SAG contracting with private security companies?
8. What are some of the limitations/shortcomings for the SAG contracting with private
security companies?
For Interviewees from the NGOs/Media/Academics:
1. As statistics show a decrease in serious crime in SA, what is the number 1 crime
concern in SA in your opinion?
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2. How do you view the role of the South African Police Services in the country‘s fight
against crime?
2(a) Why?
3. How do you view the role of PSCs in SA in the fight against crime?
3(a) Why?
4. In your experience, are government representatives cooperative with the media on
crime statistics?
5. Is the private security industry cooperative with the media in terms of their
involvement in the fight against crime?
For Interviewees from Parliament:
1. What are the main issues concerning the level of crime in SA that come before
Parliament?
2. In your opinion, does Parliament help to address the debates around the levels of crime
in an effective manner?
3. In your experience, is there a willingness to jointly address crime issues in SA across
the political divide or is the debate a divisive one?
3(a) Why?
4. What legislation, if any, would you propose to more effectively address the levels of
crime and to help reverse these levels?
4(a) Why?
5. How do you view the role of PSCs in SA in the fight against crime?
5(a) Why?
6. What are some benefits for the SAG contracting with private security companies?
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7. What are some limitations/shortcomings for the SAG contracting with private security
companies?
8. Do you have anyone else you can refer me to?
For Interviewees from SAG:
1. Is the level of crime a priority issue for the SAG?
1(a) If yes, what is the SAG doing about this?
1(b) If not, what is the SAG doing about this?
2. In your opinion, would you say that the crime statistics are accurately reported in the
SAG official annual reports on the matter?
2(a) If yes, why?
2(b) If not, why?
3. Do you see the role of the PSCs as being complementary to or incompatible with the
SAPS and the effectiveness of the SAG‘s efforts to combat crime?
3(a) Why?
4. In your opinion, would you say that the SAG is effectively addressing the public
outcry about the effectiveness of its handling of the crime levels in the country?
4(a) Why?
5. How do you view the role of PSCs in SA in the fight against crime? On a scale of 1-5
with 1 very low and 5 high.
6. What are some benefits for the SAG contracting with private security companies?
7. What are some limitations/shortcomings for the SAG contracting with private security
companies?
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APPENDIX D

International Review Board (IRB) Approval

From: zieglerirb@kennesaw.edu
To: emienie1@kennesaw.edu
Cc: zieglerirb@kennesaw.edu
Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2013 3:30:22 PM
Subject: Study 13-347: South Africa‘s Paradox? A Case Study of Latent Fragility
Edward Mienie, Student
Department of International Conflict Management
Kennesaw State University

RE: Your application dated 3/26/2013, Study #13-347: South Africa‘s Paradox? A Case
Study of Latent Fragility
Dear Mr. Mienie:
I have reviewed your application for the new study listed above. This study qualifies as
exempt from continuing review under DHHS (OHRP) Title 45 CFR Part 46.101(b)(2) –
educational tests, surveys, interviews, public observations. The consent procedures
described are in effect. You are free to conduct your study.
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Please note that all proposed revisions to an exempt study require IRB review prior to
implementation to ensure that the study continues to fall within an exempted category of
research. A copy of revised documents with a description of planned changes should be
submitted to irb@kennesaw.edu for review and approval by the IRB.
Thank you for keeping the board informed of your activities. Contact the IRB at
irb@kennesaw.edu or at (678) 797-2268 if you have any questions or require further
information.
Sincerely,
Christine Ziegler, Ph.D.
Institutional Review Board Chair
cc: vfranke@kennesaw.edu
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APPENDIX E:

Photographs of Damages to Farms during Labor Unrest

Source: Anonymous ―2,‖ (2013)
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Source: Anonymous ―2,‖ (2013)
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Source: Anonymous ―2,‖ (2013)
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APPENDIX F:
NVivo Project
Table F.1
NVivo Project
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APPENDIX G:
Intercoder Reliability
Table G.1
Intercoder Reliability Test

300

